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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s (EU’s) external competence has continuously developed to adapt 
to internal and international challenges. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU allows for a more 
comprehensive approach toward international trade and investment issues.1 The New 
Generation Free Trade Agreements (NGFTAs) are developed to pursue the switch in the EU’s 
external trade policy toward its objectives, as an international actor, aiming to achieve 
liberalisation of trade and investment. 
This introductory chapter sets out the structure of the thesis by providing a more detailed 
description of the changes in trade policy that led up, to and define the NGFTAs as EU’s 
external trade instruments (Section I-1). The scope of the agreements is also introduced and 
defined (Section I-2). The subject is thereafter considered through a theoretical foundation in 
order to provide the context through which the thesis is constructed (Section I-3 and Section I-
4). The disposition (Section I-5) stipulates the essential features of the chapters.2 
1 EU External Trade Policy that Generated NGFTAs 
The NGFTAs represent a new advancement that creates opportunities for growth and 
further development, but it may well erode old certainties and raise new fears.3 As history has 
shown, the EU’s external competence has undergone changes, and it is still developing to adapt 
to internal and international challenges. In fact, the formation of the EU’s internal market led 
to a high demand for a common external trade policy beyond trade in goods.4 
The trend, shown in recent years, puts more focus towards liberalisation of international 
economic regulations, as expressed by the formation of WTO, and demands further 
globalisation for the EU’s trade policy that covers other fields of economic activities.5 The trend 
towards liberalisation demands a higher responsibility on the trade policy since it now covers 
                                                   
1 From an institutional perspective, the Lisbon Treaty also strengthened the role of the European Parliament in relation to 
trade related matters. The institutional perspectives will be further discussed in Chapter II. 
2 EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018) [2018] N.Y.P. 
3 European Commission External Trade ‘Global Europe Competing in the World’ 2006 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf> accessed 4 November 2015, p. 3. 
4 Angelos Dimopoulos, 'The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism between Internal and 
External Economic Relations' (2008) 4 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy 101, p. 102. 
5 Ibid., p. 102. 
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other fields of economic activities.6 The EU’s external competence is still developing, in order 
to adapt to internal and international challenges.7 
After the Lisbon Treaty, the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence widened into new 
areas, where areas previously considered within shared competence were included in the 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The CCP now covers the ‘(...) conclusion of tariff and 
trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services and the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property and foreign direct investment.’8 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was, 
however not clearly defined within the CCP, which has led to many discussions.9 
1.1 NGFTA as an Abbreviation 
The policy changes generated the ‘New Generation’ of FTAs, which are also known as 
the ‘FTA-plus’, ‘New Wave’, or ‘Mega Regional’ trade agreements. The former classifications 
are merely made from either political or through economic analysis. The NGFTAs are used as 
a terminology, based on the FTA-plus classification through a legal analysis of the content 
providing a more precise legal definition. 
These bilateral international agreements pave the way for a much larger international 
legal regime, which requires further integration, where the EU, as an actor in international law, 
needs to better accommodate the interaction between the different regimes.10 This is because 
they go beyond the simple elimination of import tariffs and other trade barriers by also 
addressing non-trade related measures. Using an all-encompassing abbreviation like ‘NGFTA’ 
clearly marks the importance of the policy change, leading to such wide scope in the new FTAs. 
1.2 Agreements Considered under the New EU’s Trade Policy 
International trade has been characterized by globalization and liberalisation during the 
past decades. Currently, the EU has around thirty FTAs in force,11 or under ratification and on-
                                                   
6 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Global Europe - Competing in the world - A 
contribution to the EU's Growth and Jobs Strategy, (Communication Global Europe - Competing in the world)’ COM (2006) 
567 final, p. 18. 
7 Dimopoulos, ‘The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism between Internal and External 
Economic Relations’ (n 4), p. 102. 
8 Article 207(1) TFEU. 
9 Wenhua Shan and Sheng Zhang, 'The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way Toward a Common Investment Policy' (2010) 21 
European Journal of International Law 1049, p. 1058, The concept of the FDI will be more clearly defined in the discussions 
in chapter III. 
10 European Commision ‘Trade for All - Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy’ 2014 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf> accessed 17 May 2018, p. 29. 
11 European Commission ‘Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations’ 2017 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf> accessed 27 March 2017. 
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going negotiations.12 International and regional trade is increasingly becoming a more focused 
field. 
The EU has been involved in different kinds of commercially driven FTAs. The general 
rule can be that the EU FTA policy should require both a clear economic link interpreted as 
meaning a real increase in market access together with its ability to achieve at the multilateral 
level in the WTO. FTAs are seen as a means of strengthening the implementation of existing 
international trade rules, such as intellectual property rights. This aim is given some prominence 
in the recent European Commission paper on the EU in global competition, which provided the 
vehicle for setting out the current approach to FTA policy.8  
The policy change from 2006 was aimed to provide a ‘New Generation’ of FTAs, and the 
policy shift was considered more of a focus than a fundamental alteration. However, the 
agreements clearly illustrate a new methodological challenge to international economic law. 
This is because of the ubiquity of conflicts between rational private interests and reasonable 
public interests. In other words, it becomes essential to consider because such market failures 
can arise from restrictive business practices either through governance failure, resulting in more 
of a governmental market distortion, or through subsidies that are inadequately regulated in the 
WTO. It is, however, slightly more complex since the citizens are involved through self-
interests in a way of ‘institutionalizing public reason’ through constitutional, legislative, 
administrative, and judicial rules and institutions protecting ‘principles of justice’. These 
restrictions are in general introduced to limit, at least to some extent, ‘market failures’ as well 
as ‘governance failures’.13 The NGFTAs addresses these issues. 
The motivations and countries considered in relation to the EU promoting and concluding 
this type of agreements can be summarised with three different motivations. 
The first motivation was an attempt to neutralise potential trade diversion resulting from 
FTAs concluded by other countries, mainly the US. This was the case with the EU–Mexico 
agreement, where the agreement was made in order to neutralize trade diversion due to the 
NAFTA agreement As a result, the negotiation was done with the objective of gaining NAFTA 
equivalent access to the Mexican market.14 Other EU FTA initiatives, such as the EU–Central 
America FTA negotiations, EU–ASEAN and EU–South Korea, have also followed FTAs 
negotiated or envisaged with the US CAFTA, US–Singapore, US–Thailand and US–Malaysia, 
and US–Korea and to a lesser extent, Japan. This is considered the first attempt to conclude an 
                                                   
12 Sieglinde Gstöhl and Dominik Hanf, 'The EU’s Post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements: Commercial Interests in a Changing 
Constitutional Context' (2014) 20 European Law Journal 733, pp. 738-739. 
13 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: CETA, TTIP, and TiSA: New Orientations for EU External 
Economic Relations’ in Stefan Griller, Walter Obwexer and Erich Vranes (eds), CETA, TTIP, and TiSA - New Trends in 
International Economic Law (Oxford University Press 2017), p. 23. 
14 Stephen Woolcock, 'European Union Policy on Free Trade Agreements' (2007) 42 Intereconomics 236, p. 3. 
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ambitious and comprehensive free trade agreement with priority partners, initiated in 2006,15 
with South Korea, KOREU,16 providing the new gold standard.17 In contrary to earlier 
concluded PTAs, these agreements were primarily based on economic motivations, in order to 
aim at a high level of trade liberalization.18 The change led to different bilateral trade 
agreements, starting with the EU-Korean FTA (KOREU) which, based on its content and 
members, provokes differences in the system. This shift in policy, therefore, marks a new and 
more active phase of bilateralism.19 
The second motivation for the EU to promote this type of agreements can be through 
establishing strategic links with countries or regions to experience rapid economic growth. For 
example, this was the case when the negotiation with Mercosur (and Chile) were initiated as a 
region-to-region agreement in order to promote EU relations with Latin America and support 
the process of regional integration within Mercosur. The EU–Mercosur and EU–Chile 
negotiations were in part motivated by a desire to neutralize the potential trade diversion in 
favour of the US in Latin America. As the prospects of the FTAA faded, so did the impetus 
behind EU–Mercosur. When the US concluded an FTA with Chile, however, the EU pressed 
for a bilateral FTA to ensure equivalent access for EU exporters and service providers. 
The third motivation for the EU to promote this type of agreements could be through 
enforcement of international trade rules. This is the new strategy built up by the EU, where the 
FTAs are seen as a means of strengthening the implementation of existing international trade 
rules, such as intellectual property rights. The Commission specifically outlines this in its recent 
paper on the EU in global competition. The FTAs should provide a vehicle for setting out the 
current approach to FTA policy.20 The European Commission expressed it as an attempt to use 
bilateral agreements in a way that would support the returning of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) to the centre of global trade negotiation. It has even been discussed as far as considering 
the NGFTAs as a laboratory attempt to pursue global trade liberalisation.21 
                                                   
15 European Commission External Trade ‘Global Europe Competing in the World’ (n 3). The first stage can be considered to 
have started in 2006, with the appointment of Peter Mandelson as a new Trade Commissioner, who adopted a new trade 
strategy entitled ‘Global Europe’ that provided a new program of bilateral free trade agreements. 
16 European Commission DGTrade ‘The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in Practice’ 2011 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/october/tradoc_148303.pdf> accessed 4 November 2015, p. 3. 
17 Leif Johan Eliasson, 'Problems, Progress and Prognosis in Trade and Investment Negotiations: The Transatlantic Free 
Trade and Investment Partnership' (2014) 12 Journal of Transatlantic Studies 119, p. 125. 
18 European Commission, Communication Global Europe - Competing in the world (n 6), p. 18. 
19 Woolcock, ‘European Union Policy on Free Trade Agreements’ (n 14) p. 2. 
20 Ibid, p. 4. 
21 European Commision ‘Trade for All - Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy’ (n 10), p. 29. 
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The agreements chosen for this research are agreements which stand out due to its 
bilateral deep comprehensive far integrating. These agreements are the KOREU, CETA, 
Singapore, EU–Japan and EU Vietnam, and EU TTIP.  
1.3 The Policy Change in Relation to the EU Common Commercial Policy 
The idea behind a more advanced bilateral trade agenda was based on competitive 
liberalisation, with discussions that begun in the mid-1990s.22 Competitive liberalisation was 
about delivering liberalisation through increased market access, with a more efficient or 
equitable implementation of relevant norms, through bilateral and regional initiatives.23 
The development of the common investment policy is considered to have created a new 
era for the EU’s external economic relations. Areas, which were previously under the Member 
States’ competences, are now considered to fall within the EU’s external exclusive competence. 
An example is Article 113 EEC that provided for the policy tools, which included unilateral 
measures such as changes in tariff rates, export and import policies, commercial defence 
measures, and the establishment of contractual relations with third countries. However, the 
provision is not specifying whether the competence should be extended beyond the traditional 
focus on trade.24 Interestingly, it can be considered that the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
institutes a new understanding of the EU external action and free trade agreements. Seen from 
the newly negotiated FTA, the EU can be considered to be pursuing a more investment-focused 
direction for the CCP.25  
The external exclusive competence is not only empowering the EU but is also essential 
for its function from both internal and external perspectives. If it did not exist, the Member 
States would have to act individually in external relations; and this, in turn, would undermine 
the EU’s unity and weaken its position in its external trade relations. In this way, it is possible 
to argue that the scope of the CCP will have to follow the development of international trade. 
After the Lisbon Treaty, the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence was largely widened and 
                                                   
22 Fred C Bergsten, ‘Competitive Liberalization and Global Free Trade: A Vision for the Early 21st Century’ (1996) Working 
Paper Series WP96-15, Peterson Institute for International Economics <https://piie.com/publications/working-
papers/competitive-liberalization-and-global-free-trade-vision-early-21st> accessed 18 February 2017. pp. 97-98. 
23 UN International Law Commission ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From The Diversification 
And Expansion of International Law’ 2006 <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CN.4/L.682> accessed 
19 November 2016, para. 205. 
24 Article 113 EEC was therefore based on uniform principles and external trade, and should be governed from a wider point 
of view and not put in a narrow sense to only encompass a precise system with customs and quantitative restrictions. 
However, this strict interpretation should be non-exhaustive and not close the door to the application in a Community context 
of any other process intended to regulate external trade. ‘A restrictive interpretation of the concept of common commercial 
policy would risk causing disturbances in intra-Community trade by reason of the disparities which would then exist in 
certain sectors of economic relations with non-member countries.’ Opinion of the Court of Justice of 4 October 1979, 
(International Agreement on Natural Rubber), 1/78, EU:C:1979:224, para. 45. 
25 Paul James Cardwell, ‘EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era’ in Paul James Cardwell (ed), EU 
External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (T.M.C. Asser Press 2012), p. 14. 
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new areas, which were considered within shared competence prior, were included in the CCP. 
The CCP now covers the ‘(...) conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in 
goods and services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property and foreign direct 
investment’.26 
The CJEU stated that the EU needs to be in a position, where it can protect itself from the 
development of international trade through more elaborate means. It is established that the CCP 
should not, in fact, be regarded as a static policy. Instead, it should take the general 
developments of international trade into account, and therefore, be considered as an open ended 
and progressive policy. If the CCP is understood in a static sense, it would become insignificant 
very quickly because of the rapid development of international trade.27 For this reason, the fast-
growing NGFTAs, together with global commitments in the CCP, make it necessary to balance 
internal and external actions toward international law requirements. In other words, it is 
essential to ensure that trade liberalisation does not restrain the EU autonomy. 
1.4 Limits of the EU External Action 
The limits of the EU as an international actor should be analysed through the CJEU’s 
interpretation of the EU’s principle of autonomy. Considering this principle, there is a clear 
contrast to what is reflected in the EU’s international commitments in the treaties. The concept 
of autonomy28 was established in relation to the formation of the internal market,29 and has been 
used to protect the EU’s institutional prerogatives.30 The EU should be viewed as a detached 
system of law.31 The CJEU expressed that the EU legal order represents a separate legal order 
from the rest of international law ‘[b]y contrast with ordinary international Treaties, the EEC 
Treaty has created its own legal system which … became an integral part of the legal systems 
of the Member States …’.32 For the purpose of the EU’s external relations, the concept of 
                                                   
26 Article 207(1) TFEU. 
27 Opinion of the Court of Justice of 15 November 1994, (World Trade Organization Agreement), 1/94, EU:C:1994:384; 
1/78, Opinion on International Agreement on Natural Rubber (n 24), para. 44. 
28 Initially, the concept of autonomy was used to support the notion of direct effect and supremacy of the EU law. Direct 
effect and supremacy are tools used to organise and regulate the internal relationship of the EU with the 28 domestic legal 
orders, all combined into one. In a way, autonomy could, for the sake of the internal engagement, be understood as referring 
to the integrity of the treaty of the EU. However, this would only be to the extent of reaching an effective implementation in 
order to hinder a circumvention of the implementation by recourse to a domestic legal system in one of the Member States. 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. 
29 Conceptual framework to which Van Gend and Costa were instrumental. The broader implications of the Court’s reasoning 
were not apparent until the early 1990’s. 
30 Hannes Lenk, 'Investment Arbitration under EU Investment Agreements: Is There a Role for an Autonomous EU Legal 
Order?' (2017) 28 European Business Law Review 135, p. 136. 
31 Christian Tietje and Clemens Wackernagel, 'Enforcement of Intra-EU ICSID Awards: Multilevel Governance, Investment 
Tribunals and the Lost Opportunity of the Micula Arbitration' (2015) 16 Journal of World Investment & Trade 205, p. 215. It 
is further highlighted that there is no reference mentioned in relation to the EU’s position or affiliation with international law. 
32 C-6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L. (n 28), para. 593. This case concerned the question of the status and effect of the EEC Treaty in 
the domestic legal orders. 
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autonomy can be considered to exclude international law from having an impact on the 
interpretation and application of EU law, within the respective domestic legal order of the 
Member States, which is, in essence, very similar to the international dimension of the EU 
autonomy.33 Furthermore, the principle of autonomy focuses on the protection of institutional 
structures and prerogatives, with the result of withdrawing the institutional dimension of the 
EU from the oversight of international law.34 It is also possible to conclude that the CJEU has 
extended the scope of autonomy vis-a-vis other international legal regimes to include its 
institutional framework. This is because of its increasing engagement in international fora, 
which triggers questions regarding the legal and institutional relationship of the EU with 
international law.35  
In relation to the NGFTAs, the principle of autonomy plays an important role. The 
principle of autonomy function as a guiding principle in the attempt seeking to preserve the 
integrity of EU law from being undermined by international law.36 This is namely because of 
the establishment of the dispute settlement mechanisms with respect to the relation between the 
EU legal order and international courts and tribunals. The EU encounters increasing difficulties 
in relation to the legal and institutional requirements for its role as an actor in international 
investment law. 
2 The Scope of NGFTAs 
Considering the agreements together with the continuously increasing change in policy 
in these newly negotiated agreements, it is possible to suppose that the agreements are reaching 
further than previous concluded bilateral agreements between the EU and third states, which 
may be described as the WTO-beyond.37 The development of the EU’s trade policy is based on 
the new era of the EU’s external economic relations i.e. the EU’s investment policy. The 
investment policy clearly marks more investment-focused provisions in the new generation of 
                                                   
33 René Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law (Kluwer Law International 2004), p. 259. Barents traces the roots of 
autonomy back to the case law of the ECSC-Court. 
34 In his seminal work, Schilling presented an attempt to conceptualize the position of the superiority of the CJEU to the 
domestic courts of the Member States by recourse to theoretical concepts in internationalism or constitutionalism. In his 
work, Weiler contested Schilling’s findings and discusses the theoretical foundations of the institutional aspect of the 
autonomy of the EU legal order in its internal dimension. Theodor Schilling, 'The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: 
An Analysis of Possible Foundations' (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 389. 
35 Christina Eckes, ‘The European Court of Justice and (Quasi-) Judicial Bodies of International Law’ in Ramses A Wessel 
and Steven Blockmans (eds), Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order under the Influence of International 
Organisations (T.M.C. Asser Press 2013). 
36 Jed Odermatt, ‘When a Fence Becomes a Cage: The Principle of Autonomy in EU External Relations Law’ (2016) 
07/2016 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/41046>, accessed 29 July 2017. 
37 After thorough analyses of the agreements, the concept has been invented. 
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FTAs.38 Introducing a regulatory framework that, on the one hand, preserves the protection of 
foreign investors and, on the other hand, enhances their investment opportunities was 
considered in the Commission’s Proposal.39 This sets the basic foundations for the 
establishment of a complete and successful EU investment policy, affirming the main 
competences of the EU in the field, and the main elements of the EU future investment policy. 
This type of agreements covers a wide range of subjects and requires implementation 
through extensive revision and ratification by the Member States.40 They do not only cover 
provisions regarding trade of industrial goods but also other rules of trade liberalization, 
elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, further liberalization in services, public 
procurement investment, competition, and enforcement of intellectual property rights. In 
addition to competition policy and potential dispute settlement mechanisms.41  
Similarly, this type of agreements also covers chapters on sustainable development in 
accordance to the EU 2030 Agenda, which has the potential to trigger the necessary 
transformation of EU external action in support of EU values and objectives.42 Including these 
chapters has provided the role to ensure that trade and investment liberalisation does not 
deteriorate environmental and labour conditions.43 
NGFTAs are essential for liberalising trade among involved parties by abolishing nearly 
all tariffs and other obstacles to trade.44 At the same time, they allow each party to maintain 
external barriers to trade with non-signatory countries.45 
                                                   
38 Cardwell, ‘EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era’ (n 25), p. 14. 
39 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a 
Framework for Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the European Union, (Proposal for a Regulation Framework for 
Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the European Union)’ COM (2017) 487 final. 
40 European Commission External Trade ‘Global Europe Competing in the World’ (n 3). European Parliament, ‘Legislative 
Resolution on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing Transitional 
Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements between Member States and Third Countries, (Legislative Resolution on 
Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements)’ COM (2010) 0344 final. 
41 Gstöhl, Hanf, ‘The EU’s Post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements: Commercial Interests in a Changing Constitutional Context’ 
(n 12), p. 739. 
42 European Commission ‘The New European Consensus on Development ‘Our World, our Dignity, our Future’ - Joint 
Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Commission’ 2017 <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-
consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf> accessed 15 April 2017, para. 9. 
43 European Parliament ‘Briefing paper: Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters in CETA’ 2017 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)595894> accessed 12 January 
2018, p. 1. 
44 Gabrielle Marceau, 'Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions - The Relationship between the WTO Agreement 
and MEAs and other Treaties' (2001) 35 Journal Of World Trade 1081, p. 302. 
45 Patrick F J Macrory, Arthur E Appleton and Michael G Plummer, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and 
Political Analysis, vol 1 (Springer 2005), p. 274. The external tariff provides a clear difference between an FTA and a 
Customs Union. An FTA allows its members to set tariff rates independently and is therefore free to establish its own desired 
tariff rates in relation to imports from non-signatory countries. In a customs union the external tariff rate is set and requires 
all parties to the agreement to establish identical external tariffs. Where countries that are not signatories to FTAs, tries to 
seek to circumvent the tariff to export to the signatory country with the lowest external tariff it can create an uneven field. 
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Since there is no standard on how to negotiate FTAs, it becomes even more essential to 
contextualize the agreements in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the 
differences provided by the change in the EU’s trade policy. In order to grasp the NGFTAs as 
a new form of FTA, it is necessary to consider better categorization through a thorough analysis 
of the content of the agreements. 
2.1 The Definition of NGFTAs 
There have been several attempts to conclude international agreements for investment,46 
such as the unsuccessful attempt by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) to 
reach a framework to promote FDI,47 or the Doha round.48 The negotiations which led to the 
Doha round concerned trade in agriculture, even the continued negotiations in relation to 
service disciplines never reached a conclusion. 
When defining the NGFTAs the content plays a significant role. The ‘Global Europe’ 
trade strategy explicitly points out that NGFTAs can build on international rules and go ‘(...) 
further and faster in promoting openness and integration, by tackling issues which are not ready 
for multilateral discussion’.49 The NGFTAs cover the so-called ‘Singapore issues’,50 which 
constitute areas such as investment, public procurement, competition, or enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.  
The NGFTAs contain rules that govern capital movement such as ‘(...) restrictions on the 
free movement of capital relating to direct investments made in accordance with the laws of the 
host country, to investments and other transactions [liberalized with regards to trade in services 
and electronic commerce].’51  
                                                   
46 UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘South-South Cooperation in International Investment 
Arrangements’ (2005) NCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/3 Series on International Investment Policies for Development 
<http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20053_en.pdf> accessed 26 March 2017, p. 8. 
47 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010), pp. 104-105. 
The MIGA attempted to reach an international framework to promote FDI. However, it has resulted in ‘Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Foreign Investment’ which is not legally binding but providing the foundation to other important legal 
instrument such as BITs. 
48 Jones Kent Albert, The Doha Blues: Institutional Crisis and Reform in the WTO (Oxford University Press 2010); Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, CETA, TTIP, and TiSA-New Trends in International Economic Law, in Stefan Griller, Walter Obwexer, 
and Erich Vranes ‘Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: CETA, TTIP, and TiSA: New Orientations for EU External Economic 
Relations’, p. 26. 
49 European Commission External Trade ‘Global Europe Competing in the World’ (n 3), p. 10. 
50 The ‘Singapore Issues’ refers to transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation (customs issues), trade and 
investment and competition policy. 
51 Article 8.2, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic 
of Korea, of the other part OJ L 127/6 ; This is similarly provided Article 30.5, Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part [2017] 
OJ L 11/23; Singapore Chapter 16, EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018) 
Article 16.7, Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership [2018] N.Y.P; Article 9.2, EU-
Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016 [2016] N.Y.P. 
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The NGFTAs provide two basic provisions in relation to markets. Firstly, they provide 
‘background’ rights and obligations, including enforcement of rules. Such rules further provide 
stability for investment and incentives, enable the competition that is necessary for an effective 
function of the market, to flourish, and enhance the productive capacity. Secondly, they 
function to conduct norms that represent the EU’s claims on their markets, relating to both 
participating and affected markets. They provide a mean, by which a fabric of norms, practices, 
and understandings is created. This determines the way markets operate, influences the 
outcomes production, and shapes consequences for business affected by them.52 
These agreements can all be considered stepping-stones for attempts for further 
liberalisation. In this context, it is important to better define these instruments of the EU external 
action by considering the idea behind their introduction together with the content of the actual 
agreements. 
2.1.1 The Idea behind the NGFTAs 
The idea behind NGFTAs was to boost the EU’s economic growth and employment levels 
by improving the global competitiveness of European companies.53 It started through the need 
for a change in the era when the EU attempted to pursue multilateral trade arrangements. 
Primarily, this need for change was due to many reasons; one of them was related to the old-
fashioned philosophy underpinning WTO rules on trade, where the former idea of producing 
items in one country and exporting them to another country has changed in this globalized 
world, whereas now the production is set in many different countries and then sold in a third 
country. This led to discussions on negotiation, specifically in relation to trade in services, but 
also other trade rules in relation to agriculture, and taken up in the Doha round which was then 
stalled due to an inability to reach a consensus among the WTO members.54 The failed Doha 
round therefore contributed, in some way, to undermine the WTO, both in relation to its role as 
a global negotiation forum, and also in relation to its substantive disciplines.55 
This is because cooperative strategies for overcoming such barriers such as mutual 
recognition and equivalence, regulatory coherence, and regulatory cooperation are proven areas 
                                                   
52 David J Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (Oxford University Press 2010), p. 4. 
53 European Commission, ‘Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, (Communication Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy)’ COM (2010) 343 final. 
54 The intention was to reform the WTO system by lowering trade barrier and amending trade rules. Due to complexity of the 
topics and antagonistic interest and the WTO’s cumbersome consensus-based decision-making process, the process was 
stuck.  
55 Stefan Griller, Walter Obwexer and Erich Vranes, ‘Mega-Regional Trade Agreements’ in Stefan Griller, Walter Obwexer 
and Erich Vranes (eds), Mega-Regional Trade Agreements : CETA, TTIP, and TiSA : New Orientations for EU External 
Economic Relations (Oxford University Press 2017), p. 6.  
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to be very difficult to negotiation in the multilateral WTO context.56 Consequently for broader 
FTA, the WTO is no longer an adequate forum for negotiation, specifically not in relation to 
regulatory issues, which provide more economically important obstacles to international trade, 
such as non-tariff barriers, resulting from different domestic risk preferences and national 
regulatory cultures, and quite often from the pursuance of legitimate goals through different 
means. 
This further led to the change of focus which made the EU move away from multilateral 
trade and instead focus on bilateral attempts to reach similar agreements with new trading 
partners.57 Bilateral FTAs maintain the importance of WTO because of the central role they 
were given in international trading regimes. Competitive liberalisation was about delivering 
better liberalisation through increased market access with a more efficient or equitable 
implementation of relevant norms, through bilateral and regional initiatives.58 
Through launching the 2020 strategy, the EU tried to improve the overseas market 
through bilateral FTAs and deepened the relationship with third countries in service, 
competition, intellectual property, social environmental and labour issues, as well as in other 
regulatory cooperation.59 This was moreover clarified by the ‘Global Europe’ trade strategy 
which explicitly points out that NGFTAs can, with these subject areas, build on international 
rules and go ‘(...) further and faster in promoting openness and integration, by tackling issues 
which are not ready for multilateral discussion’.60 
Through the commitments of the signatory parties to remove trade barriers that may exist 
between them,61 the NGFTAs, can be considered to provide a new forum for regulatory 
cooperation62 to address other broader issues such as those related to social and economic 
activities.63 
The agreements negotiated or concluded after the EU’s Global Europe strategy in 2006, 
are the EU–CARIFORUM agreement between the EU and the Caribbean Group of the African, 
                                                   
56 Ibid, p. 6. 
57 Ibid, pp. 6-7 
58 UN International Law Commission ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From The Diversification 
And Expansion of International Law’ (n 23), para. 205. 
59 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission Europe 2020: A strategy for Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth, (Communication Europe 2020 strategy)’ COM (2010) 2020 final. 
60 European Commission External Trade ‘Global Europe Competing in the World’ (n 3), p. 10. 
61 Neil Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (7th edn edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2010), pp. 372-376. 
62 Traditionally regulatory cooperation has taken a variety of forms, through formal governmental agreements, to 
international intergovernmental organisations, or informal networks of regulators. It has now formed a basis for the discourse 
of preferential and free trade agreements (PTAs and FTAs), Stanko S Krstic, 'Regulatory Cooperation to Remove Non-tariff 
Barriers to Trade in Products: Key Challenges and Opportunities for the Canada-EU Comprehensive Trade Agreement' 
(2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 3, p. 3. 
63 Tracy Epps, ‘Regulatory Cooperation and Free Trade Agreements’ in Susy Frankel and Meredith Lewis (eds), Trade 
Agreements at the Crossroads (Routledge 2014), p. 142. 
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Caribbean and Pacific Forum, and furthermore the agreements with Colombia, Peru, Singapore, 
South Korea, and the CETA agreement with Canada, Japan, Vietnam, China and Myanmar, 
and Algeria, India, Libya, and the TTIP agreement with the US.64 Since this thesis attempts to 
only focus on bilateral trade agreements, naturally the CARIFORUM agreement will not be 
considered. The remaining agreements and their content will be discussed in a more thorough 
analysis. 
There have been many attempts to contextualize this type of new trade agreements; as 
‘mega-regional trade agreements’, ‘deep-comprehensive trade agreements’ or as the ‘new 
generation of free trade agreements’. The way these concepts have been used varying from a 
more political standpoint to a more economical analysed conclusion. It is therefore necessary 
to address the earlier attempts and focus on how the NGFTA differ in relation to the previous 
classification and why it was chosen as an all-encompassing terminology. 
The classification, used for the agreements falling under the terminology of mega trade 
agreements,65 is based on their economic impact in terms of their holding a major share of world 
trade and FDI, but also in relation their functions and their political and geopolitical 
implications.66 This term has been coined to signify the outstanding combination of ambition 
and trade coverage as well as the inclusion of important supply chain hubs.67 The trade deals 
aim to improve regulatory compatibility and to provide a rule-based framework to regulate in 
order to better adjust to the differences within the different countries’ regulatory environment. 
Within Mega regional agreements the TPP and the TTIP are both examples. In this case the 
TPP has 26,3% and the TTIP has 43,6% of the global FDI. 
Other attempts to categorize this type of agreements has been done. It could be regarded 
as more sufficient to consider the trade agreements in relation to their contents and their ability 
of enforcing subject areas going beyond the WTO. This was primarily established by Horn, 
Mavroidis, and Spir who argued that there is a way to recognize the different possible 
compatibilities with the WTO. Considering the anatomies of PTAs, one can deal with their 
compatibility to the WTO through either WTO-plus or WTO-extra.68 This has thereafter been 
coined as a definition for other scholars such as Ahearn.69 
                                                   
64 Billy A. Melo Araujo, 'Regulating Services through Trade Agreements - A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory 
Disciplines Included in EU and US Free Trade Agreements' (2014) 6 Trade, Law and Development  
65 Griller, Obwexer, Vranes, ‘Mega-Regional Trade Agreements’ (n 55), p. 9. 
66 Peter-Tobias Stoll, ‘Mega-Regionals: Challenges, Opportunities and Research Questions’ in Thilo Rensmann (ed), Mega-
Regional Trade Agreements (Springer International Publishing 2017), p. 5. 
67 Peter-Tobias Stoll, ‘Mega-Regionals: Challenges, Opportunities and Research Questions’ in Thilo Rensmann (ed), Mega-
Regional Trade Agreements (Springer International Publishing 2017), p. 5. 
68 Henrik Horn, Petros C Mavroidis and André Sapir, 'Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade 
Agreements' (2010) 33 World Economy 1565, pp. 20-28. 
69 Raymond J. Ahearn, ‘Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications’ (2011) CRS Report for 
US Congress <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41143.pdf> accessed 22 March 2012., p. 3. 
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In more detail, the ‘WTO-plus’ refers to agreements that have commitments that are, 
essentially, building upon areas already agreed on at the multilateral level, e.g., a further 
reduction in tariffs.70 This type of agreements contain provisions enforceable within the context 
of the WTO. In this regard it is necessary to identify provisions which are legally enforceable 
within the agreements, since they should be sufficiently precise for to be a legally enforceable 
obligation, however, this requirement does not automatically translate into whether or not a 
dispute settlement is available. Even when such provision is considered an enforceable 
obligation, the provision may be accompanied by an explicit statement that dispute settlement 
is not available. 
In other words, they include obligation in relation to policy areas that are already subject 
to some of WTO commitment. There are two ways in which this can be addressed; either 
through reconfirming existing commitments, or through providing for further obligations. For 
example, it could be that the reduction in tariffs is going beyond what is already committed to 
in the WTO context, and this is what makes them WTO-plus. It could also be through SPS 
(sanitary and phytosanitary) measures, TBT (technical barriers to trade) measures, 
antidumping, state aid, and obligations covered by the GATS. Similarly, those intellectual 
property rights provisions which address issues falling under the TRIPs agreement. Export taxes 
could also be considered in this regard.71  
The areas applicable to the WTO-plus category are FTA agricultural product, FTA 
industrial products, customs administration, IP export taxes, TBT/SPS, state trading enterprises, 
antidumping, countervailing measures, state aid, public procurement, TRIMs, GATS, TRIPS, 
and investment. 
The WTO-extra relates to commitments that go beyond issues that are dealt with at the 
WTO level, such as labour standards.72 It could be a more precise provision containing areas 
such as anti-corruption, competition, environment, IP rights, investment, labour, movement of 
capital, and social matters. The WTO-extra takes into consideration areas, which are 
qualitatively new in relation to policy instruments, and have not previously been regulated by 
the WTO. There are no obligations in relation to environmental protection. Thus, it is possible 
to classify an environmental obligation as WTO-extra. This is similar in relation to labour laws 
or movement of capital. The Preamble of the WTO clearly points out the need ‘to protect and 
preserve the environment.’ However, there are no provisions specifically addressing the 
                                                   
70 Henrik Horn, Giovanni Maggi and Robert W Staiger, 'Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts' (2010) 
100 The American Economic Review 394.  
71 The WTO contains no precise commitment in this area. The WTO members could negotiate commitments on export taxes 
under Article II GATT, so it can be argued that a WTO instrument already exists in this area. 
72 Horn, Maggi, Staiger, ‘Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts’ (n 70). 
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conduct of environmental policies with a trade impact, which leads to the conclusion that it 
should be considered as a WTO-extra category. 
However, in relation to the NGFTAs, does not fully fit into the WTO-extra group. 
Although the NGFTAs have commitments that go beyond issues that are dealt with at the WTO 
level, competition, environment, IP rights, investment, labour, movement of capital, and social 
matters, they take it one step further. This categorization does not encompass the whole picture 
of the NGFTAs, since the NGFTAs places a clearer emphasis on enforcement specifically in 
relation to investment issues by introducing the Investment Court System (ICS). For this reason 
and for the purpose of this thesis, the NGFTAs should be classified as a separate group, i.e. 
‘WTO beyond’. 
2.1.2 The Contents of NGFTAs 
The EU’s announcement of the comprehensive international investment policy justified 
the EU’s aim to include investment liberalisation and protection issues in future trade and 
investment agreements. The format to conclude was not initially set but was to include either 
sector specific and/or have investment related provisions,73 such as in the case of NGFTAs. 
The NGFTAs provide a more extensive opening of foreign markets and mark a far-
reaching policy shift. For this reason, the former role that FTAs have played in the EU’s external 
relations has been somewhat redefined.74 
Addressing liberalisation of trade through the reduction and elimination of trade barriers, 
NGFTAs have placed emphasis on denying the barriers to trade, known as ‘behind-the-door’ 
barriers to trade. They are considered, in relation to domestic regulations such as health 
regulations, making it difficult for goods to enter foreign markets, and prevent the entry of 
products, or obstruct foreign services suppliers to provide their services and operate in foreign 
markets. Consequently, the NGFTAs can be defined as commitments of the signatory parties 
to remove trade barriers that may exist between them.75 
The NGFTAs are furthermore considered to be a stepping-stone for further liberalisation 
due to their abilities to tackle issues that are not yet ready for multilateral discussions. It is 
necessary to define these instruments, and thoroughly address their origin for better and clearer 
understanding. Considering the content of the agreements negotiated by the EU, there are 
clearly agreements going beyond the WTO in terms of the enforceability within the WTO but 
instead creating or attempting to create a possibility to solve disputes in a mechanism which 
                                                   
73 European Commission, Communication on Europe 2020 Strategy (n 59), p. 7. 
74 Boris Rigod, 'Global Europe: The EU's New Trade Policy in its Legal Context' (2012) 18 Columbia Journal of European 
Law 277. 
75 Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (n 61), pp. 372-376. 
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will be enforceable between the parties. In this way the agreements clearly differ from earlier 
FTAs.  
The NGFTAs go beyond WTO issues, and cover issues that have been rejected earlier for 
multilateral negotiations.76 Both, the EU’s external presence and capacity to act on an 
international level have been considered central. Interpreting and applying rules of international 
and regional trade are becoming increasingly a more specialized field. The EU can, therefore, 
in contrary to some opinions such as the opinions of Young,77 no longer only be considered as 
an influential global regulator with unilateral adoption of its rules by third countries. Instead, 
the EU makes use of FTAs as tools for fostering its normative standing. This is because the 
EU’s external action contributes, more than before, to the shaping of the EU’s international 
identity. The key central aspect for the EU to act on an international level through this type of 
agreements is through its presence and capacity. The provisions of each agreement are 
important and need to be examined when analysing the agreements as legal instruments of the 
EU’s external relations.78 In this regard, the ‘New Generation’ of agreements creates 
opportunities for growth and further development.79 These agreements, which go beyond 
dismantling tariff and non-tariff barriers, address subjects, which are sometimes not related to 
trade, such as human rights and freedom, environmental protection, and the fight against 
corruption.80 
The WTO-beyond that constitutes the NGFTAs is therefore a platform considered to 
enhance regulatory cooperation where it can be advanced in order to address broader social and 
economic issues.81 Particularly, these agreements go further and deeper in economic integration 
than earlier agreements, in terms of regulatory cooperation, section specific standardisation, 
public procurement, competition, environmental protection, IP rights, sustainable development, 
movement of capital, and investment protection. 
Consequently, because of the attempt of the NGFTA to fill the gap between the earlier 
agreements in terms of their legal commitment and effective enforcement by the EU, the 
NGFTA can be considered the new generation of FTA. 
                                                   
76 The ‘Singapore Issues’ refers to transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation (customs issues), trade and 
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78 James Harrison, ‘An Introduction to the Legal Framework for EU-Korea Relations’ in James Harrison (ed), The European 
Union and South Korea: The Legal Framework for Strengthening Trade, Economic and Political Relations (Edinburgh 
University Press 2013), p. 5. 
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2.2 The Origin of NGFTAs  
This type of free trade agreements provides for preferences among their parties. 
Accordingly, they are often called ‘preferential trade agreements’ (PTAs). However, the term 
‘free trade agreements’ is also frequently used, and, in WTO jargon, the agreements addressed 
here are usually called ‘regional’ trade agreements.82 
With the NGFTAs, the EU aims to pursue deeper integration in order to ensure that the 
rules developed in major markets are consistent with EU law. This type of agreements pursues 
‘deep integration partnerships between countries or regions with a major share of world trade 
and foreign direct investment’. In order to be able to provide a fair analysis of the agreements 
as EU legal instruments for external trade, it is necessary look more closely at areas which are 
similar to previous agreements negotiated by the EU. In this way, considering it as the 
background to view the context of the agreement in a broader international legal framework. 
The NGFTAs are a new instrument that can be considered to be based on preferential 
trade agreements, WTO, other international commitments, and also international investment 
treaties. For this reason, it seems appropriate to discuss the different areas which has enabled it 
to become NGFTAs, i.e. the influences that arises from preferential investment treaties and 
International law. 
2.2.1 Influences from Preferential Trade Agreements 
The terms PTA and FTA are often used indistinctively to describe preferential trade 
agreements. The term FTA is more widely used to describe all preferential trade agreements 
that are not considered to be customs unions.83 The Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) 
contain no standardisation in terms of areas which should be included within the negotiation. 
The trade negotiations are flexible on so called case-by case basis.84 To a large extent it depends 
on the content of the negotiated agreement; certain agreements are shaped in relation to foreign 
security policy, whereas others reflect more commercial considerations.85 
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NGFTAs as agreements are similar to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that have 
been negotiated by the EU since 2006,86 and are in this regard, not very innovative.87 There are 
different types of PTAs. Some are merely framework agreements, which are set up as an 
institutional structure, laying down general principles with respect to the commitment of further 
investment liberalization, promotion, and protection. Other agreements are more remarkable 
when it comes to their legal character, institutional framework mechanism, and related effects.88 
Generally, the PTA as used because topics addressed in WTO rules can be dealt with more 
effectively through PTAs for example trade in services, intellectual property and trade 
facilitation. 
There is, however, a clear difference between the PTA and NGFTAs in terms of market 
liberalisation. The PTA has often been applying a very modest market liberalisation. This is 
merely because of its nature where the emphasis in more on development or neighbour policy 
instrument.89 However, in recent years it has come to increasingly include chapters on 
investment. 
2.2.2 Influences from International Bilateral Investment Treaties 
The investment provisions in the NGFTAs are not based on a particular standard. 
However, when it comes to the negotiation of NGFTAs, it seems that the EU does not 
significantly deviate from the negotiation of more traditional International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs).90 The NGFTAs go also beyond the format of the Member States’ Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs), which include market access issues and securing non-
discriminatory treatment of investors.91 
The BITs and IIAs differ in some circumstances. Property protection against 
expropriation and ISDS, which have always been featured in BITs, have so far been excluded 
from the scope of IIAs.92 The EU is seeking to regulate FDI and portfolio investment,93 but 
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also, at the same time, respect standards of investment protection, such as the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET), full protection and security treatment, and expropriation.94  
The investment policy regulation cannot be viewed in isolation; it has to fit with other 
areas of the EU’s regulation on economic activity within the EU and beyond. For this reason, 
there is a need to also find consistency with the internal policies of the EU including, for 
example, policies on the environmental protection, decent work, health and safety at work, 
consumer protection, cultural diversity, development policy, and competition policy. The 
practice of the NGFTAs will better show the result of such consistency.95 These objectives 
remain at the heart of the EU’s investment policy.96 Adhering to these objectives, the EU seems 
to prioritize the demand for increasing investment flows and addressing the role of regulation 
of admission of foreign investment, in particular in the field of services, as a major economic 
determinant of foreign investment.97 
In addition to liberalisation and competitiveness, the EU’s investment policy intends to 
focus also on the more ‘neglected’ goals of international regulation of foreign investment. The 
EU’s institutions, in particular the Parliament, attempt to link foreign investment with 
development and broader public policy considerations. Building on provisions found under 
existing EU’s agreements with third countries’, such as those on investors’ behaviour, 
maintenance of standards, and investment promotion, the EU’s institutions aim to distance from 
the obscurity that characterises development and public policy concerns in most BITs.98 The 
different content of the EU’s IIAs illustrates the different regulatory aims that the EU’s 
investment policy was pursuing so far. Putting the emphasis on admission and operation of 
foreign investment is linked with the pursuance of the goals of liberalisation, market access, 
and competitiveness.99 In comparison to NGFTAs, the IIAs lack absolute standards of 
treatment, such as fair and equal treatment, provided only from the most favoured nation, and 
national treatments which are in fact applied and interpreted differently than the same standards 
used in BITs. Thus, the NGFTAs cannot be considered as a replication of primary EU law or 
the GAT provision. They have sufficient original elements that can justify their characterization 
as innovative models for international regulation of foreign investment. 
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2.2.3 Influences from International Law 
The NGFTAs go beyond WTO issues, and cover issues that have been rejected earlier for 
multilateral negotiations.100 Both the EU’s external presence and capacity to act on an 
international level have been considered central. Interpreting and applying rules of international 
and regional trade are increasingly becoming a more specialized field. The EU can, therefore, 
in contrary to some opinions such as Young, no longer be only considered as an influential 
global regulator with unilateral adoption of its rules by third countries.101 Instead, the EU makes 
use of FTAs as tools for fostering its normative standing. This is because the EU’s external 
action contributes, more than before, to the shaping of the EU’s international identity.  
Even though the EU is characterized as a model of regional integration, it has been 
recently presented as a project for liberalization, or economic governance at a global level. 
There are responsibilities attached to the further liberalisation through bilateral FTAs. They are 
also called ‘WTO-plus obligations’ in areas that are subject to WTO rules, such as the TBT. 
There is a requirement to seek WTO compatibility,102 since the contracting parties of the 
NGFTAs are members of the WTO. Concerning trade in goods or services, the members of the 
WTO may enter into PTAs. When it comes to trade in goods, the parties of a PTA are allowed 
to favour products originating from their countries.103 Two different forms of PTAs can be 
distinguished according to Article XXIV General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT): free 
trade areas and customs unions (CUs).104 These two different areas need to correspond to the 
GATT rules in different manners. Regarding the free trade areas, trade is liberalised between 
the parties; whereas the party in an EU agreement must also, beyond the liberalisation of trade 
commitment, agree on a common trade policy in relation to the rest of the WTO members.105 
In this regard, the Commission recognized that certain aspects of the Standard Investment 
Protection and ISDS regimes are unsatisfactory and aspires to improve them. Whether the new 
EU’s policy, which includes investment protection, is consistent with the new set of FTAs 
depends on the assumptions about the nature of the international trading system. It also relates 
to whether such agreements would be compatible with the WTO. 
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The key central aspect for the EU to act on an international level through the NGFTAs of 
agreements is through its presence and capacity. This addresses the need to seek a new balance 
between protectionism and liberalising of markets.  
The EU uses traditional defence of markets and producers, trade defined instruments, and 
market power to protect domestic markets and policy choices starting from farm policy to the 
assessment of regulatory risk; this will be further addressed through the autonomy of the EU. 
The EU also uses its economic power to leverage and open up markets, offering market access 
in return for reciprocal benefits. The move towards reciprocity in its contractual trade relations, 
for example, may be presented in terms of WTO-compatibility, but may also signal the 
importance of market access to the EU.106 In this regard, the NGFTAs creates opportunities for 
growth and further development.107 These agreements, which go beyond dismantling tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, address subjects, which are sometimes not related to trade, such as human 
rights and freedom, environmental protection, and the fight against corruption.108 
Provisions of each agreement are important to examine when analysing the agreements 
as legal instruments of the EU’s external relations.109 
The WTO is considered to be a cornerstone in all of these agreements. This can be shown 
by considering the provision in each of the agreements. The CETA provides that the parties 
shall further strengthen their close economic relationship by building upon their respective 
rights and obligations established in the WTO.110 
 The parties affirm rights and obligations under each other’s commitments under the 
WTO and other agreements to which they are party.111 The Singapore and the Vietnam 
agreement states that is building on each parties respective rights and obligations under the 
WTO agreement and other multilateral, regional and bilateral arrangements.112 113 The free 
trade area should therefore be consistent with Article XXIV of GATT 1994 and Article V of 
GATS.114 115 This is portrayed in a similar manner in the EU-japan agreement.116 
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Consequently, the roles of the WTO are important to respect, and to make sure that it is 
not overseen within each of the agreements. In the case of the NGFTAs, what may clearly mark 
them in relation to earlier agreements are their objectives, but also the novel potential possibility 
to solve and enforce disputes going beyond the WTO discussions through a permanent 
established investment arbitration mechanism. This would clearly put the agreements in a 
separate group in relation to the earlier established group. In this specific consideration it is 
possible to refer to this type of agreements as ‘WTO-beyond’ since they clearly go beyond the 
WTO, establishing an arbitral tribunal, in similar manner to that of the WTO. 
The WTO is still, however, remaining in the centre of these agreements in an important 
role and is not, as was earlier feared, neglected by the attempt to pursue this type of dispute 
settlement. The NGFTA is considered to be the new generation. The new generation because 
of their attempt to fill the gap that earlier agreements have had i.e. the gap between legal 
commitment and effective enforcement by the EU. Former agreements, such as the PTA, came 
with more of legal inflation, in the sense that they cover a wide range of topics going beyond 
any other commitment taken by the EU and therefore provide more complex legal issues. This 
naturally led to an issue of the EU as a global actor. This is the case if the agreements were to 
be entirely unenforceable, which in some cases could even lead to them being entirely devoid 
of substance. Agreements, for example, with developing countries have come to play a different 
role and rather functioned as exporting EU laws. Trade policy can therefore at times be 
considered as well as political means.117 The NGFTAs have departed from this view in the 
attempt to create agreements which are enforceable. It is, however, important to consider how 
the NGFTAs have departed and become different from earlier concluded agreements, which 
will be discussed in these following sections. 
The FTAs are considered a preferred strategy to find better transnational solutions for 
international regulatory frameworks enforcing protection of investment and property rights. 
This type of agreement is the first of the bilateral FTAs to include purely commercial goals 
pursuant to the Europe 2020 strategy,118 whereas the past FTAs almost solely existed within 
the framework of other policies. 
Distinguishing the degree of legal enforceability in this way cannot only be defended 
from the point of view of practical experience, but also from the point of view of the principles 
of international law. One of the requirements in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties stipulates that for an agreement to be regarded as a treaty it needs to be ‘governed 
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by international law’. This is normally interpreted to require the parties to intend that the 
agreement has legal effect under international law. The terminology of an agreement may 
indicate the extent to which such intent exists. 
3 Research Orientation 
The research will examine whether the NGFTAs are compatible with fundamental law 
principles of the EU law, such as the principles of conferral, limited competences, and 
autonomy. This is in order to determine the implications these new instruments may have on 
the EU as a global actor. The research is framed by the purpose (Section 3.1), and explicitly 
determined by the research question (Section 3.2). 
3.1 Purpose of the Research 
The ‘New Generation’ FTAs seek to provide a deeper liberalisation that go beyond 
WTO’s commitments. This may lead to consequences on both the EU’s internal and 
international levels. This type of agreements is rapidly evolving, increasingly demanding 
deeper integration, and providing a changing landscape in regard to policy. They can be 
considered as a change in the paradigm of the definition of FTAs.119 This thesis is intended to 
elaborate on the framework encompassing principles and competences that establish the New 
Generation FTAs as a new legal instrument. 
The Lisbon Treaty provided the EU with a stronger position in respect to international 
trade. The CCP now covers services and commercial aspects of intellectual property and allows 
for a more comprehensive approach to trade and investment issues.120 To reach effectiveness 
in the international trading system,121 the purpose of the Lisbon Treaty was to have a single 
diplomatic presence for the EU, that can represent a single legal entity that is active globally.122 
The EU is increasingly employing FTAs as tools for its internal market and external 
relation policy.123 The EU is using the New Generation of FTAs as tools in order to pursue 
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bilateral commitments with strategic partners.124 These agreements aim to achieve liberalisation 
of trade and investment. Trade and investment are large concepts providing a wide range of 
subjects within an agreement.125 Due to this wide subject range, New Generation FTAs cannot 
be considered homogeneous agreements, which in turn, makes the determination of the 
competence question more intriguing. 
The CCP and the structure of the EU’s multilevel governance are a constantly evolving 
system. With the new issues within such non-homogeneous agreements, the question is 
therefore how far the CCP can be extended. With this in mind, this thesis will consider bilateral 
trade through FTAs in the context of a broader international legal framework. Particularly, it 
will elaborate on the framework of the NGFTAs as a new legal instrument with the ambition 
to provide further guidance in the interpretation. In order to do so, the interaction between 
the various competences of NGFTAs will be discussed with an attempt to establish the limits 
of these competences, from both, an EU and international points of view. 
The New Generation FTAs are assumed to require further integration. In order to achieve 
such integration, the EU needs to better accommodate the differences among the different 
international, European and Member States’ levels. 
Since the role of the EU autonomy is to safeguard the EU’s prerogatives, this type of 
agreements makes it essential to find the appropriate balance between further liberalisation of 
free trade and the EU’s attempt to maintain its autonomous legal order. For this reason, it seems 
appropriate to analyse the NGFTAs as a new legal instrument for the EU’s external action in 
relation to the EU’s competence, and also its autonomy, specifically in regard to the dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
3.2 Research Question 
What is the significance and implications of the bilateral ‘New Generation’ of Free Trade 
Agreements as a new legal instrument for external action and trade of the European Union? 
In order to answer this question, the following two sub-questions are employed as 
viewpoints, and are intended to provide guidance for the interpretation of the ‘New 
Generation’ FTAs as new legal instruments: 
1. What are the limits of the attributed competences in relation to the wide subject range of 
NGFTAs after the reformed CCP in the Lisbon Treaty? 
2. How do the reformed ISDS mechanisms within the NGFTAs affect the autonomy of the EU? 
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4 Methodology 
The NGFTAs need to be viewed in a broader context through a theoretical framework, to 
be able to evaluate their function as ‘new legal instruments’ of the EU’s external action. 
Consequently, to analyse the significance and potential implications of these external trade 
instruments for the EU, it is necessary to consider the division of competences, the adoption of 
the new legal instruments, i.e. the ratification of agreements, and the EU’s adequate protection 
of its autonomy. This will be accomplished by establishing the approach within a theoretical 
framework through which the research will be conducted. 
4.1 Research Approach 
This type of bilateral trade agreements has been able to coexist with GATT / WTO. In 
the field of international economic law, the legalization of international economic relations and 
the judicialization of dispute settlement can be best illustrated through the transformation of the 
GATT to the WTO in 1995. This transformation led to a major juridification of an international 
trade regime.126 
After the change in policy, the NGFTAs intended to achieve new trade relation with the 
adoption and application of measures designed to achieve valuable goals. The NGFTAs now 
provide a new forum for a high level of trade liberalisation that contributes to achieving a better 
allocation of resources, economic prosperity, and a raise in the standards of living.127 The 
intertwined web of legal obligations for foreign investors has always provided a difficult 
navigation for foreign investors, with these NGFTAs the foreign investors will easier be able 
to challenge the actions of host states in a dispute settlement system included in the NGFTAs. 
This means that the international investment regime moved towards a model where the dispute 
settlement will rather be resolved according to rules, in different from a former highly 
politicized international investment dispute.128 
This type of agreement is focused solely on investment but contains a very large scope of 
an international liberalisation trade regime. The question arises not in relation to the possibility 
to coexist but rather in relation to the scope of the agreements per se since the NGFTAs result 
in a wide and deeper effects for both the EU and international trade. 
Although trade liberalisation is in the core of the EU’s external trade agenda, there is a 
need for a balance between such objectives and the protection fundamental principles such as 
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autonomy, constitutionalism and the preservation of internal division of power. Finding such 
balance becomes more difficult in situations, where the trade agreements in question contain 
rules that may result in obstacles to trade, such as rules in relation to valuable goals, health 
protection, environment, human rights, etc.129 
The NGFTAs are trade instruments that provide both liberalisation and regulatory 
protection at the same time. In order to thoroughly study this type of agreements as a new legal 
instrument and reach the above-mentioned balance, it is important to regard the agreements in 
a theoretical context so that it becomes possible to see the broader structure.  
4.1.1 Multi-Level Theoretical Framework 
While researching areas directly affected by a multi-layered system between the EU, its 
Member States and international public law, it is necessary to consider the EU targeted as 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism, aimed through integration between its Member States to 
protect and emancipate citizens vis-à-vis abuses of national foreign policy powers. This is then 
based on a multi-level constitutionalism constituting, limiting, regulating, and justifying multi-
level governance of transnational public goods. These common markets, transnational rule of 
law, and multi-level legal and judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights can have far-reaching 
repercussions on international economic law, which has been illustrated by the European 
constitutional and common market law and EU membership in worldwide organizations such 
as the WTO.130 
It seems appropriate to start the theoretical discussion from the constitutional base of the 
EU, establishing that the EU is ‘(…) founded on the value of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’ (Article 2 TEU).131 
There are provisions in the EU treaties confirming the EU’s multi-level constitutionalism 
and institutional ‘checks and balances’. Firstly, this can be considered through the democratic 
principles on conferral of limited EU powers and them being subject to constitutional restrains. 
The constitutional restrains come in forms of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality and rule of 
law and are set out in Articles 2 and 5 TEU.  
In the EU, the citizens, both individually and collectively, are the democratic sovereigns 
in EU law. This means that the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions derives from the 
protection of fundamental rights democracy, and the rule of law which are considered as the 
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‘democratic trias’ governing EU Member States. There are also other sources such as the 
transnational public goods which due to a more extended globalization or more at risk and can 
no longer be protected unilaterally without international law and multilevel governance 
institutions.132 
The NGFTAs, is a new dimension affecting the same issue. This is specifically so due to 
the extensive and deep integration constituting, limiting but also adjudicating through 
investment arbitration on the international arena. In this regard the common commercial policy 
of the EU is the focus in the EU external relation. 
The approach to be taken when approaching a multilevel system according to 
Petersmann,133 should be to systematically address the external interference provided as the 
new legal instrument of the EU external action and its interdependent task between affecting 
all the different layers: international, EU and Member States competences.134 He proposes 
therefore that such an instrument needs to be viewed from a more structural categorization 
through (1) rule making, (2) rule clarification, (3) prevention and settlement of disputes, and 
(4) rule-enforcement by national and international courts based on international agreements 
accepted by the EU and its Member States, since international agreements provide an ‘(...) 
integrating part of the Community legal system (...)’.135 
The research will therefore be conducted in a way to address these structural 
categorizations in a step-by step analyzation. It considers rulemaking in the sense of the 
continuously changing CCPs and the NGFTA in terms of rulemaking. ‘Rule clarification’ is 
considered in relation to questions of competence of this type of agreements, where the purpose 
is to see and understand the exact limits within the different competences. ‘Prevention and 
settlement of disputes’ is considered in relation to the investment court system within the 
NGFTAs. ‘Rule-enforcement’ is considered in relation to the possibility of the EU to enforce 
disputes from the Investment court system in relation to both national and international law. 
The NGFTAs as a new legal instrument cannot only be considered through a structural 
categorization but should be equally considered through a theoretical understanding of the EU’s 
external action and the CCP. Considering these two approaches it helps find the balance 
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between an adequate protection of the EU’s autonomy in external trade and its aspiration of a 
more free and liberalised trade agenda. 
4.1.2 Balancing between Free Trade and Adequate Protection  
The utilitarian perspective takes the approach that liberalizing trade is a good policy. It is 
considered this way simply because the majority benefits from it. The consumers receive more 
choices, and there would be lower prices; it creates more jobs. In other words, a positive-sum 
game with the greatest good for the greatest number. However, to only focus on utilitarianism 
would not lead to a good trading environment. In fact, the utilitarianism may ignore individual 
rights. NAFTA and GATT were considered to be flawed in this regard because the trade policy 
was implemented to benefit the majority, or that benefits consumers, or that it is in the public 
interest. But a proper position to take is that a trade policy should be implemented or adopted 
if it does not violate anyone's right.  
This is the approach to be applied in this thesis where the EU, with its Member States, is 
considered as one party and the third party on the other end of the bilateral free trade agreement. 
The idea is that the free trade zone shall in fact reach a balance between free trade and 
protectionism in terms of the EU’s way of protecting its prerogatives through its restrictive 
interpretation of Autonomy. The point is not that one of the parties should lose but rather to 
have a similar gain, where the autonomy of the EU should not be at risk.136  
It is important to find an adequate protection for the ‘rule of law’ (Article 2 TEU) and 
‘strict observance of international law’ (Article 3 TEU) in order not to undermine the legitimacy 
of the EU, and the welfare of its citizens.137 This is an important area to consider since 
international dispute settlement bodies’ jurisprudence tends to be more developed, and more 
frequently invoked than other areas in EU’s international relations. 
The Lisbon Treaty acknowledged this challenge by explicitly enshrining the aim to ensure 
consistency between all areas of the EU’s external actions, and between them and its other 
policies in several treaty articles, including Article 21(3) TEU.138 Apart from this, there are the 
two general principles of the EU, which work towards the unity and effectiveness of the EU’s 
external representation: the principle of loyal or sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) 
TEU, and the principle of consistency in Article 13(1) TEU and Article 7 TFEU. 
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The questions raised by this type of agreements clearly point to the fundamental issue in 
the EU legal order on the interaction between the Member States and the EU together with its 
institutions in practice. Most of these agreements, as will be further analysed, are made as mixed 
agreements. However, in relation to the effectiveness of the EU’s representation at the 
international level, it is not always convincing, taking all the required work to accommodate all 
Member States in both negotiation and ratification. 
This debate clearly furthers this conversation to what one could consider the focus on the 
driving force in EU external relation i.e. the common commercial policy of the EU. There have 
been never-ending discussions of how to interpret the CCP. The Commission is representing 
more of a supranational approach, which strives towards a larger scope of the CCP. The Council 
represents a more internal governmentalism with the attempts to keep the CCP narrow. The 
Council considers that international trade agreements should be based on shared competence to 
a larger extent. Opinion 1/94 functioned as an attempt to confront the on-going discussions; 
however, the CJEU treated the CCP as ‘an open-ended and evolutionary concept’.139 The CCP 
operates in a more global context where its internal provisions is dependent on the international 
trade development. This clearly indicates that in order to be able to grasp the CCP and the 
NGFTAs as a new legal instrument for the EU’s external action, it is necessary to have a broader 
mind-set to consider the multi-level governance at the national, EU, and international levels. It 
also means that the multilevel governance should be viewed as the core and backbone to the 
theoretical base of the EU. The fact that the EU law should apply as a final authority is accepted 
and provides a constitutional limit in a legitimatized hierarchy.140 
The EU should, as already implied by the Van Gend and Costa, maintain its legal order 
independently from external legal processes, which, in that sense, include both domestic, i.e. 
Member States’ domestic legislations, and international law. It has become ‘(…) increasingly 
artificial to describe the legal structure and processes of the Community with the vocabulary of 
international law (…)’.141 
Maintaining such legal order provides complications in relation to the balance between 
the free trade within the NGFTAs and an adequate protection of the EU’s autonomy.  
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There have been attempts to increase the scope of judicial review inside the EU through 
the Lisbon Treaty;142 and it remains important to consider the refusal by the EU’s institutions 
of judicial remedies against their violation, and the EU’s international treaty obligations under 
the WTO law, and the NGFTAs.143 
Some scholars simply denied the existence of a basic norm, or a rule of recognition and 
some type of a merger of public resources in international law. That is, the rules of international 
law do not constitute a single system. ‘International law simply consists of a set of separate 
primary rules of obligation which are not united in this manner’.144 The CJEU instead reasoned 
that ‘(...) by contrast with ordinary international treaties the EEC Treaty has created its own 
legal system’.145 However, the more logical reasoning in relation to the EU would instead be 
that each treaty-system in fact constitutes a separate legal system, in which the agreed objectives 
and specific rules may essentially derogate from general international law.146 
The EU is an existing legal system that has already established norms and principles. 
However, the Lisbon Treaty provided a new legal system that can be considered, when it comes 
to its legal instruments, as still developing. The Lisbon Treaty acquired a new form of system 
which in turn has been giving birth to new norms and policies in the EU. The new CCP gave 
birth to new understandings of the EU’s external action, and free trade agreements.  
The NGFTAs are new type of instruments that were generated from the change of policy. 
Therefore, these instruments need to be examined in light of competence and also in relation to 
the EU autonomy.  
In order to view the distinctive character of the EU, it has to be viewed from both, its 
international identity and ‘internal’ constitutional system of relations between institutions. This 
model of integration operates at more than one level, and the different features providing the 
base of the CCP to conclude international agreements will be examined in the context of 
bilateral FTAs to reach for further liberalisation of trade. It is important to underline, in this 
regard, that effective judicial remedies for citizens in both domestic and international courts 
may be somewhat overlooked. 
The EU’s trade policy should therefore be guided by broader goals than simply the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on trade and investment. The EU aims at combining 
economic interests, political values, and other norms in its external relations, yet without 
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indicating any prioritisation among these objectives. This new constitutional framework for the 
EU’s external action creates the legal foundation for coordinating the CCP with other external 
policies and pursuing non-trade objectives through trade. It may also lead to tensions and 
problems of policy coherence, not the least as this ‘normative’ amendment of EU’s primary law 
coincides with a shift in EU’s trade policy towards more offensive commercial concerns.  
The New Generation of FTAs can, in this regard, be defined as a commitment of the 
signatory parties to remove trade barriers that may exist between them.147 It can also be 
considered to provide a new institutional framework that establishes the base to include a wide 
variety of regulatory cooperation within the agreements. This is accomplished through 
increasingly contemplating regulatory cooperation within the NGFTAs. The rational for 
promoting regulatory cooperation through these agreements is to be able to work together in 
order to develop rules that implicate areas of domestic regulatory policy. This is usually the 
situation in cases where the subjects of international regulatory cooperation have been too 
difficult to be successfully addressed through a multilateral trade agenda. 
Furthermore, the NGFTAs have also legal effects, such as the provisional application, 
and the potential conflict with the autonomy of the EU’s legal order. The balance between 
liberalisation of trade and adequate protection of the EU clearly shows a more complex 
interaction through utilitarian concepts of economic justice where the terms of consumer 
welfare and reduction of poverty. This should be based on constitutional democracies and the 
Lisbon Treaty justifying law and governance in terms of equal constitutional and cosmopolitan 
rights though human rights, ‘constituent powers’, and ‘democratic principals’, delegating only 
limited governance powers to national governments and EU institutions; democratic 
governance, rule of law, and other ‘secondary constitutional principles’ derive from the human 
and constitutional rights mutually recognized among citizens in their ‘social contracts’.148 
4.2 Methods 
The EU’s external relations law is built to govern its interaction with the world through 
rules governing the division of competence, the adoption of the instrument, and principles that 
may affect or be affected by the NGFTAs.149 This idea has helped to outline the structure of the 
thesis. Firstly, through rules governing the division of competences between the EU’s 
institutions and Member States; in other words, the competence to establish what policy to be 
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taken on which level. Secondly, in regard to the rules governing which instruments the EU may 
adopt through its conferred competences. Thirdly, in relation to the governing principles, which 
may have legal effect on these instruments in the EU, and also internationally;150 in other words, 
the autonomy principle. 
When considering the policy shift, the agreements will function to exemplify issues in 
relation to competence apparent in the agreements, and also the ISDS mechanism, and how it 
corresponds to the EU and the CJEU. 
The research will be conducted from a problem-oriented view in order to describe the 
origin, content, rationalization, and potential consequences of the NGFTAs as a new legal 
instrument. The EU’s free trade agreements are built on the WTO as the platform or starting 
point of trade. The balance is between a rule-based or liberalizing approach. This is specifically 
in regard to the fact that the EU’s role, as a rule generator in external relations, is underpinned 
by the internal development. The EU’s approach is, in this respect, dynamic with new methods 
of integration and multileveled governance, closely linked to a constantly evolving 
constitutionalism.151 
4.2.1 The Legal Dogmatic Method 
The legal dogmatic method152 refers to studies concerning what is a valid law as well as 
why different elements of such law interact with one another. This approach applies to the 
former discussions concerning the EU as a multi-layered legal order. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the dogmatic method to be used can best be described 
by Bulygin. The first sub-group refers to where it is necessary to identify the legal norms, 
where the meaning of the formulation of the norms, which occurs in the legal text, should 
be analysed. The second sub-group should refer to a systematisation of legal norms, which 
can be made through analysis of case-law. The third sub-group refers to questioning, 
modifying, or transforming the legal system.153 This will be consequently used in each 
chapter. 
The on-going development of EU law should be considered in a more interactive multi-
layered legal order with a plurality of legal sources, including EU law constitutional 
considerations, internal market provisions, competences, bilateral agreements, and to a certain 
extent, public international law. Analysis of statutes, rulings by courts and authorities, policy 
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statements and doctrine serve the practical purpose of displaying and giving content to the 
legal rules. Additionally, on a more theoretical level, it should also be possible to 
systematise the legal material and give a base for further developing legal concepts and 
doctrines. 
The two interesting points to show with this research are the scope of competence in 
relation to NGFTA, and the autonomy of the EU law in relation to dispute settlement and ISDS. 
In this regard, the overarching ambition is to provide further guidance in the interpretation 
of ‘New Generation’ FTAs. Analysis of EU law and the NGFTAs, rulings by courts and 
authorities, as well as policy statements and doctrine serve the practical purpose of 
displaying and giving content to the legal rules. Additionally, this work may give rise to a 
systematisation of the legal concepts and doctrines for the NGFTAs as legal instruments 
of the EU. 
The changes in policy starting from 2006, together with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009 provided for the FTAs as a new legal instrument. The policy changes will be 
viewed in relation to the attribution of competence and the wide subject range of the 
agreements, on the one hand, and the relation between the EU autonomy and investment 
arbitration tribunals on the other hand. During the course of this thesis, clarity was provided by 
the CJEU in relation to the post-Lisbon CCP, and the exercise of EU’s trade and investment 
policy more generally through its Opinion 2/15. The legal issues in relation to the nature of the 
new ICS in the agreements have also been brought up to the CJEU for clarification, although 
Opinion 1/17 has not yet been delivered.  
Naturally, the choice of subject for this thesis has proven to be very dynamic, where many 
changes have been provided throughout the course of writing. At the beginning, there were few 
written materials in relation to this type of trade agreements, but this has been dramatically 
changed with the many contradicting opinions surrounding the TTIP. The dynamic nature of 
the agreements provided the necessity for a flexible approach to the subject. In terms of the 
availability of materials, such as articles and doctrines, it has gradually changed from almost 
nothing to so overwhelming in extremely short period of time. The legal materials available at 
different stages have been analysed and systematized. 
4.2.2 Classification of NGFTAs 
As a first consideration, the NGFTAs are considered to be bilateral comprehensive 
agreements because of their wide scope.154 The objectives are in general similar for this type of 
agreements. The NGFTAs considered for this research have trade and investment agreement as 
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their primary objective. They are motivated through neutralizing trade diversion resulting from 
FTAs between third countries, forging strategic links with countries or regions experiencing 
rapid economic growth or enforcement of international trade rules. 
There is no standard form of EU’s international agreements. Even though all trade 
agreements contain trade components, the objective of trade provisions as well as indication of 
the level of trade liberalisation that the agreement envisages may differ among the different 
agreements. However, all the selected agreements differ from former FTAs. This type of 
agreement can be considered to have more of a commercial objective. The ultimate aim of the 
agreements should be to neutralize potential discrimination against the EU’s exports and 
investments through free trade. 
Determining which agreements to consider for this thesis has its starting point from the 
idea of Ahearn’s categorisation of EU’s trade related agreements,155 and are thereafter 
considered to go further than the already established categorisation of WTO-plus and WTO-
extra, which makes them fall into a new group named WTO-beyond. These agreements are 
specifically important because of the use of international standards in areas of deeper 
integration in order to ensure that the developed rules in major markets are consistent with the 
European standards. When it comes to international trade, the growing emphasis on the EU’s 
competitiveness may create tensions in regard to certain constitutional aspects.156 Moreover, 
together with the trade aspects of the agreements, special attention has been dedicated to the 
investment issues and in particular the new ICS. The ICS does not function as a common 
denominator in the classification processes, since the ICS was introduced much later in the 
process of the thesis. Denominator is the overall objective of deeper integration underpinning 
these types of agreements.  
Moreover, the agreements chosen for this research should be bilateral in nature and are 
geographically distant trading parties to the EU. It means that close cooperation agreements, 
such as with Turkey, will therefore be excluded from this research.  
The agreements listed for this thesis as the NGFTAs are firstly EU-South Korea, KOREU, 
which is an important agreement to consider due to the fact that it was concluded right after the 
EU’s switch in policy and could be considered as the gold standard of the NGFTAs, where 
further development has built in in the later agreements. The EU KOREA though still has a 
comprehensive depth to its provisions where it established a free trade area on goods, services, 
and establishment, with the objective to facilitate trade in services and investment between the 
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parties and promote FDI without lowering or reducing environmental, labour or occupational 
health and safety.157 
In the CETA agreement objectives can be found in the preamble of the agreement. It 
clearly states that it is within the parties’ intention to create, expand and secure market for their 
goods and services through the reduction or elimination of barriers to trade and investment 
based on clear and transparent rules governing their trade and investment. It, moreover, 
recognizes that the provision of the agreement protects investments and investors with respect 
to their investment and are intended to mutually benefit the business of the parties. It 
furthermore reaffirms that their commitment to promote sustainable development and the 
development of international trade in a way to contribute to sustainable development in its 
economic, social and environmental dimensions.158 
The objective of the Singapore agreement is to liberalise and facilitate trade and 
investment between the parties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.159 The EU 
Singapore agreement makes clear that the parties are determined to strengthen their economic, 
trade and investment relations in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, in 
its economy, social and environmental dimensions, and to promote trade. The parties are also 
determined to promote trade and investment in a manner mindful of high level of environmental 
and labour protection and relevant standards.160 
The objective of the EU Japan agreement is to liberalize and facilitate trade and 
investment, but also to promote a closer economic relation s between the parties.161 The parties 
are then determined to establish a legal framework in order to strengthen their economic 
partnership. However, the parties recognize that it should be done in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development in the economic social and environmental dimensions. 
And while promoting trade and investment they need to be mindful to ensure the high level of 
environmental labour protection through relevant international standards.162 
Similarly, the EU Vietnam objective is to liberalize and facilitate trade and investment 
between the parties.163 The parties are then determined to strengthen their economic trade and 
investment relationship in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, in its 
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economic, social and environmental dimensions. The parties are further determined to promote 
trade and investment under this agreement in a manner mindful of high levels of environmental 
and labour protection and standards.164 
The EU-US FTA (TTIP) is the largest bilateral trade initiative ever negotiated; however, 
it was indefinitely halted in 2016. It is significant in its potential global reach in setting an 
example for future partners and agreements. 
4.3 Delimitation 
By defining the boundaries of this research, it is important to state that the research will 
focus on the ‘New Generation’ of FTAs as a new legal instrument of the EU’s external trade. 
The NGFTAs considered for this research have trade and investment agreement as their 
primary objective, where trade relates to on export and investment leads to naturally exclude 
other types of agreements, trade agreements in relation to integration, cooperation, and trade 
with less developed countries.165 This also means that association agreements which have 
different objectives and where the focus is not on trade and investment but rather on promoting 
gradual rapprochement between the parties based on common values and close and privileged 
links and provide frameworks for enhanced political dialogue in all areas of mutual interest, 
fall outside of the scope of this research.166 
This type of agreements break ground into new areas, such as labour standards, 
environment and competition policy.167 Within the scope of this thesis, such specific areas will 
not be thoroughly dealt with, but rather analysed in their context. This applies also to other 
areas, such as public procurement and environmental protection. These areas do not particularly 
help answering the research question, and are therefore excluded, even if they could be seen as 
affected by the NGFTAs. 
The focus being on the new legal instrument will therefore put the focus on the potential 
risks and outcomes from the agreements as a new legal instrument, which means that they will 
not be examined in a purely comparative manner but instead analysed in relation to their 
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definition. In other words, the chosen agreements, which are examples of NGFTAs, will be 
used in order to demonstrate the function of the instrument. 
The balance between the obligation to comply with international law and the autonomy 
of the EU legal order is in the heart of the constitutional construction of the EU. The concept 
of autonomy used for the purpose of this thesis, will therefore refer to the principle of autonomy 
of the EU legal order, and specifically in relation to the EU’s external relations. This clearly 
excludes any definition of autonomy used in international law, such as institutional autonomy, 
which refers to the relationship between an international organization and public international 
law more generally.168 Moreover, it should not be confused with territorial integrity or 
sovereignty, which is discussed in international law. Territorial integrity is an international law 
principle, which was meant to broaden the protection against the use of force by more powerful 
states. The protection of the territory is an expression of the sovereign equality of all states, no 
matter how powerful they are.169 
The main perspective in the analysis and discussions will surround the effect this type of 
agreements, as legal instruments, may have on the EU. For this reason, the main focus is the 
EU. In EU law, it is possible to point out that Member States’ national sovereignty is embodied 
in the principle of conferral, even though the principle of primacy, direct effect and 
effectiveness of EU law are also important factors in this regard.170 However, this thesis is not 
intended to address problems related to the different ways in which the EU differs from the 
domestic legal systems. 
International legal perspectives will be taken into consideration and discussed for the 
purpose of reaching the larger goal in answering the research question. These include 
international public law, investment law and international economic law with international 
principles. The same applies to cases from the WTO or other dispute settlement bodies; they 
will be used as examples but will not be the main focus. 
Concerning individual Member States and national legislations, the thesis will not go into 
details. The discussions on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) will stay on a policy level 
without entering into the level of individual Member States. 
Viewing the NGFTAs as trade instruments for the EU also requires the study of their 
main functions. Technically, these agreements are legal instruments of the EU’s external trade. 
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In this thesis, the NGFTAs are used as the sole example, since they are the only agreements 
concerning free trade and investment with international parties. 
The NGFTAs are bilateral in nature and provide elimination of trade barriers between 
countries. They promote free trade that is concentrated and, more importantly, also limited to 
the trading blocks, which are parts of the agreement. 
5 Disposition 
Chapter I, being the introductory chapter, did not only establish the background to the 
subject, but also the framework, through which the research will be conducted. The main 
research question and the delimitation further provided the structured frame for the research. 
The methodology section determined the theoretical backbone and explained the method on 
which the research will be based. 
Chapter II provides overview of the legal framework for the EU to conclude the 
NGFTAs. This chapter examines the rules governing the adoption of NGFTAs as legal 
instruments. It will address the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements in regard to the 
ratification, provisional application and implementation. 
Chapter III explains the objectives for the NGFTAs as new legal trade policy instruments 
in relation to the EU’s competence. It furthermore analyses the limits of implied exclusive 
competence and shared competence. It examines the research sub-question 1 on the attributed 
competence and its limits, and also the different areas of competence applicable to NGFTAs. 
Chapter IV examines the rules governing the adoption of the NGFTAs as mixed 
agreements. It discusses the implication of concluding the NGFTAs as mixed agreements; this 
way, it addresses the link between the main research question and the first sub research 
question. 
Chapter V examines research sub-question 2 on how the dispute settlement mechanisms 
within the NGFTAs for investments and investor-States affect the autonomy of EU law, which 
corresponds to the third categorisation of the methodology. It is intended to clarify the balance 
between the autonomy of the EU legal order on the one hand, and the investment protection 
provisions included in the NGFTAs on the other hand. The interaction between the EU legal 
order’s autonomy and international dispute settlement is of particular interest, especially in 
order to clearly determine the ISDS, and institutional difficulties of the NGFTAs. 
Chapter VI concludes the discussions surrounding the significance of the NGFTAs as a 
new legal instrument, and the implication it may have on the EU’s external action. The chapter 
serves as an analytical discussion binding the previous parts of the thesis together. Furthermore, 
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it will suggest potential modifications and clarifications of the instruments and present areas, 
which will open the door for further future research on the NGFTAs. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE NGFTAS AS EU AGREEMENTS 
This chapter is intended to provide a broader presentation of the New Generation Free 
Trade Agreements (NGFTAs), which are selected for this thesis. The agreements will be more 
generally presented in terms of negotiation and conclusion, objectives and dispute settlement 
procedure.  
Thereafter, this chapter will address the legal and institutional framework, the procedure 
for negotiation, the ratification process and the surrounding circumstances for provisional 
application of trade agreement. Subsequently this chapter will further address the institutional 
requirement for implementation. The ratification process, and its surrounding issues will be 
discussed together with the possibility to provisionally apply the agreements.  
Additionally, the implementation of agreements, and the role of the European Parliament 
and Council will be explained. Thereafter, the possibility to renegotiate and make amendments 
to the agreements will be discussed. 
1 An Overview of the NGTAs 
The recent developments in the EU’s external action have led to the NGFTAs. Since the 
Lisbon Treaty, these agreements could be considered to complete the picture of the EU’s new 
trade policy and objectives. In order to be able to further analyse the legal and institutional 
framework it is important to first of all present the six different agreements which will serve as 
examples but also a base for further analytical discussion in this thesis. These agreements are 
of particular interest due to their new ambitious model with deeper integration.171 
1.1 EU–Korea FTA (KOREU) 
The EU–Korea FTA (KOREU), which was signed on 6 October 2010, was the first 
agreement to be accomplished after the shift in the EU’s policy. For this reason, it is considered 
to be the gold-standard for the ‘New Generation’ of FTAs.172  
The NGFTAs extend the rule of law by including issues, such as competition and 
investment, which were not considered by the WTO due to the lack of consensus between the 
                                                   
171 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Europeand 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness 
Globalisation, (Communication on a Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalisation)’ COM (2017) 492 
final. 
172 European Commission DGTrade ‘The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in Practice’ (n 16), p. 3. 
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parties.173 In this regard, one can consider that the KOREU was ‘(...) testing ground for new 
multilateral trade policy disciplines and regulations (...).174 
The FTAs indicate general commitments where the parties are obliged to remove barriers 
to trade in goods and services. The KOREU includes the removal of tariffs and substantial 
market access commitments for a broad range of service sectors.175 It also contains further trade 
liberalisation with provisions that go beyond existing multilateral rules or the so-called WTO-
plus provisions. 
The collaboration between the EU and South Korea had been established long before the 
KOREU’s negotiations started. The two parties were already engaged in a framework 
agreement on trade and cooperation.176 Hence, the KOREU is considered as a natural 
progression.177 The agreement was implemented after a relatively rapid negotiation. The swift 
process could have been a result of the already established close trade relations.178 
The KOREU contains a general dispute settlement mechanism provided in Chapter 14. It 
also includes some sector-specific dispute settlement rules that are provided in each relevant 
Chapter.179 The KOREU dispute settlement procedure can be considered to be evolved from 
the WTO dispute settlement procedure.180 The dispute settlement mechanism includes 
consultation, establishment of a panel, submission of report by the panel, and the 
implementation of the latter report as basic procedures.181 
                                                   
173 Der-Chin Horng, 'Reshaping the EU's FTA Policy in a Globalizing Economy: The Case of the EU-Korea FTA' (2012) 46 
Journal of World Trade 301, pp. 315-317. He suggests that: “The WTO-plus sectors must be deemed necessary if the EU’s 
[Common Commercial Policy] and foreign policy are to be lawfully pursued. From a jurisprudence angle, the failure to adopt 
these sectors in the new generation FTA would compromise the legality of EU actions because compliance with the specific 
objectives of Articles 3 and 207 TFEU and Article 21 TEU would no longer be guaranteed”, ibid, p. 315. 
174 Ibid, p. 322. 
175 Harrison, ‘Overview of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement’, p. 59. 
176 Framework Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Korea, 
on the other part [2010] OJ L 127/6, p. 4. Article 2(1)(a). The framework agreement was concluded between EU and Korea 
in 1996. The framework agreement makes reference to an increased bilateral cooperation, and hints to the possibility of 
negotiating closer economic ties between the parties in the future. 
177 Framework Agreement for Trade and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States on the one 
hand and the Republic of Korea on the other hand OJ L 90/46. 
178 In 2011, the EU exported goods worth 32.4 billion Euro and services worth 7.5 billion Euro to Korea. The EU is also the 
second largest source of imports to Korea only after China. For its part, Korea exported goods worth 36.1 billion and services 
worth 4.5 billion to the EU making Korea the tenth largest trading partner of the EU. 
179 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of 
the other part, Chapter 14. 
180 Hee-Sang Kim, 'Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Korea-EU FTA' (2010) 1 Yonsei Law Journal , p. 227. 
181 Council Decision of 16 September 2010 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of 
the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of 
the other part [2011] OJ L 127/6, Article 7.45. 
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One specific aspect of particular interest in the KOREU dispute settlement procedure is 
the ‘two-stage’ process:182 first consultation,183 and then setting up a panel of experts.184 The 
EU-South Korea FTA introduced the innovation of this two-stage process. 
1.2 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
The EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is one of the 
first signed comprehensive trade agreements. The negotiation between the EU and Canada 
ended on 26 September 2014. 
In September 2014, the provisional text was officially published; and in February 2016, 
after certain modifications, the finalized text was published.185 The agreement was thereafter 
signed in October 2016.186 The final CETA comprises forty-two chapters, annexes, appendices, 
protocols, declarations, and understandings.187 
The CETA has been provisionally applied since September 2017.188 The provisional 
application means that certain provisions of the agreement will be applied before the ratification 
process by the Member States is completed.189 However, the Investment Court System (ICS) 
will be excluded from the provisional application.190 
The CETA aims at increasing bilateral trade and investment. Many of the provisions in 
the agreement are progressive and innovative. Moreover, the CETA is considered as a 
comprehensive agreement going beyond the WTO agreements. Nevertheless, it is compatible 
with the WTO. It makes cross-references to the WTO with respect to the GATT, and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).191 
                                                   
182 European Parliament ‘Briefing paper: Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters in CETA’ (n 43). 
183 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of 
the other part, Articles 13, 14. 
184 Ibid, Articles 13, 15. 
185 One modification of the CETA texts worth mentioning is that the decisions by the CETA Joint Committee shall be 
binding on the parties only subject to the completion of any necessary internal requirements and procedures. 
186 European Commission ‘EU-Canada summit: newly signed trade agreement sets high standards for global trade’ 2016 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3581_en.htm> accessed 15 July 2018. 
187 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part. 
188 Council Decision 2017/38 of 28 October 2016 on the provisional application of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part [2017] 
OJ L 11/1080 
189 ‘European Commission Fact Sheet: CETA - a trade deal that sets a new standard for global trade’ 2016 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3580_en.htm> accessed 12 February 2017. 
190 European Commission ‘EU-Canada summit: newly signed trade agreement sets high standards for global trade’ (n 186). 
191 An example to cross-references provided in the CETA agreement could be Article 1.4 in Chapter 1 of General Definitions 
and Initial Provisions in the CETA agreement where it provides the cross-reference to Article XXIV GATT and Article V 
GATS, which constitute the benchmarks that are relevant for determining whether a free trade area is in conformity with the 
GATT and GATS. 
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These types of cross-references are found in trade in goods and services, where the WTO 
principles192 are incorporated in CETA’s central provisions.193 Moreover, in the CETA, the 
references or principles taken from the WTO discipline are sometimes further developed, 
rendered in a more precise and comprehensive manner, or simply going way beyond the WTO 
commitment through newly introduced trade rules.194 
The CETA also includes investment protection rules that go beyond the WTO 
commitments.195 Additionally, it contains commitments to treat investors fairly and equitably, 
provisions addressing ‘treaty shopping’, standards for protection of investors,196 and rules on 
transparency state disputes.197 There are also provisions to promote labour rights and 
environmental protection. Public health, safety, promotion and protection of cultural diversity 
are referred to in the preamble in order for the parties to keep its autonomy.198  
The ISDS provisions are the most important provisions of the CETA, because they 
represent a new model for free trade, and more importantly, for NGFTAs.199 In relation to the 
WTO-plus provisions, there can be a situation where the trade preference does not need to be 
extended because of its already existing reference in NGFTAs. This becomes more of a concern 
in relation to other forms of international economic integration that provide for regulatory 
cooperation. This is because such institutionalized mechanisms can come to affect future 
domestic regulatory initiatives, and in that way, also bilateral trade. 
1.3 EU–Singapore FTA (EUSFTA) 
The EU and Singapore commenced trade and investment negotiations in 2010. The 
finalised trade and investment agreements had been completed, and formally approved by the 
European Commission. At this stage, it needs to be agreed upon by the Council and the 
                                                   
192 World Trade Organization, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, preamble, para. 1. “build on their respective 
rights and obligations under the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization …”, ibid, Chapter 1, 
Article 1.5, where the parties ‘affirm their rights and obligations with respect to each other under the WTO Agreement and 
other agreements to which the Parties are party’. 
193 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part chapter 2, WTO provisions on national treatment and import and export restrictions for 
goods. 
194 New trade-rules introduced by the CETA are those which go beyond the WTO such as for example the international 
maritime transport services in CETA, found in chapter 14 of the CETA agreement. 
195 The WTO commitment contains few substantive rules on investor protection, but has no investor-State dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
196 In relation to investment protection the ISDS represent a turning point, in relation to the fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
standard and indirect expropriation. 
197 Kevin Ackhurst, Stephen Nattrass and Erin Brown, 'CETA, the Investment Canada Act and SOEs: A Brave New World 
for Free Trade' (2016) 31 ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal 58, p. 59. 
198 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part, In particular paras. 6, 10, and 11 of the preamble as well as Chapter 22 concerning trade 
and sustainable development and Chapter 23 concerning trade and labour, and Chapter 24 concerning trade and environment. 
199 Ackhurst, Nattrass, Brown, ‘CETA, the Investment Canada Act and SOEs: A Brave New World for Free Trade’ (n 197), 
p. 58. 
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European Parliament. Bilateral agreements between the Member States and Singapore will 
cease to have effect with the entry into force of this NGFTA. This is because the new agreement 
will replace and supersede other agreements.200 
The EUSFTA trade agreement can also be considered as one of the initial “new 
generation” bilateral agreements, since it contains important provisions on intellectual property 
protection, investment liberalisation, public procurement, competition and sustainable 
development. These provisions are on top of the classical removal of customs duties and non-
tariff barriers for trade in goods and services. The objective of the EUSFTA is to liberalise and 
facilitate trade and investment in accordance with the provisions of the negotiated agreement,201 
and to establish free trade area consistent with Article XXIV of GATT and Article V of 
GATS.202 The parties shall further progressively and reciprocally liberalise trade in goods.203 
In accordance with Article XI of GATT, neither party shall adopt or maintain any prohibition 
or restriction on the other party’s importation of goods or exportation or sale for export of any 
goods.204 
The EUSFTA has further commitments than current WTO’s in many aspects. Moreover, 
the agreement does not only provide improved access to the Singaporean market but is also 
beneficial for European companies operating from Singapore across the Southeast Asian 
region. The agreement will provide a framework to facilitate and increase trade in goods 
between the parties, and prevent and eliminate unnecessary barriers to trade.205 The parties 
further recognized the importance of customs, and had agreed upon trade facilitation and 
reinforcing cooperation in order to ensure that the legislations and procedures fulfil the 
objectives of an effective customs control.206 Furthermore, the parties shall cooperate towards 
removing or reducing tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers to trade in order to foster regulatory 
convergence with or towards regional international standards.207 
The parties shall, through the adequate level of protection of intellectual property rights 
and effective enforcement, increase the benefit from trade and investment, and facilitate the 
production and commercialisation of innovative and creative products.208 In relation to issues 
of standards and certification, good regulatory practices, cooperation on standards and 
                                                   
200 EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018) Chapter 9, Investment, Section A, 
Article 9.10. 
201 Ibid., Article 1.2 Objectives. 
202 Ibid., Chapter one, objectives and General definitions, Article 1.1. 
203 Ibid., National Treatment and Market access for goods, Section A, Article 2.1. 
204 Ibid., National Treatment and Market access for goods, Section C, Article 2.9. 
205 Ibid., Chapter 4, Technical Barriers to Trade, Article 4.1. 
206 Ibid., Chapter 6, Customs and Trade Facilitation, Article 6.1. 
207 Ibid., Chapter 7, Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade and Investment in Renewable Energy Generation, Article 7.1. 
208 Ibid., Chapter 11, Intellectual Property, Article 11.1. 
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transparency provisions, the outcome in the EU–Singapore agreement is considered to be 
similar to the KOREU’s. Additionally, in line with the KOREU, the EUSFTA will also include 
sectorial annexes on technical barriers to trade.209 
The NGFTAs contain rules in order to better benefit the playing field for the operators. 
For example, they comprise competition rules, where the parties acknowledge the importance 
of free and undistorted competition. Otherwise, the proper functioning of their markets may be 
distorted, and the benefits of trade liberalisation may be undermined.210  
In Opinion 2/15, The CJEU decided that the EUSFTA has to be concluded as a mixed 
agreement,211 where it has to be ratified by all Member States.212 The EUSFTA was divided 
into two sections, and it now constitutes two parallel agreements to be signed as partnership 
and cooperation agreements. Once it is entered into force, it will constitute the legal framework 
to further develop strong and longstanding partnership between the EU and Singapore.213 On 
April 18, 2018, the European Commission presented to the Council the free trade agreement 
split into two segments: one being the EUSFTA, and the other being the EU–Singapore 
Investment Protection Agreement.214  
The chapter regarding dispute settlement is made to avoid and settle any difference 
between the parties, concerning the interpretation and application of the agreement.215 The 
parties have also agreed on effective enforcement of the framework to settle disputes in an 
effective and transparent manner.216 Rulings from the bilateral arbitration panel can be obtained 
faster than those from the relevant WTO dispute settlement system.217 Dispute settlement is 
used to settle differences between the parties concerning interpretation and application of the 
agreement.218  
When there is a conflict between the parties, an investor wishing to challenge the action 
of the host state can, through arbitration to the ICS, either challenge indirectly via a State-to-
                                                   
209 IBEC Irish Business and Employers Confederation, ‘EU--Singapore Free Trade Agreement’ (2011) Quarterly Trade 
Bulletin <http://www.ibec.ie/IBEC/Publications.nsf/vPages/Trade_Bulletin~trade-bulletin---march-2011-10-03-
2011/$file/IBEC+trade+publication+Mar2011.pdf> accessed 20 April 2017. 
210 EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018), Chapter 12, Competition and Related 
Matters, Section Antitrust and Mergers, Article 12.1.1. 
211 Opinion of the Court of Justice of 16 May 2017, (Singapore FTA), 2/15, EU:C:2016:992. 
212 Marc Maresceau, ‘A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements’ in Panos Koutrakos (ed), Mixed Agreements Revisited: 
The EU and Its Member States in the World, vol Bloomsbury Collections (Hart Publishing 2010), p. 12. 
213 European Commission ‘Fact Sheet: Memorandum, Key elements of the EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements’ 
2018 <www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-3327_en.pdf> accessed 30 June 2018. 
214 ‘Investment Protection Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, Of The One Part, and The 
Republic Of Singapore, of the Other Part’ 2018accessed EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as 
of April 2018) 
215 EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018), Chapter 15, Dispute Settlement, 
Section A, 15.1. 
216 Ibid., Chapter 15, Dispute Settlement, Section A, 15.1. 
217 Ibid., Chapter 15, Dispute Settlement, Section A, 15.5. 
218 Ibid., Chapter 15, Section A, objective and scope, Article 15.1. 
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State dispute settlement, or challenge directly via the ISDS.219 Both parties in the NGFTA are 
committed to a high level of transparency when it comes to rule making, where they recognise 
the impact which their respective regulatory environments may have on trade and investment. 
Furthermore, the parties shall have a predictable and regulatory environment for economic 
operators, including small and medium-sized enterprises.220 
1.4 EU–US FTA (TTIP) 
The first round of talks for the EU–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) came to a closure in July 2013. The negotiating directive for TTIP was released in 
October 2014.221 Between July 2013 and October 2016, 15 negotiation rounds had been held.222 
The negotiation of the TTIP agreement was conducted by the European Commission and the 
US Trade Representative. Although the former negotiations have been stalled, with the 
possibility of terminating the talks,223 the TTIP agreement’s negotiations might be reopened.224 
The TTIP was planned to be based on common values, including the protection and 
promotion of human rights and international security. It was intended to be ambitious, 
comprehensive, and fully consistent with the rules and obligations of the WTO. The 
liberalisation of trade in goods and services, and other trade-related issues should have been of 
reciprocal manner and go beyond the WTO commitments.225 
The objective of the TTIP is:  
(...) to increase trade and investment between the EU and the US by realising the 
untapped potential of a truly transatlantic market place, generating new economic 
                                                   
219European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) ‘From Arbitration to the Investment Court System (ICS) - the Evolution 
of CETA Rules’ 2017 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/607251/EPRS_IDA(2017)607251_EN.pdf> accessed 27 March 
2017, pp. 5-6. 
220 EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018), Chapter 14, Transparency, Article 
14.1. 
221 Council of the European Union ‘Directives for the Negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
between the European Union and the United States of America’ 2014 <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf> accessed 23 June 2015. 
222 Office of the United States Trade Representative ‘Press release: U.S.-EU Joint Report on T-TIP Progress to Date’ 2017 
<https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/january/us-eu-joint-report-t-tip-progress-0> 
accessed 15 December 2017. 
223 ‘France urges Brussels to halt TTIP talks’ Financial Times (London, 30 August 2016) 
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224 Richard Bravo, Julia Chatterley, ‘Trump Is Willing to Reopen TTIP Amid EU-U.S. Trade Dispute, Ross Says’ Bloomberg 
(New York, 29 March 2018 ) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-29/trump-willing-to-reopen-ttip-amid-eu-
u-s-trade-spat-ross-says> accessed 6 April 2018. 
225 ‘Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the 
United States of America’ 2014accessed Council of the European Union ‘Directives for the Negotiation on the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America’, provisions 1-5. 
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opportunities for the creation of jobs and growth through increased market access 
and greater regulatory compatibility and setting the path for global standards.226 
The Commission emphasized three main purposes of the TTIP. Firstly, the TTIP aims to 
improve the access of EU companies to the US market, and by consequence, also facilitate 
exports and imports, as well as making overseas investments easier and more secure. This 
would be accomplished by cutting or removing custom taxes on goods exported from the EU 
to the US.227 Secondly, because of the different standards and rules between the two parties, the 
Commission aims to facilitate the export by regulatory cooperation. This means that even 
though standards are usually conforming, it is the technical details and procedures that are 
employed to verify that the standards have been met. When the standards are conforming, the 
TTIP would promote mutual recognition of rules for the different technical details and 
procedures. When the standards are non-conforming, they would be replaced by new 
compatible rules.228 Thirdly, introducing new rules will facilitate trade for companies with 
access to energy and raw materials, and provide better protection for intellectual property and 
investment.229 
The EU and the US have had a long-term cooperation with the EU–US Positive Comity 
Agreement from 1998, the Administrative Arrangement on Attendance (AAA),230 and the US–
EU Merger Working Group in 2011.231 Through international arbitration, ISDS became a major 
stumbling block in the negotiations of the TTIP. The ISDS was to be characterised by 
transparency and independence of arbitrators, and predictability is also to be included. 
1.5 EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
The negotiations for the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) were 
launched in 2013. In July 2017, the parties reached an agreement in principle on the main 
elements, and the negotiations were finalised in December 2017. On 17 July 2018, at the EU-
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228 European Commission ‘Factsheet on Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP’ 2016 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153002.1%20RegCo.pdf> accessed 18 December 2017. 
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Japan summit in Tokyo, the leaders signed two landmark agreements: The Strategic Partnership 
Agreement and the Economic Partnership Agreement.232 After the legal verification and 
translation processes, the European Commission can submit the agreement for the approval of 
the European Parliament and Member States. The European Commission has proposed to the 
Council and European Parliament to approve the EPA.  
In 2018, on April 18, the Commission presented the text of the agreement to the Council. 
It marks the beginning of a ratification processes at the EU where the agreement aims to be 
entered into force by the end of the current mandate of the European commission in 2019.233 
The EPA is considered to be a comprehensive FTA; and it goes beyond the FTA standard 
commitments by also regulating movement of people and investment rules.234 The EPA differs 
significantly, in both scope and level of ambition, from earlier FTAs that Japan concluded with 
other partners. The EPA, as a comprehensive FTA, will cover a higher number of market access 
issues including tariffs, non-tariff measures affecting trade in goods (including TBT and SPS 
aspects) and services, further market access for services, investment and public procurement, 
competition, intellectual property rights, as well as specific chapters on investment 
protection.235 
The EPA is considered to be the most important bilateral trade agreement ever concluded 
by the EU. Moreover, this agreement will be the first to include a specific commitment to the 
Paris Agreement.236 The adaptation of the scope of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
compels adopted tools of the EU trade policy as well in order to approach the new globalised 
demand to ensure that the EU remains open to the world and other markets.237 
Prior to the EPA, The EU had established a Strategic Partnership with Japan in 2001; and 
the top leaders of the two parties have been meeting regularly at the annual EU–Japan Summit 
since 1991.238 The EU is committed to integrating its new approach to investment protection 
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and dispute resolution, and to an ICS, in all of its new trade agreements. The ICS is considered 
to create a more predictable environment for investors. 
1.6 EU–Vietnam FTA (EVFTA) 
The negotiations of this Free Trade Agreement started in October 2012 and were 
concluded in December 2015. In February 2016, following the announcement of the conclusion 
of negotiations, the text of the EU–Vietnam free trade agreement (EVFTA) was published. On 
25 June 2018, the EU and Vietnam agreed on a final text of the FTA. The legal review of the 
negotiated text is currently on-going.239 After the agreement is translated into EU’s official 
language and Vietnamese, the Commission will provide the Council of Ministers with a 
proposal for approving the agreement. Thereafter, the Council will send the agreement to the 
European Parliament for ratification. 
This agreement is the most ambitious and comprehensive FTA that the EU has ever 
concluded with a developing country. Most remarkable is the inclusion of its sustainable 
development objectives and provisions.240 
The EU–Vietnam FTA includes areas in relation to market access, trade remedies and 
other trade rules regulating national treatment, custom and trade facilitation, technical barriers 
to trade, trade in services, investment and e-commerce, government procurement, competition 
policy, intellectual property, dispute settlement, sustainable development, and transparency.241 
Trade liberalisation, social justice and respect for human rights, and high labour and 
environmental levels of protection also go hand in hand in the FTA. This makes part of the 
Commission’s new strategy on trade and investment.242 Trade policy should not only deliver 
growth, jobs and innovation, but also promote European and international values. 
Prior to EVFTA, Vietnam had preferential access to the EU through the Generalised 
Scheme of Preferences granted by the EU to developing countries. However, this was 
accomplished under the unilateral control of the EU, who could, at any time, change the 
conditions. Additionally, Vietnam could only have access to products defined by the EU.243 
The FTA is now mutually beneficial, and has emphasis on sustainable development, as well as 
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strong commitments to fundamental labour rights and environmental protection. Moreover, the 
EVFTA also includes provisions regarding human rights.244 
To ensure the proper operation of this agreement, there will be trade committees and 
specialised working groups.245 The FTA also provides a permanent dispute resolution system 
to settle disputes that relate to the investment protection provisions, such as protection against 
expropriation without compensation, non-discrimination or fair and equitable treatment 
(FET).246 The agreement sets up a permanent investment tribunal system, under which such 
above-mentioned disputes can be submitted. Moreover, the decisions can be appealed through 
an appeal tribunal, which will ensure the legal correctness and provide certainty in relation to 
the interpretation of the agreement.247 
2 Legal and Institutional Framework for Negotiating NGFTAs 
The EU possesses a legal personality to conclude international agreements on behalf of 
its Member States according to Article 47 TEU. The EU’s legal personality makes it subject to 
international law capable of negotiating and concluding international agreement with the 
competence that is conferred upon it from the Member States by the treaties. The negotiations 
with Singapore and Canada have shown a clear example on how the structure of an agreement 
may provide difficulties for the EU in terms of its internal difference within its constitutional 
organs and Member States. In some cases, this can even lead to stalled negotiations, such as in 
the case of TTIP. The CCP does no longer, after the Lisbon Treaty, address the notion of mixed 
agreements.248 In contrast to Article 218 TFEU, there are no treaty rules in relation to the exact 
way of providing a proper negotiation of a mixed agreement.249 
2.1 The Legislative Procedure 
According to Article 207(2) TFEU, the conclusion of a trade agreement should be made 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure as provided for in Article 294 TFEU. The 
Commission initiates by submitting recommendations to the Council. The Council then 
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authorizes the commencement of the trade negotiation by providing the Commission with a 
negotiation mandate.250 While conducting the negotiation, the Commission continuously 
informs the Council and the European Parliament of the progress and keeps the negotiation in 
accordance with the negotiation mandate.251 
The conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement252 requires the approval of the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, and the consent of the European Parliament, acting by a simple 
majority.253 The legal and institutional backgrounds are important to consider in relation to the 
negotiation and implementation of an agreement, such as the KOREU FTA. 
If we consider the CETA as an example, the Council adopted a package of decisions by 
a written procedure on 28 October 2016. This package included a decision on the signature of 
the agreement, a decision on the provisional application of the agreement, and also a decision 
to request the consent of the European Parliament for the conclusion of the agreement. The 
Member States’ representatives also adopted a joint interpretative instrument, which will 
provide a binding interpretation of the CETA’s terms on specific issues.254 
The EU adopted, through a proposal, the different parts (of the CETA) that fall within its 
competence, and also within the competence of its Member States, such as areas of the 
investment protection and the chapters concerning financial services, as well as the protection 
of intellectual property. In order to ratify and implement the agreement, each Member State 
must vote. The CETA cannot enter permanently into force until it is fully implemented by the 
Member States.255 However, hopefully the benefits of the provisional approval may put 
additional pressure upon the Member States to ratify the agreement for fear of losing all the 
benefits they have experienced. 
On 24 January 2017, the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament voted 
in favour of approving the CETA. This was followed, on 15 February 2017, with a vote by the 
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European Parliament in favour of ratifying the CETA. Unless the CETA is implemented 
properly and fully, it will not be able to realize its full economic potential as an NGFTA.256 
2.2 The Different Stages of Negotiation 
Negotiating an agreement can be distinguished through different levels, first the design 
of the negotiation mandate, secondly the representation of the EU during the negotiation, 
thirdly the ratification and fourthly the implementation and enforcement of the agreement. 
When commencing a negotiation of an agreement, it is the role of the Council to authorize 
the European Commission to negotiate a new trade agreement on behalf of the EU, through a 
‘negotiating mandate’. The objectives, and scope in which the negotiation should be conducted, 
as well as the time frame of the procedure, in the Councils negotiating directive. The 
Commission would thereafter have the framework on which it will conduct its negotiation with 
the third country on behalf of the EU. The negotiation would be accomplished in close 
cooperation with the Council and the European Parliament.257 
After the parties have agreed on the text, the Commission submits its formal proposals to 
the Council for adoption. The Council adopts a decision for the signature of the agreement on 
behalf of the EU. The signed agreement is then transmitted to the European Parliament for 
consent. If the European Parliament provides its approval, the Council thereinafter adopts the 
decision to conclude the agreement.258 
The exercise of the competences in the CCP cannot, as we have seen, be used to 
circumvent the delimitation of competences between the EU and its Member States, affecting 
other legislative acts of regulatory provisions.259 
2.2.1 Negotiations in the Different Agreements 
The European Council is actively involved in determining the general direction of policies 
in the field of external relations.260 To start negotiation, the Commission or High Representative 
make recommendations to the Council, who thereafter adopts a decision to authorize the 
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opening of negotiations.261 In relation to this type of agreements, the Commission262 is then 
nominated as a negotiator.263 
Moreover, the Council provides a directive that encompasses the guidelines of the 
negotiations for the Commission to follow.264 The Commission also needs, throughout the 
negotiation, to consult with a special committee appointed by the Council, which is available 
to assist in the task, and within the framework of the directives given by the Council. 
Furthermore, the Commission shall regularly report to the special committee and the European 
Parliament on the progress of the negotiations.265 
The legal and institutional background for the negotiation and implementation of the 
KOREU in the EU was of crucial importance for three reasons. First of all, given that it was the 
first agreement in the field of trade to be subject to the new procedures, which became 
applicable as a result of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a number of challenges were 
posed as regards untested procedures. Secondly, being the second largest trade agreement ever 
concluded by the EU, a number of substantive issues required attention during the process. 
These included the position of the European Parliament in safeguarding the investigations and 
the operation of certain provisions of the FTA. Thirdly, the procedure for ratification was 
closely watched, as it was likely to set down the framework for the ratification of future 
FTAs.266 The various elements that make up the procedural and institutional framework are 
taken up in the following sections of this contribution.  
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU possesses exclusive competence in market access 
liberalisation and investment protection. When starting the negotiations with Singapore, the 
negotiation mandate did not cover investment protection, therefore the Commission made a 
request to the Council to extend the negotiation mandate, so that the negotiation mandate would 
also include investment protection. The first drafted provision was initiated on 20 September 
2013.  
In March 2013, The Commission drafted a negotiation mandate, which was submitted to 
the Council of Ministers for approval by the Member States. In May 2013, the European 
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Parliament passed a supporting resolution for the negotiation. In June of the same year, the 
Council of Ministers approved the Commission’s submission, giving it a mandate to commence 
the negotiation. In October 2014, the negotiation directive was declassified as an attempt to 
make negotiations more transparent, in order to ensure that the general public had accurate and 
full information of the EU’s intentions. In September 2015, the first draft of the investment 
section of the TTIP was released, conforming to the negotiation directive and giving a good 
insight on the EU’s current position on the investment protection provisions. A big change is 
that the latest draft proposes the establishment of the entirely new ICS in the TTIP, complete 
with a framework on how this could work. According to the Commission, the establishment of 
an investment court is ‘(...) intended to be the stepping stones towards a permanent multilateral 
system for investment disputes’.267 
When the negotiations of the EUSFTA started, investment protection was not included; 
therefore, the agreement was previewed to be concluded within the exclusive competence of 
the EU; that is, without the participation of the Member States. The Commission seeks an 
opinion from the CJEU regarding the allocation of competences between the EU and its 
Member States in relation to the NGFTA, under Article 218(11) TFEU. In Opinion 2/15, the 
Commission considers that the EU has exclusive competence to conclude the agreement. The 
submissions of the Council and its members contend that the EU does not have the competence 
to conclude the agreement within exclusive competence, since certain parts of the NGFTA fall 
within the shared competence of the EU and its Member States. 
2.2.2 Transparent Negotiation 
The negotiation of bilateral and regional agreements is often being criticized for lacking 
transparency, inclusiveness and equal participation of stakeholders and the public.268 For this 
reason, the regulatory practices need to be negotiated with the national government as well as 
with a civil society organisation, as was noticed in the negotiations of CETA. The Commission 
learnt that it could only enter into negotiation with external partners as a homogenous actor, 
only if all parties are on the same side. The trade policy is a project, which is in a clear relation 
with the principle of cooperation, from both sides of the EU and its Member States. To 
accommodate this issue, the CETA required the EU to make substantial change in relation to 
transparency, and also in relation to social and environmental concerns. Establishing the EU as 
a homogenous actor will continue to be an on-going process. 
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2.3 Ratification Process 
Ratification by just the EU is only possible when an agreement is concluded through 
exclusive competence, or through direct exercise of shared competence. When it is concluded 
as a mixed agreement, it has to go through a ratification process by all Member States. Such 
procedure is accomplished through the national parliaments of the Member States and is 
thereafter completed by a ratification process in the Council. The AG Sharpston described the 
process as likely to be both cumbersome and complex. This type of negotiation may become 
lengthy since they may be blocked by few Member States, or even by one Member State. 269 
Both the CJEU case law and the existing literature hardly cover what happens when a 
bilateral mixed agreement is not ratified.270 Mixed agreements, which are not ratified, are 
considered as incomplete271 or imperfect.272 
This type of outcomes would lead to undermine the efficiency of EU external action and 
have negative consequences for the EU’s relations for EU’s relation with the third state 
concerned in the negotiation.273 For Member States that have ratified an agreement, the 
agreement would fully enter into force within their territories. However, Member States that do 
not ratify would remain bound solely to the areas that fall within the exclusive competences 
according to Article 216(2) TFEU.274 
Considering the CETA as an example, it is indicated in the preamble that the agreement 
concerns on the one part the EU and its Member States, and on the other part Canada.275 This 
is because both, the EU and its Member States function as contracting parties to a mixed 
agreement;276 and they have to act within their own competences.277 
On the other hand, the ratification of multilateral mixed agreements, where one or several 
Member States do not ratify, does not lead to the same issues as when a bilateral agreement is 
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not ratified by all parties. This is namely because most agreements can only enter into force 
once a number of signatory states has ratified the agreement.278 In a multilateral agreement, 
there is the possibility for Member States to join at a later stage. For this reason, it could be 
considered ‘less incomplete’.279 In certain situations, this is even expressly allowed for in the 
Council’s decision when concluding the agreement. 
The issue that really makes a bilateral mixed agreement differ from a multilateral 
agreement is the inclusion of an entry into force-clause, which states that the agreement can 
only enter into force after all ‘the Parties’ have deposited their respective instrument of 
ratification or approval.280 
2.4 Provisional Application 
There is the possibility to apply NGFTAs through provisional application. This means 
that the agreements may start applying even before the ratification process is fully completed. 
With this type of wide subject ranged agreements, the concern is related to the extent the 
provisional application should be assumed, when provisionally applied. While applying an 
agreement provisionally, the EU can only act within the limits of the competences conferred 
upon it. That naturally means that it may solely apply the parts of the agreement which falls 
within the scope of its competences.281 
For example, in the KOREU, the question was about the areas that would be covered as 
shared or exclusive competence. The Commission only accepted the Member States’ 
competence to cover a limited number of areas referring to ‘(…) certain commitments in the 
Protocol on Cultural Co-operation’.282 The KOREU is different from previous agreements 
because it requires the identification of parts that are not to be provisionally applied in Article 
15.10 (b).283  
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This development was possible due to the changes and clarification of competences given 
by the Lisbon Treaty. Article 2(2) TFEU284 mentions certain other areas which fall under shared 
competence. From the reading of this provision, one can draw the conclusion that the EU could 
potentially act in all areas other than those specifically reserved for the Member States. 
Moreover, Article 4(2) TFEU lists areas subject to shared competence. In the KOREU, the 
provisions, which were not provisionally applied, were those of the Protocol on Cultural Co-
operation, and certain provisions on the criminal enforcement of intellectual property rights 
given their perceived sensitivity for Member States. Almost the entire KOREU was 
provisionally applied according to the Council decision Article 3(2); furthermore, the extent of 
provisional application did not have a precedential effect.285 However, such provisional 
application cannot have a retroactive effect, and be understood as affecting the division of 
competence.286 
In relation to mixed agreements, the EU frequently uses provisional application of the 
agreements that are awaiting the procedure for completion, i.e., awaiting the Member States’ 
ratification. The ratification process can take time, and it can also lead to a serious delay for the 
agreement to enter into force.287 To apply an agreement provisionally, the Council should, upon 
a proposal by the negotiator, adopt a decision to authorize the provisional application of the 
agreement according to Article 218(5) TFEU.288 In this instance, there is no requirement for the 
consent of the European Parliament. However, in accordance with an inter-institutional 
agreement between the Commission and the Parliament,289 information shall be provided to the 
Parliament ‘(…) in sufficient time for it to be able to express its point of view if appropriate, 
and for the Commission to be able to take the Parliament’s views as far as possible into 
account’. 
The provisional application, which is stipulated in the CETA agreement under Article 
30.7(3), provides that if a party does not intend to provisionally apply the entire agreement, it 
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can notify the other party and offer to enter into consultations. If the other party objects, then, 
the entire agreement shall not be provisionally applied. This could also mean that certain 
provisions should not apply provisionally.  
According to this provision, a party cannot at any time terminate the provisional 
application by a written notice. It becomes particularly interesting in relation to mixed 
agreements where the Member States can alone also terminate a provisional application since 
they are contracting parties to the international treaty. Germany and Austria ‘(…) declare that 
as Parties to CETA they can exercise their rights which derive from Article 30.7.3(c) of 
CETA’.290 
However, a statement by the Council clarifies that: 
If the ratification of CETA fails permanently and definitively because of a ruling of a 
constitutional court or following the completion of other constitutional processes and 
formal notification by the government of the concerned state, provisional application must 
be and will be terminated. The necessary steps will be taken in accordance with EU 
procedures.291 
In this regard, a Member State cannot by itself terminate the provisional application, but 
such termination requires a decision by the Council adopted by a qualified majority.292 
In the CETA agreement, only certain provisions in Chapter 8 on investments were 
decided to be provisionally applied.293 This means that all other provisions, which are not 
selected, will not be applied provisionally. This includes provisions on the treatment of 
investors and covered investments, expropriation, and resolution of investment disputes 
between investors and states. Further exceptions are, for example, stipulated for particular 
provisions of Chapter 13 (Financial Services).294 
2.5 Implementation 
The fundamental principles, such as direct effect, primacy and effective protection, guard 
the implementation of EU law through domestic Member States’ courts. The domestic courts 
                                                   
290 Council of the European Union, ‘Statement of the General Secretariat of the Council to the Council, on Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, 
of the other part, (Statement on CETA)’ COM (2017) 493 final , para. 72. Here the German Federal Constitutional Court in a 
recent decision emphasized the importance of Germany having the option to terminate the provisional application of CETA. 
291 Ibid. 
292 From a procedural point of view, it could be argued that the legal basis could be applied through Article 218(5) or 218(9) 
TFEU by analogy. This is because both provisions contain simplified procedures, prescribing no active participation by the 
European Parliament. 
293 Council Decision on the provisional application of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between 
Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part [2016] OJ L 11/1080, Investment 
Chapter are Articles 8.1-8.8, 8.13, 8.15, with the exception of para. 3 thereof and 8.16. 
294 Ibid. 
  -63- 
have to be careful when applying EU law to ‘(…) ensure that those rules take full effect and 
must protect the rights which they confer on individuals’.295 
Judicial implementation of EU law is, first of all and according to the principle of 
conferral, governed by the principle of procedural autonomy. It is established case law that  
(…) in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for each Member State, in 
accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, to lay 
down the detailed rules of administrative and judicial procedures governing actions for 
safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law.296 
However, national rules should not affect the implementation of EU law; and national 
procedural autonomy is limited by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness297 affirmed 
in the case Rewe.298 This would lead to a balancing exercise between effective implementation 
and national interests (for example, legal certainty, where effectiveness impacts on res judicata, 
or procedural protection where effectiveness impacts on an ex officio review). 
2.5.1 The European Parliament’s Increased Power in Implementation 
The Lisbon Treaty made certain changes in the division making process for trade 
agreements. Before the Lisbon Treaty, most decisions were taken by the Commission and the 
Trade Policy Committee. The European Parliament had very limited influence, and no 
substantive power in decision-making.299 Trade agreements were concluded without 
parliamentary involvement, which had democratic consequences for exclusive competence. In 
fact, for trade agreements, based on shared competence, the Parliament’s involvement was 
required; however, it was unable to effectively scrutinize the EU’s external trade policy.300 
The Lisbon Treaty tried to assist with this issue by establishing the requirement to make 
regular reports to the European Parliament during the negotiation process, and to have its 
consent. The European Parliament became even more important because of the CCP expansions 
including trade in services, commercial aspects of Intellectual Property, and Foreign Direct 
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Investment (FDI). These changes provided the European Parliament with more power, but its 
influence is still not comparable to that of the Council. This is because the European Parliament 
still cannot authorize negotiation, and in this regard, it is still not possible to suggest that it can 
effectively influence the EU’s external trade policy.301 In fact, the power of the European 
Parliament to give its consent means that the European Parliament should be taken into 
consideration during the negotiation of a trade agreement in order not to veto against it 
afterwards.302  
The consent can go a long way. In fact, in the KOREU, a joint declaration was concluded, 
where the Commission committed to respond to the adoption by the European Parliament of a 
resolution calling for a safeguard investigation,303 and to report, at the request of the responsible 
committee, on Korea’s implementation of the non-tariff barrier and sustainable development 
commitments. The joint declaration gives a structure to any requests by the Parliament for an 
action on a particular issue. ‘The parliament is placing itself in the system for implementing the 
EU-Korea in the future, something which it is not, as a legislative body, normally called upon 
to do.’304 
By leveraging its position, through the generated form of consent requirement to create a 
system, the Parliament succeeded in ensuring a certain oversight of the future implementation 
of the KOREU.305 
The focus of the European Parliament tends to be set more on issues that are not related 
to trade liberalisation such as human rights, labour or environmental standards.306 This was 
shown in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), where the European Parliament 
refused to give its consent for the signing of the agreement, because the protection of 
fundamental human rights had not been considered. 
In relation to the political sensitivities inherent in the new institutional balance, 
established by the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament played a key part in the management 
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of the KOREU.307 The KOREU is considered to be the first agreement subject to the new power 
of the European Parliament.308 
2.5.2 The Power of the Council in Relation to the Implementation 
Once the parliament has given its consent,309 and all the Member States have ratified the 
agreement the Council adopts the final decision on concluding the agreement. 
By nature, the implementation is trailing the negotiation process and will be adjusted in 
order to ensure that the specific policy objectives of the agreement at stake will be ensured.  
The more ambitious and comprehensive a trade agreement is the more complex and 
resource -intensive the implementation will be. Given the new generation and their 
comprehensive scope, it is important to consider the aspects where they are falling short in 
order to attempt to improve aspects which can facilitate an effective implementation in future 
trade agreements. The commission is trying to emphasis a smooth transition from negotiating 
to implementation, through provisional application.310 
2.5.3 Implementation of Mixed Agreements 
When agreements are concluded as mixed agreements, the EU can still exclusively 
implement them. In the OTIF case, the CJEU reaffirmed that if the EU negotiates agreements 
as mixed agreements, this does not prevent an exclusive EU’s implementation. The CJEU 
furthermore confirms that despite the mixed nature of the agreement, the Council may adopt a 
position on aspects concerning shared competences.311 The positions taken within the 
framework of the agreement are also not dictated by the nature of the agreement itself. 
Consequently, this can have an impact on the scope of activity of the Commission in relation 
to both the trade committees, which are set up by the FTAs, and also to determining the 
respondent in the investor-state disputes. 
There has been some discussion on how to interpret provisions in an agreement where the 
provisions can apply to both the situations falling within the scope of national law and to 
situations falling within the scope of EU law. In the case of Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, this 
was a concern and the CJEU announce that, in situations where a provision falls within both 
the scope of the national law and the EU law it is within the interest of EU law. This is so due 
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to the task of the CJEU to forestall future differences of interpretation and preserve a uniform 
interpretation of circumstance.312 The reason why this should be determined by the CJEU is 
essentially in order to prevent fragmentation and legal uncertainty.313 
Consequently, it is important to underline the importance of uniform interpretation also 
in mixed agreements, mainly due to that the discussions that these cases promoted. The 
otherwise imaginable situation would be that there is a risk of a neutral provision being 
construed differently depending on the circumstance of its application. In this regard the duty 
of cooperation is the key. In the Dior case the CJEU underlined that there is a need for a 
cooperation in order to sustained uniformity of EU law.314 The CJEU instead meant that the 
duty of sincere cooperation should be considered as an instrument to protect the specific Union 
interest in the Hermès case. This is because competence alone could not justify that the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court and also extends to situations not coming under Union 
competence.315 
2.6 Renegotiations and Amendment to Signed NGFTAs 
Article 218(7) TFEU is a provision that permits the Council to authorise the Commission 
to approve limited amendments to agreements. The Council may, in doing so, set down the 
conditions for the Commission to approve such amendments.  
An example of how an agreement has made use of amendments would be the KOREU, 
and the decision on the signature, which contains two applications of Article 218(7). Firstly, in 
relation to the extension of the entitlement of Korean workers to co-production rights under EU 
policies promoting cultural diversity; and secondly, in relation to the addition of new protected 
geographical indications (GIs) to the list that is already established by the FTA. The procedure 
for the addition of new GIs is relatively unremarkable, since it implies an existing procedure to 
obtain the approval of new GIS, which is based on existing policy. However, the procedure for 
the entitlement for co-production rights is remarkable, because it requires unanimity in the 
Council to permit the continuation of the entitlement to co-production. This was considered 
appropriate, because of the very sensitive nature of such matters, and since the agreement 
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would, de facto, be concluded by unanimity given that parts of the protocol on cultural 
cooperation fall under the exclusive competence of the Member States.316 
“The Commission shall provide notice to Korea of the European Union's intention not to 
extend the period of entitlement to co-production pursuant to Article 5 of the Protocol on 
Cultural Co-operation following the procedure set out in Article 5(8) of the said Protocol unless, 
on a proposal from the Commission, the Council agrees four months before the end of such 
period of entitlement to continue the entitlement. If the Council agrees to continue the 
entitlement, then this provision will again become applicable at the end of the renewed period 
of entitlement. For the specific purposes of deciding on the continuation of the period of 
entitlement, the Council shall act by unanimity”.317 
Amendments to the FTA must first be considered by the Trade Committee.318 Once 
adopted by the parties, it will enter into force after the parties have exchanged written 
notifications, certifying that they have completed their respective applicable legal requirements 
and procedures.319  
There are clear differences between amendments and renegotiations. In fact, 
renegotiation of certain aspects of an agreement could, at least at an early stage, trigger ideas 
to make changes in other areas of the agreement as well. For this reason, it is usually avoided. 
In relation to the KOREU, the advantage to adopt investment provisions to the agreement at a 
later stage is that all of the investment related provisions would be kept regrouped together in 
one single instrument. However, if such would trigger the renegotiation of other aspects, it may 
be favoured to instead conclude a new comprehensive EU–Korea investment agreement. 
2.7 Cooperation Obligations 
It is essential to ensure close cooperation between the EU’s institutions and Member 
States when an agreement falls partly within the competence of the EU, and partly within that 
of its Member States. This should apply in the process of negotiation and conclusion, and in the 
fulfilment of the commitments stemming from the agreement in action.320 The reason hereto is 
to establish the unity in international representation of the EU.321 It was further recognized by 
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the CJEU in relation to the ratification of mixed agreements.322 The duty of cooperation ‘(...) is 
of general application and does not depend either on whether the Community [now Union] 
competence concerned is exclusive or on any right of the Member States to enter into 
obligations towards non-member countries.’323 
As Article 4(3) TEU reveals, the unity of the international representation is a way to apply 
the duty of sincere cooperation within the EU legal order.324 The Member States are required, 
by Article 4(3) TEU, to facilitate the attainment of EU’s objectives, and refrain from any 
measure that could jeopardize such objectives. In these circumstances, the CJEU may therefore 
impose obligation on the Member States not to depart from an agreed common negotiation 
strategy.325 The principle is mutual in its nature and ensures that loyal cooperation shall be 
exercised by the Member States and the EU institutions ‘in full mutual respect’,326 but not 
limited thereof and should apply in a similar fashion to inter-institutional cooperation.327 
The CJEU has exclusively stipulated the existence of cooperation duties. It has also 
examined its application in relation to mixed agreements. Primarily, this was stated in the ambit 
of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), but the CJEU clarified that it was to be 
applied also in the context of the European Economic Community (EEC): ‘[t]his duty of 
cooperation, of which attention was drawn in the context of the EAEC Treaty, must also apply 
in the context of the EEC Treaty since it results from the requirement of unity in the 
international representation of the Community.’328 
This principle has become a fundamental tool for ensuring the external representation of 
the EU.329 The Court emphasized that the duty of cooperation must be observed in all three 
stages of external action: negotiation, conclusion, and execution of agreements.330  
However, a distinction has to be drawn between the external policy aims, on the one hand, 
and the EU’s internal policy objectives on the other. The external policy is not intended to solely 
                                                   
322 Opinion of the Court of Justice of 19 March 1993, (Convention No. 170 ILO on Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work), 
2/91, EU:C:1993:106, para. 38. Interesting to note is that the ILO Convention 170 (at issue in Opinion 2/91) has been ratified 
by seven EU Member States only.  
323 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 June 2005, Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, C-266/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:341, para. 58; C-246/07, Commission v Sweden (n 321) para. 64.  
324 Steven Blockmans and Ramses A Wessel, ‘Principles and Practices of EU External Representation’ (2012) 2012/5 Centre 
For The Law of EU External Relations Cleer Working Papers <https://euglobal.wordpress.com/2012/09/20/cleer-working-
papper-20125-principles-and-practices-of-eu-external-representation/> accessed 24 October 2015., p. 8. 
325 C-246/07, Commission v Sweden (n 321). 
326 Blockmans, Wessel, 'Principles and Practices of EU External Representation' (n 324), p. 13. 
327 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 September 1988, Hellenic Republic v Council of the European Communities, C-
204/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:450. 
328 2/91, Opinion on Convention ILO on Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work (n 322), p. 36. 
329 Leonhard Hertog and Simon Strob, 'Coherence in EU External Relations: Concepts and Legal Rooting of an Ambiguous 
Term' (2013) 18 European Foreign Affairs Review 373, p. 380. 
330 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 March 1996, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European 
Union, C-25/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:114, para. 48. 
  -69- 
depend on the EU, but should also reflect the enlarged EU, and contribute to trade liberalization 
to help define a policy direction or strategy rather than function as an end purpose to which 
external policy is leading.331 The partnership between the EU and the US will be based on 
common principles and values. These common principles and values have to be consistent with 
the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action.332 The idea about the cooperation for 
external relations is mainly to ensure that the action of the EU’s international representation is 
coherent and consistent, stemming from the obligation of cooperation between the EU’s 
institutions and Member States.333 
The loyal cooperation has been taken into consideration in the different facets of the EU 
action, and loyalty duties have been established to ensure the internal functioning of the EU, as 
well as its external action. The principle is at the same time an expression of the international 
principle of good faith, the fidelity principle characterizing the federal systems (‘Bundestreue’), 
and the requirement of unity underlying the European integration process. This is strictly linked 
with other fundamental principles of the EU legal order, such as effectiveness and supremacy. 
The question of shared competence and potential issues in relation to the administration 
of the agreements was already discussed in relation to the GATS and Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreements.334 The Commission argued that the Member 
States would seek to express their views individually on matters falling within their 
competence. This applies whenever no consensus was found, and interminable discussions 
would be required to determine the competence question. This, in turn, would lead to 
undermining the EU’s unity vis-à-vis the rest of the world and therefore, the negotiation power 
would also be weakened.335 However, the allocation of competence cannot depend on problems, 
which may possibly arise in administrating the agreements in relation to the coordination to 
ensure unity for both negotiation and implementation.336 
This leads to the conclusion that in situations where the EU and its Member States have 
shared competences for an agreement, they are obliged to cooperate closely in the process of 
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negotiation and conclusion, and in fulfilling their commitments.337 Such obligations stem from 
the unity requirement in international representation. 
The CJEU disregarded potential obstacles for the exercise of EU’s competence on the 
international scene,338 in the way that even if there is no possible contradiction between 
international commitments and the EU rules, the EU rules may be affected by the international 
commitments.339 Already in Opinion 2/91, the CJEU stated that the EU competence, if needed, 
should be exercised internationally through the medium of the Member States, acting jointly in 
the EU’s interest.340 This, however, does not mean that the Member States would lose their 
visibility on the international scene just because they have lost their individual action in the 
attempt to fulfil their EU law obligations.341 
3 Intermediate Conclusion 
The negotiation of bilateral and regional agreements has often been criticized for its lack 
of transparency. It is important that the regulatory practices need to be negotiated with the 
national government as well as with the civil society, as was the case in the CETA. To 
accommodate to this issue, the CETA required the EU to make substantial change in relation 
to transparency, and also in relation to social and environmental concerns. Establishing the EU 
as a homogenous actor will continue to be an on-going process. 
The structure of the agreement, with its wide subject range may provide difficulties in 
terms of EU’s internal difference within its constitutional organs and Member States, the TTIP 
is a clear example hereto. The reformed CCP that resulted from the Lisbon Treaty has affected 
the legal basis of free trade agreements. The EU was subject to new procedures which raised 
challenges in relation to the negotiation, adoption, ratification, and implementation of these 
new trade instruments. In this new procedure the possibility to undermine the efficiency of EU 
external action and have negative consequences for the EU’s relations with third state 
concerned remains. For this reason, it becomes even more important to focus on ensuring a 
close cooperation between the EU’s institutions and Member States. This is specifically 
important when an agreement falls partly within the competence of the EU, and partly within 
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that of its Member States. Such cooperation should apply throughout the entire process of 
negotiation and conclusion, and in the fulfilment of the commitments stemming from the 
agreement in action.342 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EU COMPETENCE FOR NGFTAS AS NEW TRADE 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
The EU has competence in the fields which are conferred to it by the Treaties. This 
chapter intends to define and analyse the different competences of the EU and its Member States 
in relation to the NGFTAs. Since this question became the core question of Opinion 2/15, the 
analysis will be conducted in relation to the discussion of the CJEU. 
Firstly, it will address the EU’s explicit and external competence through defining the 
areas falling under the common commercial policy in Article 207(1) TFEU. Once a certain area 
of action of the EU falls under the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), it falls under EU’s 
exclusive competence pursuant to Article 3(1) TFEU. This naturally leads to consider which 
provisions that relates specifically to trade, and whether such provisions will have an immediate 
and direct effect on trade. 
Secondly, it will address the EU’s implied exclusive external competence for NGFTAs, 
where it will consider and identify the areas that fall outside of the CCP in order to determine 
whether implied exclusive competence could be established by virtue of Article 3(2) TFEU, 
through a legislative act of the EU, when it is necessary for the EU to exercise its internal 
competence, or when it may affect common rules or alter their scope.  
Thirdly, it is substantial to also consider the EU’s shared competence for NGFTAs, in 
order to be able to determine whether agreements such as NGFTAs should be concluded as 
mixed, or exclusive. 
Fourthly, the framework and objectives, provides a larger role than before in its purpose 
of guiding the CCP. This because the CCP is carried out in the context of various and sometimes 
conflicting trade and non-trade objectives, established in Article 21 TEU, and the agreements 
are wide in scope and content. For this reason, the obligation for the EU to follow these 
objectives in its external action will be discussed and analysed together with the need for 
balancing of competence in relation to the choice of the appropriate legal basis and the 
delimitation of competence. 
  -73- 
1 The EU’s Explicit and Exclusive External Competence for 
NGFTAs 
The EU’s external trade policy is defined by the CCP. The CCP has a vital role for the 
EU’s external relation. It is seen as the EU’s voice to the rest of the world, as illustratively 
explained by Eeckhout as ‘(…) if the single market were a building the CCP would be its 
facade.’343 The powers of the EU’s external relations are based on the CCP, which establishes 
the core of the EU’s external action. The CCP has always been an exclusive competence of the 
EU. However, what can be considered as attributed to the CCP has not always been the same. 
Originally, services and intellectual property were considered to be within shared 
competences; however, they are now part of the CCP. The extent to which the scope of the CCP 
has been expanded is a result of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, in particular, 
regarding the commercial aspects of intellectual property, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and 
trade in services as provided in Article 207(1) TFEU.  
The Commission tried to stretch the notion of CCP, by arguing that trade agreements 
which purely have a commercial focus should fall under exclusive competence.344 The pre-
Lisbon Treaty case-law shows a mixed understanding of the CJEU’s approach to exclusive 
competence. This can be shown by the evolution of certain areas that were prior not considered 
to be within the CCP. For example, in relation to the case Daiichi Sankyo, after the Lisbon 
Treaty, the rules of TRIPS are an area covered by the CCP.345 Given the longstanding case-law 
of the CJEU, the practical importance of clarifying the EU’s competence should not be 
underestimated.346 
Article 216(1) provides the EU to conclude an international agreement ‘where the 
Treaties so provide’. If a particular subject matter falls within the CCP, the EU will enjoy 
exclusive external competence to conclude an international agreement in relation to that subject 
matter. The relevant query in relation to the question of competence for NGFTAs is whether 
their content matches or exceeds the scope of the CCP, and the EU’s exclusive competence. 
For example, of particular concern is whether the EU’s exclusive treaty-making competences 
extend to the entirety of EUSFTA’s obligations including portfolio investment and transport 
services, and also in relation to the non-commercial provisions of the agreement such as ‘moral 
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rights’ of intellectual property holders and the agreement’s chapter on ‘sustainable 
development’ (labour rights and environment protection). 
In Opinion 2/15 the CJEU clarifies and nuances the picture of the interpretation of the 
Lisbon Treaty’s codification of EU law on external competences. It does not only focus on the 
interpretation of the enlarged scope of the CCP but also on the application of Article 3(2) TFEU 
on implied external competence, on how the external powers may be derived from internal 
competence-conferring provisions.347 
1.1 Explicit External Competence 
Since the EU can only act when it is empowered by its Member States through the 
Treaties, the European Union must act within the limits of the competences conferred upon it 
by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out in the Treaties.348 This 
should be considered with respect to both the internal action and the international action of the 
European Union. The division of competences between the EU and its Member States will 
necessarily also have implications on the exercise of external competence, and on the ability of 
both, the EU and its Member States, to conclude international agreements.349 The proper 
category of competence, in which the agreement should be concluded, needs to be established. 
An agreement may be concluded within either exclusive350 or shared competence.351 If the legal 
basis is exclusive, the explicit external competence is exclusive, under Article 207 TFEU on 
the CCP, and Article 3(1)(e) TFEU on exclusive competence.352 
According to Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, the EU shall have exclusive competence in the area 
of CCP.353 The CCP can be considered to include trade agreements which relate to services, 
commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy, and measures to protect trade, such as 
those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.354 
Article 207 TFEU make clear that the CCP is based on uniform principles, particularly 
with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements. This should 
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be in relation to ‘trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, 
export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping 
or subsidies.’ Importantly is to consider that the CCP should be conducted in the context of the 
principles and objectives of the Union's external action.355 The question of where to draw the 
limits between the different competences in the EU’s external action is not as simple as it might 
appear. Defining a clear limit of CCP should be accomplished through the interpretation of 
Articles 206 and 207 TFEU. This is namely due to the fact that the structure establishing the 
competence is made in such a complex and multifaceted way.  The question of competence is 
not always based on purely legal categorisations and contributions. The attempt to reach a 
limitation between the different categories becomes rather a sliding scale than fixed 
categories.356 
Opinion 2/15 provided further clarification that will be analysed in this context, the 
Commission asked the CJEU to decide whether the EU has the competence to sign and conclude 
the FTA alone, and not as a mixed agreement.357 It has been clear that the EU favours more of 
a strict interpretation of what is considered to be within its exclusive competence.358 When it 
comes to defining the competence in the case of NGFTAs, where there may be different 
objectives to consider, ancillary objectives may be absorbed by more dominant objectives in 
the agreements.359 The NGFTA has become the most significant instrument in EU’s trade 
policy-making, because of the priority of bilateral avenues for trade liberalisation.360 
The CCP concerns the external action by the EU in Article 206 TFEU and 207 TFEU. 
Regarding the aims of the CCP, by ‘(…) establishing a customs union the Union shall 
contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and 
the lowering of customs and other barriers.’361 Moreover, the measures to be adopted in the 
framework of the CCP shall be based on: 
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(…) uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion 
of tariff and trade agreements relating to goods and services, and the commercial aspects 
of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in 
measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be 
taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The CCP shall furthermore be conducted in the 
context of the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action.362 
In order to view the balance between the EU’s underlying policies of international trade 
and free trade agreements, the EU has been considered to offer a model for global integration 
law, working with the key constitutional features of the ‘integration paradigm’.363 This mainly 
reflects the EU’s trade policy and underlying principles; unity and effectiveness are what make 
the CCP applicable in EU’s external action. 
1.2 The EU’s Exclusive External Competence in Relation to Investment  
Following Opinion 1/94, one could suggest that the CCP should no longer be regarded as 
dynamic. However, what matters is the interpretation of Article 207(1) TFEU, and that it is 
accomplished in a manner that provides the EU with an effective CCP in an international 
commercial environment, while, at the same time, respecting the wording of the provision. The 
commercial policy evolves over time. This means that it cannot be viewed in a static and rigid 
manner.364 In this regard, when considering and comparing the commercial trade policy with 
other policies, for example in international law, such as trade policy or investment policy, they 
are not necessarily similar. 
It is important that the CCP is conducted in an effective way since it would otherwise 
become irrelevant over time,365 and prelude the EU from fulfilling its role as a global trading 
partner.366 In fact, if the EU was not in a position to also avail itself of means of action going 
beyond instruments intended to have an effect only on the traditional aspects of external trade, 
it would no longer be possible to carry on any worthwhile Common Commercial Policy.367 
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para. 20. 
  -77- 
1.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
The Lisbon Treaty’s expansion into the foreign direct investment is perhaps the most 
visible change; however, the exact scope of what the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) should 
include is still debated.368  
This discussion started even before the Lisbon Treaty with Krajewiki who considered that 
only the aspects of the FDI that which could be considered to be directly linked to international 
trade would fall within the EU’s exclusive competence. This should furthermore be based on 
the context, object and purpose of the Treaties negotiated.369  
It stands for a new important legal basis, solidifying the EU’s competence in regard to 
certain aspects of foreign investment regulation.370 This is particularly the case in relation to 
NGFTAs, and their negotiations with third countries.371 The concept of foreign investment, as 
defined in international investment agreements, goes beyond FDI and portfolio investment.372 
The Treaty itself does not provide a definition of what constitutes FDI and portfolio investment, 
but there is a broader understanding of the characteristics of both areas.373 
Chapter 9 of the CETA agreement relates to direct investment, and also to other types of 
investment. A direct investment has been defined by the CJEU as an investment made between 
natural or legal persons. This type of investments should serve to establish or maintain lasting 
and direct links between the persons providing the capital, and the undertakings to which that 
capital is made available. A foreign direct investment is when a foreign entity acquires a 
significant share in an EU’s company that enables it to effectively participate in the 
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management or control of the Company.374 The effective management participation or control 
carries out an economic activity which has a direct and immediate effect.375 
Article 207(1) TFEU provides that EU acts concerning ‘foreign direct investment’ fall 
within the CCP. The EU has exclusive competence, pursuant to Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, even 
though the Council meant that EUSFTA’s Chapter 9, concerning investment, relates to the 
protection of direct investment and not their admission, and should therefore not fall within 
CCP.376 The CJEU established that this chapter falls within the EU’s CCP as far as the 
provisions relate to foreign direct investment between the EU and Singapore.377 
Investment, in itself, appears to be conceived as an activity in EU law, as a transfer of 
assets, or as the establishment of an undertaking; this definition is contrary to the international 
law asset-based perception of investment.378 For example, in most bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), the economic asset, which is to be considered as an investment is defined. Such 
definition includes assets ‘(…) that accompany an investment and make it possible in practice’ 
in both the traditional form and new type of investment, such as shares, real estates, securities 
and portfolio investment.379 
Moreover, there is a need to have a clear definition of the distinction between FDI and 
portfolio investment in the EU’s investment policy. The reason is that the FDI has similar 
characteristics to the investment contractual rights in the BITs, which under EU law would be 
treated as services rather than capital movements.380 The EU’s external competences extend 
beyond issues of investment liberalisation. Only a few areas, covered by the BITs, remain under 
the shared competence.381 The future international trade agreements would comprise 
investment provisions related to standards of investment protection, such as fair and equitable 
treatment, full security and protection treatment and expropriation issues; and in such 
agreements, an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism would be also included.382 
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In broader terms, one can conclude that direct investment is considered to aim at 
establishing lasting economic links and strategic long-term relationship. The direct investor 
would have a significant influence or control over the investment; normally, the investor would 
own at least 10% of the voting power.383 
Another issue could be if one considers the scope of the FDI to be limited to regulation 
of market access and promotion of investment issues. It could additionally be possible to extend 
the competence so that it surrounds also the protection of investors and their investments. 
Two different argumentations could be made in this regard. Firstly, Article 206 TFEU 
with the aim to contribute to ‘(…) the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade 
and on foreign direct investment’. In turn, it would suggest ‘…that foreign direct investment is 
only part of the CCP as far as restrictions to foreign direct investment are concerned.’384 
Furthermore, it could be argued that such an approach would not be supported by Article 
207(1). 
Advocate General Sharpston further adds to the debate that market access limitations are 
‘merely one type of restriction’, while other restrictions might, for example, result from ‘(…) 
discriminatory treatment; the lack of security, predictability and transparency in the regulation 
of international trade and foreign direct investment; or the existence of unfair trade practices’.385 
Secondly, in accordance with Article 345 TFEU, the Treaties ‘… shall in no way prejudice the 
rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership’, and at least standards of 
protection against expropriation fall within Member States’ competence.386 AG Sharpston 
argues that that the EUSFTA does not infringe the Member States’ exclusive competence to 
choose their system of property ownership.387 This understanding goes similarly in line with 
the narrow reading of the provision in Article 345 TFEU by the CJEU.388 
The reference to foreign direct investment in Article 207(1) TFEU lacks a proper 
definition. However, a reference to ‘direct investment’ can be found in Article 64(1) TFEU, 
and also in case-law. AG Sharpston’s attempts to find a proper definition of the term direct 
investment. She states that foreign investments are: 
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[I]nvestments made by natural or legal persons of a third State in the European Union and 
investments made by EU natural or legal persons in a third State which serve to establish 
or maintain lasting and direct links, in the form of effective participation in the company’s 
management and control, between the person providing the investment and the company 
to which that investment is made available in order to carry out an economic activity.389 
The most common types of FDIs are those referring to an investment made to acquire 
lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor.390 FDI 
competence is primarily concerned with market access, hence, allowing the EU to act with 
regard to the initial establishment of foreign investors. 
In fact, investment protection is also present in the GATs including non-discrimination 
against the foreign service supplier,391 transparency, due process and fair administration 
obligation. If the intent behind the expansion of the CCP was merely to cover rules of FDI, 
which were already covered by the GATs, the idea of expanding the CCP could be meaningless. 
Whether expropriation should be considered to form part of the CCP has become a 
controversial question. The Commission intends to include provisions on the protection of 
foreign investment against expropriation and other political risks in future EU’s international 
free trade agreements.392 Article 345 TFEU provides that the EU Treaties shall not ‘(…) 
prejudice the rules of Member States governing the system of property ownership (…)’. 
A strict reading of this provision would lead to that the property ownership system of the 
Member States excludes investment protection from the scope of EU’s competence.393 
However, most scholars are not convinced by such.394 Furthermore, as Eeckhout explains, the 
EU’s case-law has repeatedly confirmed that this provision should not be read to restrict EU’s 
competence.395 Instead, the FDI, in Article 207 TFEU, should be read in broad manner and in 
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this sense also cover the protection of FDI against expropriation.396 Perhaps, a broad asset-
based definition of foreign investment would make it easier to negotiate with third countries. 
1.2.2 Non-Direct Investment 
It is not very clear whether and to what extent the provisions on capital movements, 
establishment and services confer implied powers to the EU with regard to the admission and 
treatment of non-FDI forms.397 The FDI alone is subject to protection under international law.398 
Protection against foreign investment includes non-discrimination obligations, national 
treatment through establishing Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN), fair and equitable treatment 
standards, e.g., standards relating to due process and denial of justice, full protection and 
security, repatriation of profits, compensation for expropriation, and investor state dispute 
settlement.  
Portfolio investment is more of short-term and speculative nature. The investors’ 
influence on the management of the company also differs significantly from direct 
investment.399 Taking these differences into consideration, it can be argued that the portfolio 
investment is not to be considered as an exclusive competence.400 
This way, perhaps it was meant for the Member States to secure a certain level of their 
influence, as was accomplished in regard to external competence before the Lisbon Treaty.401 
The CJEU similarly held that ‘the resolution of the issue of the allocation of competence could 
not depend on problems which might possibly arise in administration of the agreements 
concerned’.402 
Whether portfolio investment should be regarded as shared or exclusive competence was 
disputed for a long time,403 but has been clarified in Opinion 2/15. It seems to be of a general 
understanding that the investment protection should cover protections, which are dealt with in 
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the International Investment Agreements (IIAs).404 A clear definition between these two 
concepts would not affect the FTAs as such, but rather the scope of protection given from these 
agreements, to which the European parliament is in favour.405 
In terms of portfolio investment, the FDI is defined as the movement of money for the 
purpose of buying shares in a company formed or functioning in another country.406 Portfolio 
investment covers, in contrast to FDI, short-term investments,407 and is generally considered 
not to form part of the CCP.408 The regulatory aspects concern the movement of capital, and 
the participation of foreign investors in the capital of the host state. For this reason, the EU’s 
competence to regulate portfolio investment is based on the provisions on capital movements.409 
It is not possible to exclude measures from the scope of the CCP just because they may 
have repercussions on certain economic sectors falling under the Treaty.410 This type of FTAs 
does not only have effects on capital movements, but also on the liberalisation of trade. The 
clear difference between the two provisions is basically that only Article 207 TFEU provides 
explicitly for the conclusion of international agreements. Post signing an agreement, the similar 
problem can occur in relation to the treatment of EU’s companies, as stipulated in Article 49 
TFEU.411 
The CJEU concluded that investment taking place in form of the acquisition of company 
securities, with the intention of making a financial investment and not to influence the 
management and control of the undertaking, such as portfolio investments, should constitute 
movements of capital for the purposes of Article 63 TFEU.412 The AG Sharpston clarifies this 
point by considering that in addition to the acquisition of company securities, certain categories 
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of real-estate investment or the use of loans are also investments involving capital movements 
or payments.413 
The European investment policy communication has confirmed that the FDI should not 
be read as encompassing portfolio investment.414 On the other hand, it would remain possible 
for the EU to imply its competence from the provisions on the free movement of capital.415 In 
this regard, the question is whether such capital movement within FDI falls under Article 63 or 
Article 207 TFEU in relation to Article 3(2) on implied EU’s competence.416 
1.3 Limits to Exercise of Competence According to Article 207(6) TFEU 
If competence is already established in relation to Article 207(1) TFEU, Article 207(6) 
TFEU concerns the exercise of such competences, i.e., the limits in regard to the FDI. Article 
207(6) TFEU imposes two limits that will be discussed in the following section. The exercise 
of competences shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the 
Member States and shall not lead to harmonization of legislative or regulatory provisions of the 
Member States insofar as the Treaties. This is important to consider since a large interpretation 
of Article 207(6) TFEU can undermine its effective application.  
1.3.1 The Delimitation between the EU and its Member States 
The exercise of the competence cannot, in itself, affect the delimitation of competence 
between the EU and its Member States.417 
Instead of stating that the EU has exclusive competence over all measures that may be 
adopted in order for the EU to perform its obligations resulting from international agreements, 
Article 207(2) TFEU states the legal basis to adopt ‘… the measures defining the framework 
for implementing the common commercial policy’. Just because the EU, according to Article 
207(1), exercises its exclusive competence in relation to a specific agreement, for example the 
TRIPS, does not mean that the EU should have competence in all the different areas covered 
by that agreement in the internal market.  
The first limitation should not therefore mean that the exercise of the EU’s competence 
over the CCP depends on whether the EU enjoys internal competence on some other basis, and/ 
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or in relation to whether they have exercised that competence.418 Others may differently 
consider that the meaning and purpose of the first subparagraph of that provision is 
(…) very generally, to put the European Union’s ‘internal and external powers on a parallel 
footing and to prevent the European Union from entering into external commitments to 
which it would be unable to give effect internally for want of sufficient powers.419 
The CCP may include trade in cultural and audio-visual, social, education and health 
services according to Article 207(4) TFEU; however, in the area of public health, for example, 
the EU’s internal competence is limited.420 
The most important question with regard to Article 207(6) is rather in relation to 
international investment law, since mainly substantive treatment standard provisions against 
expropriation would be excluded from the EU’s competence.421 The parallelism clause in 
Article 207(6) TFEU means that the lack of exercise of EU’s internal competence limits the 
existence or the exercise of EU’s external competence.  
Another interpretation of Article 207(6) could be that it is possible to limit the internal, 
but not the external competence of the EU.422 Consequently, the EU’s external competence 
extends beyond the scope of the internal competence.423 The interpretation that external 
competence may exist without a parallel internal competence would also be in line not only 
with the jurisprudence of the CJEU, but also Article 3(2) TFEU.424 
1.3.2 Not-Harmonizing Legislative or Regulatory Provisions of the Member States 
Article 207(6) TFEU provides for a second limitation to the exercise of competence under 
the CCP. It shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the EU and its Member 
States, and lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States, 
as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation. It further provides that the exercise of competences 
under the CCP cannot lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the 
Member States insofar as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation. This goes in line with the 
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AG Kokott who pointed out that CCP’s measures may lead to harmonisation of national 
legislation. However, harmonisation of national legislation may not give rise to an external 
competence to pursue an international trade and external action objectives, because of its 
different objectives.425 
Such limitation does not mean that the CCP cannot cover matters that are precluded from 
harmonisation in other Treaty provisions, such as in matters of social policy, education, public 
health or culture.426 The reason is that Article 207 TFEU should not be able to function for 
circumventing the prohibition of harmonisation under the Treaties. That limitation is thus, a 
particular application of the first limitation. 
Article 345 TFEU states that measures based on this article shall not entail harmonisation 
of Member States' laws or regulations in cases where the Treaties exclude such harmonisation. 
Taking it in relation to expropriation, it would not preserve exclusive power for the Member 
States to determine expropriation. The exercise of the right to property may be restricted, 
provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by 
the EU. In relation to such objectives, it should not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference, since it would impair the very substance of the rights guaranteed.427 
The CJEU interpreted Article 345 TFEU narrowly in order for the Member States not to 
be able to decide on the conditions under which an expropriation would take place.428 In other 
words, there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed 
and aim sought to be realised.429 
The CJEU applies a test where it considers more intensively the aim of the agreement but 
also the content, in comparison the AG Sharpston’s approach. This test makes it possible to 
apply all the provisions in a more generous manner. It moreover applied a wider criterion than 
what has been done in the past in relation to the application of ‘immediate and direct eﬀects on 
trade’.430 
                                                   
425 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 October 2013, European Commission v 
Council of the European Union, C-137/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:441, para. 66. 
426 Articles 153(2)(a), 165(4), 168(5) and 167(5) TFEU. 
427 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 20 January 2005, Cristalina Salgado Alonso v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad 
Social (INSS) and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS), C-306/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:44, para. 22; Judgment of 
the Court of Justice of 12 May 2005, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia and ERSA, C-347/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:285, 
para. 119; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 September 2008, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, paras. 358 and 360. 
428 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 September 1975, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Ruhrkohle 
Aktiengesellschaft, C-4/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:114; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 July 1996, Bosphorus v Minister 
for Transport, Energy and Communications and Others, C-84/95 ECLI:EU:C:1996:312. 
429 Burgstaller, ‘The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties of EU Member States’ (n 422), p. 65. 
430 2/15, Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 211). 
  -86- 
In earlier case-law, it was considered that the mere fact that an agreement may have 
implication for international trade is not enough for it to be fall within the CCP. It was thereafter 
decided that if it specifically related to international trade and is essentially intended to promote, 
facilitate or govern trade and constitute a direct and immediate effect on trade it should be 
considered to fall within the CCP.431 
The EU’s trade objective plays a large role. For example, the meaning of commercial 
aspects of intellectual property rights in Daiichi Sankyo was considered to be associated with 
the objective of the EU’s external action to be an international trade actor. While the CCP 
measure may lead to harmonisation of internal provision, internal provisions can no longer be 
the legal basis of an international trade linked measure.432 
2 The EU’s Shared Competence for NGFTAs 
It is important to clearly define the distinction between shared and exclusive EU 
competences. When identifying the shared competence, it is not only to identify the aspects 
which fall under shared competence by not being subject to exclusive competence but, it is in 
fact also necessary to identify the shared competence also by consider it relation to the subject 
matter and whether it falls entirely outside the EU competence.433  
2.1 Definition of Shared Competence  
Shared competence is defined as the Member States exercising their competence to the 
extent that the EU has not exercised its competence. If the EU cease to exercise its competence, 
the Member States can retake their actions to exercise the same competence434 regarding certain 
subject matters, such as environmental policy,435 in Article 4 TFEU. Article 2(5) TFEU 
introduces a third category of competences. It states  
‘(…) the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States, without thereby superseding their 
competence in these areas’. In matters falling under this category, the Union is allowed to 
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pass legally binding acts. These, however, ‘shall not entail harmonization of Member 
States’ laws or regulations.’ 
Article 6 TFEU lists the following policy areas as supporting competences: the protection 
and improvement of human health, industry, culture, tourism, education, vocational training, 
youth and sport, civil protection and administrative cooperation. All matters not mentioned in 
the Treaty are sometimes called reserved competences or retained powers of the Member 
States.436 In these areas, the Member States are in principle free to act, but must respect and not 
be in breach with EU law.437 
Firstly, if shared competence exists in Article 4 TFEU, Article 216 TFEU comes into play 
to see whether one of the grounds listed there, allowing the EU’s competence to enter into an 
international agreement, is satisfied. The combination of Article 4 TFEU and Article 216(1) 
TFEU creates the conditions that are necessary for applying shared competence.  
Article 2(2) TFEU concerns the EU’s right to pre-emption, which means that if the EU 
does not choose to exercise that right, both external and internal competence will remain within 
the competence of the Member States.438 The Member States would then ‘(…) be competent to 
negotiate, sign and conclude an international agreement whose subject matter falls within that 
area of shared competence’.439 Article 2(2) TFEU can be interpreted to mean that the EU is 
permitted to exercise its right to pre-emption in relation to both external and internal 
competences. However, it doesn’t mean that the EU can, irrespective of whether it has chosen 
to exercise its competence or not, assert external competence over all area of shared competence 
in Article 4 TFEU.440 
2.2 NGFTAS Covering Areas of Shared Competence 
An international agreement which covers areas that fall within shared external 
competence and is later signed by the EU within external competence, is completely different 
than an agreement which, from start, only covers exclusive external competence. This is 
because to conclude an international agreement which covers areas that fall within the shared 
external competence, Member States should act in their capacity through their membership in 
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the Council. They have the authority to agree that the EU should exercise its sole power for 
external exclusive competence. An agreement signed by the EU and its Member States, both, 
the EU and its Member States are, as a matter of international law, parties to that agreement. In 
relation to the question of liability for a breach of the agreement and the right of action in respect 
of such a breach, the fact that both the EU and its Member States are parties to the agreement 
could have consequences. In this case, each Member State remains free under international law 
to terminate that agreement in accordance with whatever the appropriate termination procedure 
under the agreement is. The fact that the EU in these circumstances played a leading role in 
negotiating is irrelevant, because the Member States per se are viewed as sovereign state parties 
to the agreement, and not as an appendage of the EU. 
The CJEU concludes in Opinion 2/15 that investment arbitration falls within a 
competence shared between the EU and the Member states.441 The court reasons that this is the 
case because an investment arbitration system cannot be considered as an ancillary provision 
in these circumstances.442 A provision of ancillary nature naturally means that such provision 
has no effect on the nature of the competence to conclude it. These provisions are considered a 
subgroup provisions and therefore fall within the same competence as the substantive 
provisions which they accompany.443 The investment arbitration is, in essence is removing 
disputes from the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State, which cannot be considered to 
be of an ancillary nature and therefore leads to that it cannot be established without the Member 
States’ consent.444 This is because the claimant investor may decide to pursuant to Article 9.16 
NGSFTA,445 to submit the dispute to arbitration. The Member State, in this procedure is not 
being able to oppose this, as its consent in this regard is deemed to be obtained under Article 
9.16.2 of the agreement.446 
The dispute settlement regime in the EUSFTA being part is part of the institutional 
framework for the substantive provision of the agreement and is not liable to remove disputes 
from the jurisdiction of the court of Member State or the EU. This is because the of the EU’s 
competence of the EU in the field of international concluded agreements with EU would entail 
a power to submit the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such agreements 
as regards the interpretation and application of their provisions. This has already been stated by 
                                                   
441 2/15, Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 211), para. 293. 
442 Ibid, para. 292 
443 Opinion of the Court of Justice of 26 April 1977, (Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland 
waterway vessels), 1/76, EU:C:1977:63, para. 5; 1/78, Opinion on International Agreement on Natural Rubber (n 24), 
para. 56; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 October 2013, European Commission v Council of the European Union, C-
137/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:675, para. 70 and 71. 
444 2/15, Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 211), para. 292. 
445 EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018). 
446 2/15, Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 211), para. 291. 
  -89- 
the CJEU in relation to the EEA agreement;447 in relation to the Patent litigation system448 and 
in relation to the agreements concerning the EU’s accession to the ECHR.449  
3 The EU’s Implied and Exclusive External Competence for 
NGFTAs 
The analysis of the EU’s exclusive implied competence considers the agreements in 
relation to trade, i.e., whether they have immediate and direct effects on trade. This will be 
considered in relation to the areas which fall outside the CCP in order to establish whether (or 
which) provisions would be considered to be implied exclusive competences by virtue of 
Article 3(2) TFEU. Implied exclusive competence is assigned to the EU for the conclusion of 
an international agreement, when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the EU, is 
necessary to enable the EU to exercise its internal competence or may affect common rules or 
alter their scope. 
The implied powers were created by the CJEU in order to facilitate the possibility to 
regulate without using the competences established in Article 3 TFEU. It is meant to further 
ease and facilitate for the EU to negotiate international treaties. This implied competence is 
relied upon the internal competence provided in such area; in other words, the exercise of the 
competence. This section intends to analyse the limits of such implied competence. The EU is 
limited by its own internal procedure; and this procedure needs to be considered in relation to 
the objectives and competences in order for the EU to take decisions in relation to particular 
issues within the NGFTAs.450 
The implied competence only applies to the extent that the matter, dealt with by the 
international act, falls, in Union law, under one of the shared competences’ areas set out in 
Article 4(2) TFEU. For this reason, it is first of all necessary to define the policy area concerned 
by the agreement, and then consider that in relation to EU law and EU policy in that area. In 
this way, the agreement and the EU law must be analysed in relation to their main objectives.451 
                                                   
447 Opinion of the Court of Justice of 14 December 1991, (European Economic Area EEA Agreement I), 1/91, 
EU:C:1991:490, paras 40 and 70. 
448 Opinion of the Court of Justice of 8 March 2011, (European Patent Court), Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, para. 74. 
449 Opinion of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014, (Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, para.182. 
450 Harrison, ‘An Introduction to the Legal Framework for EU-Korea Relations’ (n 78), p. 16. 
451 Erlbacher, 'Recent Case Law on External Competences of the European Union: How Member States Can Embrace Their 
Own Treaty' (n 346). 
  -90- 
Thereafter, it should be considered whether the content and nature of the specific area in the 
agreement are such that the EU common rules may be affected or altered in their scope.452 
What falls within the scope of implied external competence is an ongoing discussion 
between the Council and Commission. The CJEU gave some clarification in regard to this in 
its opinion in relation to the EUSFTA.453 According to Article 3(2), the EU enjoys implied 
external exclusive competence in situations where the EU does not have express exclusive 
competence in relation to Article 3(1) TFEU. Unlike Article 3(1) TFEU, Article 3(2) TFEU 
concerns external competence alone. There are three situations454 where the EU is exclusively 
competent to conclude an international agreement, ‘(…) when its conclusion is provided for in 
a legislative act of the EU’, ‘(…) when its conclusion is necessary to enable the union to 
exercise its internal competence’, and ‘(…) insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules 
or alter their scope’.455 
To have the right internal policies remains one of the big challenges under the questions 
of competence and within the legal framework of the EU. This reflects the external competitive 
challenges, and also maintains the openness to trade and investment. It additionally ensures 
greater openness and fair rules underpinned by transparent and effective rules, domestic, 
bilateral and multilateral. In particular, this is important in regard to future major trading 
partners. It is clear that foreign direct investment is within the EU’s exclusive competence. 
However, when it comes to non-direct investment and ISDS, the question of competence was 
answered by the CJEU. The CJEU put it as that the EU should enjoy exclusive competence 
pursuant to Article 3(2) TFEU, since the Treaty provisions on free movement of capital would 
be affected by the EUSFTAS. 
The CJEU has, post-Lisbon, interpreted the EU’s external implied competence quite 
restrictively in Broadcasting Organisation.456 
Through the changes and reforms of the Lisbon Treaty, it could be argued that shared 
external competences no longer exist per se. This is because the codification of the EU 
competence did not include shared external competence unless specifically provided for in 
individual matters. Consequently, it would imply that they do not exist in relation to either a 
test of facilitation or by any other rule.457 
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However, it could instead be argued that a general shared external competence exists 
based on the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, through the difference in wording between Article 
3(2) and Article 216(1) TFEU; although Article 216(1) does not specify the exclusive or non-
exclusive nature of the competences that it confers, while Article 3(2), through a first reading, 
could suggest that Article 216(1) is corresponding to the exclusive competences.458 
In situations where the EU has the power to conclude an international agreement 
according to Article 216 TFEU, such power stems from four different situations: when the 
Treaties so provide; when an agreement is necessary within the framework of the EU’s policies 
to achieve an EU’s objective, when it is provided for in a legally binding EU act, or when it is 
likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.  
It may be possible in theory to envisage cases that do not fit into these four categories, 
but the reality is that one or more of these categories will legitimate the making of an 
international agreement in the post-Lisbon Treaty world. The breadth of the second category is 
worthy to note. Provided that it can be shown that the agreement was necessary, it can be made 
so in order to achieve a Union objective within the framework of Union policy. Thus, an 
international agreement could be made to effectuate one of the broad objectives in Article 3 
TEU or Article 21 TEU, within the context of any Union policy. 
The link between Article 216 TFEU and Article 3(2) TFEU is significant. Article 216 is 
concerned with whether the EU has competence to conclude an international agreement; and 
Article 3(2) deals with the related, but distinct, issue as to whether competence is exclusive or 
not. 
However, in this regard, when external competence is conferred and where the conclusion 
of an agreement is ‘necessary’ to fulfil objectives of the Treaties, this could relate to both, 
exclusive and shared external competences.459 
This codification could be read as a double necessity standard, where either exclusive or 
non-exclusive competence would be applied.460 The case-law, such as the Lugano Opinion on 
implied shared competence, has only referred to necessity and not facilitation. However, it 
could be possible to argue for facilitation on this basis. This case-law, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, 
could be analogously interpreting the wordings of Article 216 TFEU. It could also be possible 
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to approach this problem by arguing that in specific cases, the intention of the drafters of the 
Treaty was to make all implied competences explicit. The reasons are that the Lugano Opinion 
has been given by the CJEU, the case-law on this issue was not conclusive, and the codification 
would be difficult because nothing can be said with certainty.461 
3.1 Competence Enabling Exercise of Internal Competence 
Exclusivity is established when an international agreement ‘(…) is necessary to enable 
the Union to exercise its internal competence’, which is a codification of Opinion 1/76. This 
principle basically establishes that the EU has exclusive competence to conclude international 
agreements in situations where its powers for passing internal measures cannot be exercised 
without such international action.462 The case concerned the conclusion of an agreement on a 
scheme for the elimination of disturbances for navigation on the Rhine. The power itself flows 
from the implication of the provisions of the Treaty, which create the internal power; and for 
international scope, it is necessary for the attainment of the objective of such powers to be 
reached within the EU.463 The CJEU found it necessary for the EU to enter into such agreement 
autonomously, because the arrangement included also Switzerland as a third state.464 The 
necessity test was introduced by the CJEU.465 Article 216(1) TFEU put the necessity criterion 
different by referring to the necessity of achieving one of the Treaties’ objectives instead.466 
The Court thereafter rendered its judgement in ERTA and Kramer and held that: 
(…) the Court has concluded inter alia that whenever Community law has created for the 
institutions of the Community powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining 
a specific objective, the Community has authority to enter into the international 
commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the absence of an 
express provision in that connexion. (…) 
The power to bind the Community vis-à-vis third countries nevertheless flows, by 
implication from the provisions of the Treaty creating the internal power, and insofar as the 
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participation of the Community in the international agreement is, as here, necessary for the 
attainment of one of the objectives of the Community. Transport policy, which was the concern 
of the case, led it to be considered implied exclusive external competence.467 
The CJEU has mentioned certain conditions for this kind of exclusivity, requiring an 
inextricable link between internal policy objectives and international agreements.468 The test of 
necessity cannot be compared to the EU’s proportionality test, as used within the internal 
market.469 The reason hereto is that the proportionality principle is related to the EU’s act 
against alternative measures to see whether it can be considered as appropriate and 
indispensable.470 
Shared competence must in this sense be conditional on certain criteria; in other words, 
the principle of complementarity.471 This is because the competence is not automatically 
generated for the EU when it has internal competence to enact directives or regulations.472 The 
requirement for implied shared competence would be, on the other hand, linked to an internal 
competence.473 
Thus, the pertinent requirement for implied shared competences has to be attached to the 
nature of an internal competence. For example, in relation to international agreements, the EU 
is exclusively competent to conclude such agreements. For this reason, the only way an EU’s 
objective can be attained would be through exclusive competence; however, when the 
participation would merely facilitate the exercise of an internal competence, it is to be argued 
as shared competence. In order to be an implied shared competence, it requires that the 
obligations of the EU vis-à-vis third States would further the attainment of one or more of its 
internal competences.474 
This test is based on the same theory as the necessity criterion element within exclusive 
external competence, as introduced in the Opinion 1/76. In other words, it is the necessity test 
that provokes the EU’s exclusive competence, even in the circumstances of shared competence. 
Through Opinion 1/76 or Article 352 TFEU, the necessity criterion aims to reconcile the 
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implied competence of the EU’s external action, while still interpreting the Treaties 
effectively.475 
The question of the necessity is understood when there is an inextricable link, which 
requires and leaves no other option for the EU to act externally in order for it to be able to fulfil 
its tasks internally.476 The standard of facilitation and its exact scope are not made clear, and 
remain, for this reason, an open question in relation to implied shared competence.  
The threshold, in order for it to be considered as a necessity, is very high, and this has 
resulted in that the external competence was denied. Firstly, it should be a close link to the 
internal competence. However, such link would not need to be indispensable. Secondly, the test 
of facilitation should be guided by the principle of effectives, as rooted in the ‘effect utile’ of 
the internal power that requires external action for it to be effectively exercised. In order to be 
able to view whether it could be regarded as an effective measure of assessment on whether the 
internal competence would be further analysed.477 
3.2 Competence Stemming from a Legislative Act 
According to Article 3(2) TFEU and the first ground of this provision, the EU shall have 
exclusive competence ‘(…) when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the 
Union’.478 
The reason behind this rule has been expressed by the case-law of the CJEU. In this 
regard, there may be situations where the Treaties themselves do not establish an external 
competence of the EU to conclude internal agreement, but that common rules laid down by the 
institutions can establish such competence.479 
Enabling Member States to conclude their own international agreements in these 
situations would be liable to jeopardise concerted external action in the spheres covered by 
those EU rules;480 the EU, therefore, acquires exclusive competence as a result of common 
rules.481 
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The first ground of Article 3(2) TFEU is called the WTO principle. This is because the 
rule was made in the CJEU’s Opinion 1/94.482 In this case, it was concluded that the EU acquires 
exclusive external competence when the ‘(…) the Community has concluded in its internal 
legislative acts’ provisions relating to the treatment of nationals of non-member countries or 
expressly conferred on the institutions powers to negotiate with non-member countries’.483 
In this regard, one could reason that ‘(…) the Lisbon Treaty would opt against the theory 
of legislative pre-emption and in favour of subsequent constitutional exclusivity in the external 
sphere (...)’.484 This is considered to be an important difference between the powers, conferred 
by the Treaty, and the powers that the EU acquires as a result of the passing legislative acts. 
Furthermore, if the EU could empower itself with exclusive competences, the WTO’s principle 
would consequently undermine the constitutional division of powers of the EU.485 This 
principle is indeed a way for the EU to acquire exclusive external competence; however, its 
implications depend on its interpretation.  
Firstly, it would be possible to interpret this provision in a narrow way, thereby not really 
establishing a fundamental difference between the ERTA principle and the WTO principles, in 
the case where it would be a substantive relation between the internal and external content of 
the rule in question. In this regard, it should not be compared to external competences expressly 
conferred by the Treaty and consequently, it should not provide a threat to the constitutional 
division of powers.486 Because this is in line with the ERTA principle, the EU could acquire 
exclusive competence by virtue of any form of internal legislation. This should apply a fortiori 
when they already contain an ‘international’ element regarding the treatment of third-country 
nationals, or when the EU’s instruments are more specific on the external mandate of the EU’s 
institutions. An example is ERTA case, where a regulation had provided for a treaty-making 
negotiating mandate, but only for the scope of the international agreements in question.487 
Secondly, Article 3(2) TFEU can be interpreted to speak very shortly about exclusive 
competence when it ‘(...) is provided for in a legislative act of the Union’. This would mean 
that when the EU regulates on a matter, such matter could lead the EU to have the power to 
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negotiate with a third state. However, there is no case law on the precise meaning of the WTO’s 
principle before the Lisbon Treaty. By looking at Article 3(2) TFEU from a narrow perspective, 
anything else would, in a fundamental manner, run counter to the principle of conferral.488 
3.3 Competence Affecting Common Rules or Altering their Scope 
In relation to the third ground of Article 3(2) TFEU, the EU enjoys exclusive competence 
to conclude an international agreement ‘(…) insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules 
or alter their scope’. This ground corresponds to the ERTA case-law for defining ‘(…) the nature 
of the international commitments which Member States cannot enter into outside the framework 
of the EU institutions, where common EU rules have been promulgated for the attainment of 
the objectives of the Treaty’.489 
The ERTA principle gives a basis for the EU to enjoy implied exclusive competence 
through appropriate measures, and for the Member States to fulfil their obligations under the 
Treaties and their duty to abstain from measures capable of jeopardising the attainment of the 
objectives of the Treaties.490 
In this regard, the exclusive external competence is for the situation, where there is a risk 
that the Member States, acting outside the EU, would affect the common rules or alter their 
scope. The reason is that otherwise, the implementation of EU’s policies and also the integration 
process would be questioned. In fact, there must be a specific analysis of the relationship 
between the proposed international agreement and EU law in relation to exclusive 
competence.491 Such analysis contains three different steps i.e. defining the subject matter, 
identifying existing common rules, and also the possibility to impact the conclusion of 
international agreement 
3.3.1 Definition of Subject Matter  
Defining the area or the subject matter of the agreement is regarded as the first step of the 
analysis. This is considered by looking at the content and objective of the agreement. In this 
regard, not all agreements are homogenous; there are certain agreements which cover larger 
areas. In such cases, there is a need to verify whether the EU rules fully harmonised, or whether 
the EU largely covers these areas.492 The question is whether the common rules constitute rules 
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already adopted in the exercise of the EU’s legislative competences, or whether the Treaty 
provisions can also constitute ‘common rules’.  
3.3.2 Identification of Existing Common Rules  
Identifying whether the common rules already exist in the area is the second step in this 
analysis. The scopes of international agreements and common rules need not to fully 
coincide;493 it could be sufficient that the area of the international agreement is largely covered 
by the common rules.494 The common rules may include legislation that is applicable to the 
specific area, and also legislation that has a broader scope of application.495 The common rules 
can be also found in different legal instruments,496 and not only in situations involving a non-
EU element. 
The CJEU states that when the EU adopts provisions to lay down common rules, the 
Member States can no longer act, individually or collectively, to undertake obligations with 
third states that may affect this type of rules.497 
It has been further made clear that for such analysis, one should not only take the current 
state of EU law into account, but also its future development insofar as it would be foreseeable 
at the time of analysis.498 Moreover, this was confirmed in Opinion 1/13.499 For example, in 
Green Network, the CJEU ruled that even though the EU had not regulated on the specific issue 
(the support schemes for electricity produced from renewable energy sources), the Commission 
was required to submit, within a limited time period, “(…) a report on experience gained with 
the application and coexistence of the different national support mechanisms, accompanied, if 
necessary, by a proposal for a Community framework with regard to those support schemes for 
electricity produced from renewable energy, specifying in that respect various criteria such a 
framework should meet”.500 “Without making this very explicit, the Court was manifestly 
guided (and rightly so) by the idea that unilateral international action of Member States could 
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jeopardise foreseeable future development of Union law. It is with this objective in mind that 
the unavoidable grey areas need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis”.501 
In Opinion 2/15, the CJEU concluded that when an agreement provides for the application 
of rules which, to a large extent, overlap with the common EU rules, the agreement may affect 
or alter the scope of the common rules.502 In this regard, international agreements’ provisions 
that essentially affect the common rules are likely to satisfy the conditions for exclusive 
competence. 
3.3.3 Possibility to Impact the Conclusion of International Agreement  
To analyse the possible impact of the conclusion of the international agreement on the 
relevant common rules is the third step. A risk exists where the commitments under the 
international agreement fall within the scope of the common rules.503 When assessing the 
impact, it is sufficient to show that the common rules may be affected, or that their scope may 
be altered,504 and not necessarily the conflict itself between the international agreement and 
common rules.505 
It is in fact easy to establish the exclusive competence for concluding international 
agreements where the common rules fully harmonise the area governed by the international 
agreement.506 In cases where the common rules are only harmonised partially, the fact that an 
international agreement concerns are largely covered by EU rules does not by itself 
automatically lead to that the EU acquires exclusive competence for the entire agreement. The 
ERTA principles do not automatically apply in these circumstances and must therefore be 
examined because everything depends on the content of the commitments and its specific 
connection to EU rules.507 
Protocol no. 25 concerns the exercise of shared competence; Article 2(2) TFEU defines 
the scope of the EU’s competence only to cover those elements governed by the EU to act in 
that regard, and therefore, it does not cover the whole area. The scope of Article 3(2) TFEU can 
therefore not be limited by the protocol.508 
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Portfolio investment is similar to such activity since it does not require managerial 
control. Consequently, portfolio investment would as well remain outside the scope of the CCP. 
The question is whether it is possible for EU to enjoy either shared or exclusive competence in 
relation to portfolio investment. The Commission has argued that the Treaty provision on 
capital and payments should be read together with the third ground of Article 3(2) TFEU. From 
this reading, insofar as it may affect the common rules or alter their scope, the implied external 
competence should be exclusive for the EU in relation to portfolio investment. The Commission 
would need ‘(...) to provide evidence to establish the exclusive nature of the external 
competence of the EU on which it seeks to rely’. The argument put forward by the Commission 
is essentially that the investment policy should be consistent with the Treaty provisions on 
capital and payment. 
In principle, the Commission claims that all restrictions on payments and capital 
movements, including those that involve direct as well as portfolio investment between Member 
States themselves, and between Member States and third countries would be considered 
prohibited. The Commission furthermore claims that such prohibition should be ‘(…) to the 
extent that international agreements on investment affect the scope of the common rules set by 
the Treaty’s Chapter on capital and payments, the exclusive EU competence to conclude 
agreements in this area would be implied’. In this regard, the Commission argues that portfolio 
investment should be an implied exclusive competence for the EU.  
However, many have questioned this statement by the Commission, since it would be 
contrary to EU’s external competence. For example, it would be ‘(…) difficult to see on what 
basis the EU could claim a general competence to conclude international agreements on the 
protection of portfolio investment’. This statement is based on that Articles 64(2) and 66 TFEU 
provide the EU with substantive competences in the field of portfolio investment. Through 
reading these provisions, it can be concluded that they ‘clearly do not cover all aspects of such 
investment’. It could also be because Article 63 TFEU covers the movement of capital between 
Member States and third countries. 
Moreover, if the FDI and portfolio investment had existed as exclusive implied powers 
prior to Lisbon Treaty, it would have been strictly unnecessary to include them into Article 
207(1) TFEU.  
The Commission means that by reading Article 3(2) TFEU from a more creative 
perspective, one could suggest that ‘common rules’ in the absence of secondary legislation also 
include Treaty provisions. If that would be the case, then, Article 3(2) together with Article 
63(1) would mean that the EU enjoys exclusive competence over portfolio investment.  
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This creative proposition by the Commission was rejected by AG Sharpston, who argued 
that the ERTA and subsequent case-law made ‘(…) clear that the Commission’s broad 
interpretation of ‘common rules’ cannot be accepted’. Such interpretation cannot be possible 
since Article 3(2) TFEU provides the EU with an addition ground of exclusive competence, not 
covered by Article 3(1). For this reason, the competence ‘(…) must therefore stem from some 
other basis than the Treaties themselves’. 
Since Articles 63(1) and 64(2) TFEU are not linked to any secondary legislation, there is 
no ‘common rules’, and the requirement from Article 3(2) cannot be met. The Commission’s 
interpretation of Article 3(2) TFEU would in fact imply that the EU has the right to conclude 
agreements that affect the Treaties or alter their scope, but EU primary law ‘… can be changed 
only by amending the Treaties in accordance with Art 48 TEU’, as argued by AG Sharpston. 
Portfolio investment represents major area of interest since the EU’s explicit competence 
is limited to foreign direct investment, according to Article 207 TFEU. Following the 
mainstream view in the literature, it means that it would be necessary for the Member State to 
be contracting party to an agreement with portfolio investment included. The fact that Article 
207 TFEU covers foreign direct investment does not automatically lead to the conclusion that 
the EU’s competence should be limited to foreign direct investment, since it would contradict 
the entire implied shared competences, which have not been terminated or modified by the 
Lisbon Treaty. In fact, whether this would be the case, or whether the mainstream literature 
would prevail, mainly depends on the interpretation of the free movement of capital in a third-
country context.509 
Following the reason of free movement of capital provisions as already granting access 
and treatment standards for third countries and EU investors through a restrictive approach of 
the CJEU, would provide the EU with exclusive competence to determine the condition of 
access to and post-access treatment of foreign direct investment in the NGFTAs.510 
It is important to clarify the portfolio investment. Non-direct foreign investment, which 
would take place in form of acquisition of company securities with the intention of making 
financial investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the 
undertaking, is considered movement of capital for the purpose of Article 63 TFEU.511 
The CJEU determines whether portfolio investment should be considered to be within 
exclusive competence pursuant to Article 3(2) in relation to the EUSFTA. The CJEU argues 
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that even if there is no contradiction with common EU rules.512 Chapter 9 of the EUSFTA may 
affect Article 63 TFEU and should for this reason fall within the exclusive competence of the 
EU according to Article 3(2) TFEU.513 
4 Framework and Objectives Guiding the CCP 
The ‘New Generation’ of FTAs is subordinated to the EU’s trade policy, and to a wide 
range of the EU’s objectives.514 Whether an agreement fall within the CCP needs to be 
presented through showing that the different components of the agreements are intended to 
promote, facilitate or govern trade. It should moreover be considered whether the agreements 
have a direct and immediate effect on trade.515 It must thereafter also be shown whether the 
components of the agreement show commitments which are intended to promote facilitate or 
govern trade and more over have a direct and immediate effect on it.516 
The NGFTAs are broad in content and can therefore carry multiple related or unrelated 
components and purposes. This type of objectives may or may not be within the CCP objectives. 
The NGFTAs include commitments such as market access, investment protection, intellectual 
property protection, competition and sustainable development. 
The interaction between the CCP and other principles and objectives of the EU’s external 
action is expressly recognised in the final sentence of Article 207(1) TFEU. According to 
Article 206 TFEU, the ‘(...) union shall contribute, in the common interests to the harmonious 
development of the world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade 
and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers’.  
When the EU acts internationally, regardless through which competence, and whether it 
stems from internal or external objectives, it is the action itself which is regarded as the EU’s 
external action.517 The action itself is guided through different objectives.  
The Lisbon Treaty creates a common framework for EU’s external action, in relation to 
Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU; thus, subjecting all fields of the EU’s external action to the same 
common general principles and objectives. Article 21 TEU does not in itself confer competence 
to the EU but may, through its list of general objectives, give a more global approach to the 
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EU’s external action. These principles are to guide the EU’s external actions and promote them 
in a wider world. 
It is clearly indicated that the principles and objectives of Article 21 TEU are not limited 
to specific external competence but apply to all EU’s competences. For this reason, one can 
consider Article 21 TEU to provide a guiding framework for the exercise of EU’s external 
competence.518  
Substantive specific objectives correspond to specific external action competences 
conferred to the EU in part C of the TFEU. The objective to promote an international system 
based on TFEU’s stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance is not linked to 
a specific competence of the EU. 
When defining the EU’s exclusive competence objectives, it is natural to, first of all, 
determine the underlying objectives of the CCP in respect to its trade liberalisation objectives 
and non-trade objectives. This in order to be able to see whether there is a clash between the 
different objectives and whether in fact, the objectives can contribute to limiting the EU’s 
external action. 
In this regard, it is important to analyse whether or which area that can be subsumed under 
the obligations of Article 207 TFEU as provisions which are affecting international trade in a 
more or less ‘direct and immediate’ manner. The indication of the legal basis is essential in the 
light of the principle of conferral, since the choice of an appropriate legal basis has a 
constitutional significance.519 
4.1 The Principle of Conferral 
The EU can only act within the limits of the competences conferred upon it according to 
the principle of conferral laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) TEU. The competences in the 
Treaties are conferred competences from the Member States to the EU.  
The principle of conferral links the EU’s external competence to the EU’s objectives.520 
This becomes a core constitutional issue that underscores the division of competence between 
the EU and its Member States. The Member States have conferred parts of their competence to 
the EU in order for the latter to be able to legislate in various areas of policy and economic 
activity.  
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It determines that the EU shall act only within the limits of the competences, conferred 
upon it by its Member States, in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein, and that the 
powers which are not given to the EU remain with its Member States.521 In this regard, the 
principle helps to provide a more desired balance between the EU and its Member States.522 
The idea of conferring competences is based on the attempt to strike the balance between 
the EU as a supra national authority, and its Member States. In this regard, it is of specific 
importance that the division of competences is clear, since it may have implications for the 
exercise of external competence.523 The CJEU carries out the function of assuring that the 
vertical division of competences between the EU and its Member States is correctly established 
through the constitutional principle of conferral.524 
This competence is therefore relative to the principle of conferral, which means that the 
EU is only competent to conclude agreements in the field where it has acquired such 
competence by the Member States to do so.525 Additionally, the exclusive competence doesn’t 
allow Member States to act in parallel, and it distinguishes the EU from other intergovernmental 
organisations.526 The Treaties, however, do not clarify all aspects of division of competence 
between the EU and its Member States. Nevertheless, Opinion 2/15 provided some needed 
clarity in this context which will be further discussed in this chapter. 
4.2 Trade Liberalisation Objective 
Article 21.2(a-g) TEU covers substantive and specific external action objectives and an 
objective, which could be considered as general or ultimate under Article 21.2(h) to ‘(…) 
promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global 
governance’. While the EU shall contribute with common interest to harmonious development 
of world trade and the progressive abolition of restriction on international trade and on foreign 
direct investment.527 This provision reflects the ‘liberalisation objective’. To consider the 
wording in a more detailed manner, one can distinguish the obligation in the wording of the 
provision that the EU ‘shall’ contribute to international trade. In other words, the EU is bound 
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to formulate the CCP for it to provide positive effects on trade and foreign direct investment 
liberalisation.528 
Article 206 TFEU shows the relationship between the internal customs union and the 
objective to reach to a more global level. For this reason, the CCP is constructed to have a core 
based on exclusive competence. The development of trade has shifted from the Member States 
to the EU. Article 206 TFEU refers to the EU and mentions international trade and also foreign 
direct investment as forming part of the CCP. 
Article 206 TFEU offers also a different role to the objective of liberalisation in the field 
of the CCP. Within this context, it is necessary to examine how the Lisbon Treaty affects the 
application of the principles of uniformity and liberalisation, the importance of the general 
objectives for the CCP, and the mechanisms it provides for ensuring coherence and consistency. 
There is a possibility of overlaps between the NGFTAs and already existing agreements. 
This provides an increased difficulty to a clear gateway. The key word for the legal framework 
is therefore cooperation. Cooperation can be viewed in the way of balancing various policy 
goals, where certain provision can be found in both, the framework agreement529 and the 
FTA;530 for example, the concept of sustainable development, which guides the parties to 
achieve coherence in their bilateral relations. 
When trying to protect certain industries or consumers, the meaning of progressive 
abolition of restriction is not always clear. The EU is very active in making disputes at the WTO 
level; for this reason, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the EU is not a social trade giant 
but rather active in dispute litigation.531 
The purpose of the EU’s trade policy was never linked to protectionism; on the contrary, 
restrictive measures adopted towards third countries should always promote liberalisation of 
trade, such as the objectives of GATT 1947. The references to the progressive abolition of 
restrictions and the lowering of customs barriers date back to the text of the Treaty of Rome. 
At the time, they constituted an acknowledgement of trade liberalisation as one of the main 
principles underpinning the creation of the common market. They also served as a reminder 
that the common market is subject to the rules of GATT 1947, and, in particular, that the 
establishment of a customs union is an exception to the free trade imperatives set out under 
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GATT and is therefore only allowed under the very restrictive conditions of Article XXIV 
GATT 1947. Alongside the objective of trade liberalisation, the CCP shall be conducted in the 
context of the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action according to Article 207(1) 
TFEU.  
However, if there was no such protectionism, and the EU would continue to promote 
liberalisation to trade, there would be no trade restrictive measures adopted against third 
countries. This was decided in the EMI ,532 where the CJEU pointed out that the liberalisation 
objective does not extend to third countries. 
The CJEU furthermore states that the objective of trade liberalisation could be subjugated 
to inherently internal interests of the EU.533 However, this case can be questioned after the 
changes promoted by the Lisbon Treaty, because of the liberalisation objective in that the EU 
‘shall contribute’ to trade liberalisation according to Article 207 TFEU.  
Such change can suggest a more of a binding obligation, which is at the same time 
considered to be of a gradual nature in Article 206 TFEU. This perhaps suggests the obligation 
to gradually move towards liberalisation, where the minimum would be the maintenance of the 
existing level of liberalisation.534 Naturally, this would preclude introducing new protectionism 
measures in form of trade restrictions. There is no obligation to per se liberalise trade with third 
countries, but at the same time, promoting trade liberalisation should be understood as a 
collective effort on the international stage. This means that the EU is merely under an obligation 
to promote, through authorizing, increased liberalisation when negotiation trade agreements.535 
This further shows that trade liberalisation is not a goal in itself, but rather a mean to 
achieve improvements for economic, social, and environmental conditions. This can be showed 
by the EU’s aim to ‘(…) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental 
development of developing countries with the aim of eradicating poverty.’536 The EU’s external 
trade provisions cannot be read in isolation, and all provisions need to be considered as the 
EU’s external trade provision as a whole; where the EU should encourage the integration of all 
countries into the world economy through the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
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international trade.537 It is clear that the drafters of the Treaty, when amending Article 206 
TFEU, aimed to provide a new dimension of trade liberalisation providing the liberalisation 
objectives as a declaratory; putting more emphasis on the political importance of the economic 
integration, whether at multilateral, regional, or bilateral level, for the EU. 
4.2.1 Primacy of Trade Liberalisation with Regard to Other Trade Objectives  
Article 206 TFEU states that the CCP shall contribute to trade liberalisation, whereas 
Article 207 TFEU states that the CCP ‘(…) shall be conducted in the context of the general 
objectives of the Union external action’. The language used in relation to trade liberalisation, 
‘shall contribute’, is stronger than the language used for the general objectives, ‘shall be 
conducted in the context of’, making it possible to argue the primacy of trade liberalisation over 
other non-trade objectives. 
Moreover, although it seems unlikely that the EU institutions would ever countenance the 
notion that trade liberalisation can override such fundamental interests, like those of security, 
democracy and the rule of law in practice, some contend that Article 21 TEU does not actually 
list legally binding objectives, but rather well-meaning – although ultimately toothless – 
declarations reflecting the various objectives of the EU, that it should strive to pursue in the 
context of its foreign policy.538 
On the other hand, it is worth considering that it is not uncommon for national 
constitutions to include foreign policy objectives, which whilst leaving executive branches a 
significant margin of discretion as to how to achieve such objectives, at least require a best 
endeavour obligation to pursue them.539 
4.2.2 Sustainable, Economic, Social, and Environmental Development 
It is not possible for the CCP to be limited to only encompassing measures, which pursue 
commercial objectives. Article 21 TEU shows that such subjects include a wide range of 
objectives ranging from political and social to environmental and economic. In this sense, not 
all objectives are purely commercial, such as development,540 foreign and security policy,541 or 
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the protection of the environment or human health,542 but they still have direct and immediate 
effects on trade. 
The EU is seeking for cooperation to continue, preserve, and improve the quality of the 
environment and sustainable management of global natural resources. This is indicated in 
Article 21.2(f) TFEU,543 stating that the EU should work to help develop international 
measures. The emphasis is put on the environmental aspects, and the term ‘sustainable 
development’ is not further explained. ‘International measure’ is another term, that is also not 
further explained by the Treaty. International measure could mean measures made by 
instruments in cooperative practice, such as bilateral or multilateral instruments; for example, 
the NGFTAs. It could also be interpreted in a wider manner to also include unilateral actions 
of the EU, such as restrictions, or taxes for environmental purposes. For this reason, one can 
conclude that the EU is able to proceed to take unilateral action to ensure sustainable 
development, but at the same time respect international law, and its bilateral and multilateral 
commitments. 
The EU has to ensure a strict consistency between the areas in its external action and other 
policies. The consistency requirement is reinforced by institutional cooperation. The 
requirement of consistency stemming from Article 21 is repeated in Articles 205 and 207 
TFEU.544 The link between EU’s external action and the principles and objectives is stressed 
again in Article 207 TFEU.545 
The fact that the CCP is subordinated to the general principles and objectives of external 
relations, including the sustainable development, is not questioned. The issues of conflict 
between the CCP and objectives and principles in relation to trade liberalisation objectives are 
sometimes very difficult to reconcile with other principles and objectives of the EU. One of the 
conflicts could be between trade and environment. The abolition of trade barriers could lead to 
damaging effects in the field of trade, and also in other fields, such as social policy or 
environment. 
The environmental protection requirement in Article 6 TFEU546 is established on a 
coordinated, parallel-like relation to trade. Depending on the ‘substance’, it could have different 
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impacts in relation to different policy areas. This naturally means that measures, which are 
detrimental to the sustainable development, cannot be adopted in the CCP. Because of these 
requirements of coherence, the potential conflicts between abolition of trade barriers and 
environmental concerns, including the sustainable development, can be solved.547 
4.2.3 Progressive Abolition of Restriction on International Trade 
In spite of the fact that the ultimate aim of the KOREU agreement, as an example, is free 
movement of goods, customs duties are not abolished at once. The majority of duties are 
eliminated with the entry into force of the Treaty; however, the FTA provides for a phase-in 
period during which the tariffs that were exempted from immediate liberalisation are gradually 
reduced until they are fully removed.548 
The parties have set out base rates, which are rates of customs duties applicable at the 
moment of entry into force of the agreement.549 Thereafter, annual steps are applicable for 
reducing the applicable rates until they are fully abolished. The annual percentage of reduction 
varies according to the respective category of products. 
For some products, trade is liberalised immediately. The full abolition of duties on highly 
sensitive goods, in particular agricultural products, requires the phase-in period.550 In this 
regard, the determination of the actual applicable duty and amount of time scheduled is noted 
until full liberalisation takes place. It requires that there will be an examination of the base rate, 
and identification of the category that the respective product is listed within. 
The different phase-in periods are used to grant the concerned sectors enough time for 
structural adjustments in order to diminish the social costs of liberalisation. A slower or gradual 
liberalisation could therefore help limiting labour market adjustment. In the EU, this is 
particularly used in the automotive sector, while in Korea, the agricultural product sector is 
primarily considered.551 
The FTA does not provide the possibility of introducing new tariffs, complementing the 
elimination of existing duties, nor enacting any new duties.552 These two mechanisms ensure 
the permanent abolition of tariff barriers between Korea and the EU.  
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Non-tariff barriers were among the main concerns identified in the Commission’s Global 
Europe communication, which initiated the shift towards bilateralism, and identified Korea as 
a priority FTA partner.553 Reducing tariffs remains important to opening markets for industrial 
and agricultural exports.  
In line with this statement, the provisions on domestic regulatory measures in the KOREU 
are considered to be the agreement’s main innovation in terms of rule development in the field 
of trade in goods.554 While the FTA incorporates Article III of the GATT 1994555 on national 
treatment and reaffirms the signatories’ rights and obligations under the agreement on the 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),556 it goes well beyond the WTO obligations of the parties. 
The reason for the presence of additional provisions on TBT is that national treatment may 
solve the problem of overtly discriminatory, and thus, protectionist regulation. The national 
discipline is not well equipped to address these specific difficulties. 
The good faith of market fragmentation is not tackled by the non-discrimination. 
Regulatory measures are normally put in place in order to pursue legitimate policy objectives, 
such as addressing information asymmetries, negative externalities and so forth without any 
protectionist motivation. Although legitimate, these measures may have the effect of increasing 
transaction costs and, thus de facto, ban products from the market. This is especially the case 
when producers are faced with the costs of having two conformity assessment procedures, one 
in their home country and another in the export market. To overcome this problem, there are 
three basic alternatives: (1) states may opt for some weak form of policed decentralisation, 
based on transparency and notification requirements, (2) states may opt for the harmonisation 
of their standards, and (3) states may also choose the mutual recognition of their respective 
domestic regulations.557 
It is often difficult to ascertain the regulatory intent behind a measure in practice; 
however, it is the key to determining whether the measure should be allowed or condemned 
under international trade law. Despite the fact that non-protectionist regulation may also have 
the effect of excluding foreign products from domestic markets, this is acceptable because it is 
globally efficient as long as the measure is not a protectionist proposal. In other words, 
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regulatory measures should be allowed as long as they are not enacted. Subsequently, as to 
afford protection to domestic producers,558 any regulation of standards must strike a balance 
between inhibiting such protectionist measures and not interfering with states regulatory 
autonomy to adopt necessary and legitimate domestic measures. 
The additional disciplines in the KOREU should be understood against this background. 
On the one hand, they are proxies to ascertain regulatory intent, serving to distinguish 
protectionist motivated regulation from measures that were promulgated in good faith and 
pursuing legitimate goals. On the other hand, they address the problem of bona fide market 
fragmentation by reducing transaction costs for exporters through different mechanisms such 
as the recognition of foreign standards and conformity assessment, and the alignment of 
regulations on the basis of international standards. 
4.2.4 Technical Barriers to Trade  
Technical barriers to trade may result in mandatory technical regulations or voluntary 
standards specifying the characteristics of the products, as well as the conformity assessment 
requirements for certifying products in compliance with the relevant regulatory scheme.559 In 
contrast to EU’s previous FTAs, the annexes of the KOREU contain detailed rules on regulatory 
measures in four different sectors: Consumer electronics, motor vehicles and parts, chemicals 
and pharmaceutical products. The approaches toward the four sectors differ, ranging from 
harmonisation on the basis of international standards of mutual recognition to enhanced 
transparency requirements. 
In the case of consumer electronics, the parties principally agreed to base their domestic 
regulation on international standards established by the International Organisation for 
Standardisation, the International Electrotechnical Commission, and the International 
Telecommunication Union.560 In general, this is the common rule except when a relevant 
international standard does not exist, or where one of the parties decides to deviate from the 
international standard for legitimate reasons, such as safety or other public interest 
requirements.561 After implementing such rules, the domestic regulation of the EU and Korea 
should be very similar, and would therefore ease cross-border trade. 
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Furthermore, Korea also accepts supplier declarations of conformity for the majority of 
products562 after a transitional period.563 This means that the EU’s producers are exempted from 
conducting conformity assessment in Korea and should, thus, further reduce the costs of 
exporting to Korea, instead of requiring third-party certification.564 
However, certain standards could be viewed as regulatory obstacles to trade in automotive 
products that are tackled through partial alignment of standards.565 This is also done through 
partial recognition of the other parties’ standards.566 Korea and the EU explicitly spelled out 
which specific standards they would recognise as equivalent to their products to the individual 
markets and can, therefore, fully exploit the resulting economies of scale. The aim of this 
provision is to present the erosion of market access concessions through the conclusion of 
subsequent and more favourable FTAs with third parties. Finally, the annex is subject to special 
dispute settlement rules. Disputes concerning motor vehicles and parts thereof shall always be 
considered as a matter of urgency, and in comparison, to ordinary dispute settlement 
proceedings, time periods concerning consultations, panel proceedings and compliance with 
rulings are shortened accordingly.567  
With regard to pharmaceutical products and medical devices, the KOREU focuses on two 
specific issues. Firstly, for cases in which reimbursement is determined by government 
agencies, the FTA provides for rules ensuring that pricing and reimbursements are fair, 
transparent and non-discriminatory.568 In particular, manufacturers shall have the opportunity 
to apply for price adjustments.569 It means that they have a right to demand higher prices, and 
shall have the right to be heard before any ex officio price adjustment by the competent 
authority.570 Secondly, the Annex 2D of the FTA contains specific transparency requirements 
for domestic measures, which affect reimbursements or pricing.571 However, these provisions 
do not provide widely coverage. The least ambitious rules are those concerning chemicals. The 
relevant annex contains little more than a list of several duties to strive for cooperation.572 
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Various sector-specific working groups and committees established under the FTA aim 
at further elimination of barriers to trade and are set up through cooperation and consultation573 
for all four sectors, not only to promote common rules development, but also prevent trade 
conflicts before they arise. To that end, the parties are committed to inform each other about 
any measure that affects trade and consult on such matters with a view to arrive at mutually 
satisfactory outcomes.574 
The sector specific rules in the KOREU raise an interesting question in relation to WTO 
law. Given that the mutual recognition under the agreement is limited to the FTA parties, the 
relevant FTA provisions may be the Most Favoured Nation obligation under WTO law, which 
prohibits any differentiation between products on the basis of origin.575 To this end, it is not 
clear whether WTO law allows limiting recognition to only some WTO members without 
extending it to others, where the same conditions prevail.576 
It is doubtful whether the provisions could pass under Article XXIV GATT necessity test 
as established by the appellant body in Turkey textiles.577 Provisions in a preferential trade 
agreement, which are in conflict with GATT obligations can be justified, if they are necessary 
to form the preferential arrangement. In the event, that the special TBT rules would not be 
present the parties would inevitably be prevented from establishing the FTA is, at the very least, 
questionable. 
Finally, the TBT chapter provides for an interesting mechanism, aimed at diminishing the 
trade restrictiveness of technical barriers on the side of the EU. Upon notifying Korea that the 
EU Member States’ measure is not in compliance with the EU legislation, the EU authorities 
make their best endeavours to address the issue in a timely manner.578 This provision is geared 
to its Member States and reflects Korea’s worries concerning variations in Member States’ 
legislation, which would potentially result in obstacles to trade. Therefore, the KOREU extends 
Korea’s right to a certain extent, in that it allows not only to claim non-compliance with the 
FTA, but also non-consistency of domestic legislation with the TFEU. The underlying 
assumption is that a measure which is not hindering trade between the EU Member States does 
not impede trade between the EU and Korea. This is sensible given the broad definition of a 
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measure having an equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, pursuant to Article 34 of the 
TFEU,579 which goes beyond the requirements set out in the FTA. It is hardly imaginable, but 
of course possible, that a measure which would not be considered as a trade hindrance in intra-
EU trade could present an obstacle to EU–Korea commerce. 
In the EUSFTA, the TBT and SPM are measures laid down in order to permit each other 
to apply its technical and sanitary standards. This should be in accordance with the WTO rules. 
This type of rules is intended to reduce barriers that may result from these actions. Such rules 
facilitate trade in the sense that it clarifies the standards which the other party need to apply to 
and make sure that such standards are not discriminatory or disproportionate compared with 
those that are applied to its own products. This type of standardised rules is intended to facilitate 
trade in goods between the parties and was considered by the CJEU in the case of Opinion 2/15 
to have direct and immediate effects on international trade. Consequently, these fall within the 
exclusive competence of the European Union pursuant to Article 3(1)(e) TFEU.580 
4.3 Non-Trade Objectives 
The proliferation of treaty-recognized objectives for the CCP does have its problems. The 
Lisbon Treaty does not institute a hierarchy between the general objectives of the EU’s external 
action, meaning that one cannot discount the very real possibility that conflicts would arise 
between different objectives.  
Whilst the general assumption seems to be that the objectives and principles of Article 21 
TEU are broad enough to fall within the margin of appreciation of the EU’s institutions,581 one 
could easily envisage a conflict where, for example, a trade policy measure adopted by the EU 
pursuing one of the general objectives listed in Article 21 TEU, would adversely affect existing 
levels of trade liberalisation with third countries. This would be problematic if the Court was 
to accept that the principle of trade liberalisation, as currently formulated, is mandatory since 
the Treaty’s language does not provide any meaningful guidance as to how to resolve the 
conflict between contradictory policy objectives. It has even been posted in this regard that 
where the pursuance of a non-trade objective leads to a trade-restrictive measure, such measure 
should only be permitted to the extent that it passes a proportionality test, whereby it is 
demonstrated that the measure is required in order to achieve the non-trade objective, and that 
it does not exceed what is necessary to achieve said objectives.582 
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The fact that non-trade objectives are now to be incorporated in the CCP should not come 
as a surprise since the EU’s external trade policy has been long used as a tool to achieve goals 
that are not necessarily trade specific. For example, the CJEU has long accepted development 
objectives to be part of the CCP. These include successive EU regulations applying schemes of 
general systems of preferences and the cooperation agreements concluded with developing 
nations, where the primarily aim is development cooperation. Because of the ever-evolving 
international trade system, this type of agreements was considered compatible with Article 110 
TFEU, to the extent that an overly restrictive interpretation of the purposes for which the CCP 
could be used would render it useless.583 In this sense, the Lisbon Treaty is merely formalizing 
practice that is already well established with the references to support democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and environmental development to provide an unambiguous legal basis for 
trade conditionality.584 
According to Article 207 TFEU, what to be included into the CCP are areas in relation to 
the EU’s internal or external actions, which specifically relate to international trade.585 In this 
regard, it concerns international trade with third member countries, and not trade within the 
internal market. Furthermore, in relation to international trade, it is essentially intended to 
promote, facilitate or govern trade, and has direct and immediate effects on trade, which in turn 
means that it does not concern trade within the internal market.586 
For this reason, the purpose of each agreement is of importance to consider. In fact, if the 
purpose of the agreements was to extend beyond the territory of the EU, then the agreement 
would be presumed to seek the promotion of international trade, and fall within the CCP, 
because the approximation of law of the Member States would have largely been achieved by 
the EU’s secondary legislation in the internal market.587 However, in cases where the 
approximation is the object of the agreement, the purpose would automatically be to improve 
the functioning of the internal market, and fall outside the CCP, even if it has effects on 
international trade.588 
International trade in goods and services cannot be viewed in isolation from many of the 
regulatory challenges that confront governments. International trade liberalisation relies on the 
regulatory environment and creates its own externalities that in turn call for regulatory 
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responses. In this particular setting, it would be possible for cooperation between the 
corresponding states in order to improve regulatory outcomes that will facilitate trade 
liberalisation, and address the externalities associated with it.589 
4.3.1 Objectives without Assigned Powers 
Article 21 (2) TEU establishes the objectives without assigning its necessary powers. It 
does not allocate external competence but serves as a framework for the exercise of such 
powers. The overall approach to the external action objectives determines the scope of Article 
21(2) TEU and must be respected by the EU when exercising its competence in its external 
action. Moreover, it must be pursued in parallel to the EU’s internal objectives, which gives 
rise to external action by the EU.  
The assumption that the Lisbon Treaty has or has not conferred normative value to the 
various external action objectives listed in the Treaty is one that is contested,590 and that shall 
remain unverified unless a challenge is brought before the Court. Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that Article 21 TEU was included in the Treaty, and the language of this provision suggests that 
‘(…) the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions’591 that it imposes some 
form of obligation on the EU. By stating that the CCP must be conducted in the context of these 
objectives, Article 206 TFEU indicated that at the very least, the CCP must conform to an 
overarching external policy framework. 
This makes sense when viewed in light of the abolition of the pillar structure which 
separates the supranational economic community from intergovernmental policy areas of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and justice and home affairs, from the emergence 
of a de-pillarized EU. The Lisbon Treaty sought to acknowledge the need for a unified external 
policy by listing all EU’s objectives in a single provision, and by requiring that the EU ensures 
‘(…) consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its 
other policies’.592 The concept of the consistency, which is referred to in a number of occasions 
in EU Treaties, is the key to understanding how the EU must conduct its various external 
policies. Consistency is understood as entailing not only an obligation to ensure the removal of 
contradiction between different external policy areas of the EU, but it also means that efforts 
should be made to develop policies of mutually reinforcing act that create synergies.593 
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To promote such consistency, the Treaty of Lisbon creates most of the high representative 
of the EU’s foreign security policy, which occupies simultaneously the role of the high 
representative of the CFSP, vice-president of the Commission, and Commissioner for external 
relations. Subsequently, it seeks to bridge the gap between the different external policies of the 
EU.594 
In this sense, Article 207 TFEU calls to conduct the CCP in the context of the general 
objectives of the EU’s external action is a reminder that the EU’s trade policy may not be carried 
out in a vacuum, and that at an operational level, the EU must take steps to ensure that trade 
policy considers other external policy areas by not undermining and, if possible, furthering the 
objectives pursued in these policy areas.  
4.3.2 Safeguard Values, Fundamental Interests, Independency, and Integrity 
According to some aspects of Article 21 TEU, the EU shall define and pursue common 
policies and actions, and shall cooperate in the fields of international relations in order to 
safeguard its values, fundamental interests, independency and integrity.595 It should also 
encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy through the progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade.596 In other words, a new transatlantic partnership 
has to be based on solid ground. In this regard, to achieve a solid ground, the principle of loyal 
cooperation could be regarded as a ‘master key’ that gives a more effective external 
representation of the EU.597 ‘Vertical coherence’ means that not only EU’s policies but also the 
individual level of the Member States could fear that the EU’s external principles and objectives 
will be too widely interpreted in order to find a convergence with the US principles and values. 
The proposed agreement and its objective, therefore, have to be consistent with the EU acquis 
and Member States’ legislation, and shall not affect the ability of the EU and the US to develop 
policies, according to the directives for negotiation on the TTIP that was declassified.598 
The EU is a working process in the external relations, and also within the EU itself with 
the work directed towards a single voice and unity in order to reach a more effective partnership 
with external partners.599 In fact, the unity of international representation of the EU is merely 
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an expression of the duty of cooperation, and therefore, the unity of internal representation of 
the EU and its Member States does not have an independent value.600 
4.4 Balancing Conflicting Objectives 
The EU’s credibility rests on what it can achieve unilaterally. In other words, it requires 
a consistency between internal practices and external objectives, and constant checking of the 
EU’s set of projection on its own internal goals and deficits.601 Article 21(1) TEU reflects 
Articles 2 and 4 TEU, which set out principles or values underpinning all EU’s activities.602 It 
lays down the underlying principles governing the EU’s external action at the international level 
through the list of objectives which the EU should take into consideration when carrying out its 
common policies and actions in all areas of its external relations. Uniformity therefore holds its 
character as an instrumental principle of the CCP, providing a link between the exercise of 
internal powers and the type of external commercial measures. The EU’s external policy should 
be used as a tool for this type of free trade agreements. This should be accomplished through 
the strength of the internal market and its regulatory framework, in order to liberalise the 
market.603 
The complexity can be shown by considering the founding values of the EU, such as the 
respect of equality, the rule of law, the respect for human rights, and the principle of non-
discrimination in Article 2 TEU. Furthermore, the EU should uphold and promote its values 
and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. At the same time, the EU shall also 
contribute to ‘free and fair trade’ and ‘strict observance and the development of international 
law’, according to Article 3(5) TEU. Furthermore, it is the EU’s ambition to support ‘(…) the 
rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’ in Article 21 TEU,604 which 
provides the guiding framework for the EU’s external action and is applicable to the EU’s trade 
policy that is necessary for the EU to consider when concluding international agreements.605 
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The new trade policy obliged the EU to carry out the CCP in the context of various and 
sometimes conflicting trade and non-trade objectives.606 These various and often competing 
objectives are established through Article 21 TEU and cannot be ignored in the EU competence 
since they have been considered not just guidelines but that ‘(…) Article 21 TEU establishes 
true legal obligations (...)’.607 
In the multi-layered system of the EU external relation it is necessary that the notion of 
the balance of competence becomes the central role in the choice of the appropriate legal basis 
and the delimitation of competence. ‘Attention should be paid to drawing the outer limits of not 
only the CCP but also the other external relations legal bases in a way which would ensure that 
the conditions for their application do not become irrelevant.’608 
The EU’s political institutions have a wide discretion, not only to balance competing EU 
objectives, but more generally to protect the EU’s interests in external trade relations – 
regardless of whether these interests are in conflict with the aim of trade liberalisation. The 
political objective of international trade liberalisation is a matter of choice and political 
expediency, and thus, it is differentiated from the core legal principles of internal free trade.609  
The EU is limited by its own internal procedure considered in relation to the objectives, 
and its competences to take decisions regarding particular issues within the FTA.610 
Coordination, therefore, functions as the key word for the legal framework, because, at times, 
it is inevitable not to have overlaps between already existing agreements and new FTAs. The 
framework agreement, for example, contains a climate change cooperation, which undertakes 
measures to mitigate carbon emission. This may have significant economic implications, and 
potentially clash with rules and principles contained in the FTA.611 Another example of 
balancing the various policy goals is also reflected in the concept of sustainable development. 
Such concept should guide the parties in the furtherance of their strategic partnership and help 
them achieve coherence in their bilateral relations. Consequently, it is to be found in both the 
framework agreement612 and FTA.613 
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The Durbeck case614 dealt with the interaction of two EU policy objectives, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and CCP; and the Court held that the political institutions are 
relatively free to strike a balance at least in such situations.615 The case is however carefully 
worded and based also on the text of the Council’s regulation. 
In particular, the case does not fully preclude the possibility that there is no need to 
balance conflicting Treaty objectives; and the aim of the CCP could impose some substantive 
restrains on the political institutions’ exercise of external competence. The case UK v. Council 
concerning import quotas imposed by the EU on certain toys from China, however, makes clear 
that the objective of trade liberalisation does not in any way curtail the discretion of the political 
institutions, and therefore, cannot serve as a standard for legality review of EU acts.616 In this 
case, the UK argued that the relevant Council’s regulation infringed Article 206 TFEU. The 
Court held that it followed already from the Durbeck case that Article 206 TFEU could not be 
interpreted as prohibiting the EU from enacting any measure liable to affect trade with third 
countries. As is clear from the actual wording of the provision, its objective of contributing to 
the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade cannot compel the institutions to 
liberalise imports from non-member countries, where to do so, it would be contrary to the 
interests of the EU. 
The Council’s discretion was in no way limited by the fact that it had itself decided in the 
preamble of the regulation that the starting point for the new rules was to be the liberalisation 
of imports. In that connection, the analogy drawn by the UK government between the national 
protectionist view on the one hand, and the liberalisation of imports and the exceptions thereto 
on the other hand is irrelevant. By contrast to the principle of free movement of goods within 
the EU, the abolition of all quantitative restrictions on imports from non-member countries is 
not a rule of law which the Council was required in principle to observe but is the result of a 
choice made by that institution in the exercise of its discretion.617 
Regulating free trade is very important, even though it can seem to go strictly against the 
concept of free trade. The EU’s commitment to liberalisation of international trade depends on 
a level playing field between domestic and foreign producers based on genuine competitive 
advantages. Anti-dumping measures, which are meant to prevent the market from being 
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distorted by products that are sold under their normal value, are examples of this.618 The defence 
of free trade is based on the Article VI GATT and Council Regulation 1225/2009 on ‘(…) 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European 
community’.619 In this respect, it is the task of the Commission to monitor the application of 
these instruments, follow up the enforcement of measures, and negotiate future international 
rules with EU partners. 
In this regard, it is possible to establish that the CCP should not simply be an instrument 
to trade protection, but it generally provides guidance towards trade and investment 
liberalisation.620 Even the CJEU has declared that Article 206 TFEU should not be used as a 
benchmark for the review of particular trade measures.621 
Article 206 TFEU, together with Article 21 TEU, set out the legal constraints from the 
EU’s obligation to pursue external trade trough trade and non-trade objectives. Trade policy is, 
and has been traditionally, also used to promote foreign policy objectives. The objective should 
in this type of agreements also incorporates provisions on human rights, labour right and 
environmental protection. The NGFTAs contain not only essential elements in trade 
agreements, but also elements such as sustainable development.  
Sustainable development provisions are usually drafted in a very broad manner, but still 
manage to implement labour and environmental agreement rules. Such provisions are to be used 
in order to promote some kind of minimum standard in the NGFTAs. However, such standard 
cannot be employed in a way that adversely impacts trade liberalisation in order not to conflict 
the CCP objectives. One can therefore draw the conclusion that the social and environmental 
standards are not just an attempt to project constitutive values and norms of the EU, but also an 
important tool to protect the global competitiveness of EU’s firms.622 
5 Intermediate Conclusion 
The changes provided by the Lisbon Treaty revised the EU’s competences, and widened the 
EU’s objectives for its external action. These changes have shown to affect both, the process of 
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elaboration and the content of the EU’s trade policy.623 The principle of conferral should be 
kept in mind when discussing the EU’s external competence, and what should be considered 
within the EU’s exclusive competence, as well as within shared exclusive competence. The 
EU’s large span of objectives, together with the large scope of NGFTAs, provides a complex 
picture when defining the extent of the CCP. Even though it is clear that the interpretation of 
Articles 206 TFEU and 207 TFEU is what defines the limit of the CCP in general, it becomes 
rather a sliding scale than fixed categories to provide a clear limitation between the different 
categories.624 After an indebt analysis, it is possible to conclude that the areas which fall within 
the EU’s exclusive competence pursuant to article 3(1) TFEU, are trade in goods trade and 
investment in renewable energy generation trade in services. However, in relation to services, 
transport services are not included. Thereafter areas such as government procurement, 
intellectual property rights, competition, foreign direct investment, trade and sustainable 
development, state-state dispute settlement, the termination of Member State BITs for the parts 
concerning exclusive competence. 
The areas which were considered to be within the EUs implied competence pursuant to 
Article 3(2) TFEU are the following areas; trade in maritime, rail and road transport services 
commitments on government procurement in the field of transport. Thereafter within the shared 
competence between the EU and the Member States, the areas that were considered was non-
direct foreign investment, in particular portfolio investment and dispute settlement between 
investor and states. 
In relation the EU’s implied competence within the NGFTAs, the provision 3(2) TFEU 
in particular circumstances that ‘may affect common rules or alter their scope’ should, 
according to the CJEU in opinion 2/15 be interpreted in a less strict manner than what the AG 
Sharpston did. This conclusion of the CJEU clearly led to provide the possibility to conclude 
the agreement within exclusive competence.  
However, the non-direct foreign investment, such as portfolio investment, which has no 
intention to influence the management and control of an undertaking and the regime governing 
dispute settlement between investors and states, are fields which are not considered to fall 
within the EU’s exclusive competence and the Singapore FTA. For this reason and in relation 
to how the agreement was at the time it was concluded, it was considered necessary to conclude 
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it as a mixed agreement. However, the outcome of this case made the commission to split the 
agreements into two supporting agreement; an exclusive and a mixed agreement. 
Moreover, the question of whether to include the ICS in this type of agreements as a new 
procedure for dispute settlement remains to be solved, through the pending Opinion 1/17.  
Furthermore, it is not only the question of competence but also the objectives that have 
shown to have a great impact in these type of trade agreements. In Opinion 2/15, it was 
moreover considered that the close link to the agreement’s trade objectives such as the chapter 
on sustainable development, played a large role and should therefore be considered to be part 
of the CCP. It clearly shows that the objectives of the EU external trade have a great impact on 
the interpretation of the CCP. This is contrary to the prior understanding that the nature of the 
objectives should form more of a guiding indication. Consequently, trade objectives could come 
to play a large role in the conclusion of an international agreement. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NGFTAS AS MIXED AGREEMENTS 
This chapter is intended firstly to determine when to conclude NGFTAs as mixed 
agreements. It will more narrowly consider the legal basis and circumstances for concluding a 
mixed agreement. The chapter aims at establishing a clear categorisation of when to conclude 
an agreement as a mandatory mixed agreement and when it is a choice to conclude it as mixed 
or not.  
Secondly, this chapter will consider which practical implication concluding a NGFTAs 
as mixed agreements can have for the EU. Such legal implications can take place, in the event 
of incomplete ratification of the agreement by one of its Member States, but also through 
withdrawal of a Member State of the EU, or through provisional application of a mixed 
agreement. It will thereafter also address the difficulties that may arise in relation to the question 
of responsibility since both, the EU and its Member States can be held responsible for not 
fulfilling their obligation under the agreement.  
Thirdly the chapter will discuss the adjustments that the Commission made in order to 
accommodate to such complicated situations that may emerge in the NGFTAs. 
1 Determining when to Conclude NGFTAs as Mixed Agreements 
Mixed agreements constitute an integral part of the EU as long as both, the EU and its 
Member States retain treaty-making capacity.625 In mixed agreements, the EU and its Member 
States are contracting parties, and their joint participation is required in the case where not all 
matters in the agreement fall exclusively within EU’s competence, nor within the Member 
States’ exclusive competence. A mixed agreement is concluded in the case where competence 
over the subject matters of the agreement is shared between the EU and its Member States. This 
type of agreements form an integral part of the EU law, and is binding on both, the EU’s 
institutions and the Member States.626 The EU and its Member States are both contracting 
parties in bilateral and multilateral mixed agreements.627 When an agreement is negotiated as a 
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mixed agreement, each of the parties will have to act within the boundaries of their own 
competences.628 The parties are often separated in the preamble of the agreement as the third 
country, of the one hand, and the EU and its Member States, of the other hand.629 
The EU is incapable to conclude a mixed agreement, unless the Member States ratify the 
areas that remain under their competence.630 The CJEU has not generally established any 
detailed delineation of areas of competence in the context of mixed agreements. Once exclusive 
competence is ruled out, the CJEU generally turns its attention to how to best organise the joint 
participation of the EU and its Member States. One additional reason for its unwillingness to 
address the exact space of the respective competences of the Member States and the EU, has 
been the dynamic and evolving nature of EU’s competence.631 In its ruling on the compatibility 
with the Euroatom Treaty of Member States participation in the convention on the physical 
protection of nuclear materials, the CJEU held that the division of competence with regards to 
implementation of the agreement was to be resolved on the basis of the same principles that 
govern the division of powers concerning the negotiation and conclusion of agreements.632 
According to the CJEU, Member States are subject to special duties of action and abstention as 
soon as a concerted common strategy exists at the EU’s level.633 The CJEU has also rules that 
whatever difficulties may be present in managing mixed agreements, these difficulties do not 
provide a reason for altering the classification of competence, or for arguing that it should be 
exclusive.634 
More technical cases, for example, are related to the conclusion of mixed agreements by 
a hybrid Council act.635 This act is in part a Council division, and in part a decision of the 
representative of the Member States’ meeting within the Council. The CJEU did not approve 
of this technique as the unanimity required for an intergovernmental decision of the Member 
States would distort the decision-making procedure under the TFEU.636 Another instance is the 
conclusion of a broad development agreement including a cooperation provision on the 
readmission of third country nationals, on the basis of Articles 208 and 209 TFEU alone. 
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In order to identify the competence through which the international agreement ought to 
be concluded, one must consider the objective factors open to judicial review, such as the aim 
and content of the agreement in question.637 This is because the choice of legal basis, when the 
EU adopts an international agreement, must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial 
review, which include the aim and content of that measure.638 If an agreement would have a 
twofold purpose, and one would be considered as the main or predominant purpose in the 
agreement, then the agreement would be based on the predominant purpose, since the other was 
merely incidental. However, if an agreement, such as NGFTA, is considered to simultaneously 
pursue a number of objectives or has several components which are inextricably linked without 
one being incidental to the other, such that various provisions of the Treaty are applicable, such 
a measure will have to be founded on the various legal basis corresponding to those 
components.639 
In other words, it is possible to conclude that if an EU competence is not exclusive, it is 
in most cases shared with the Member States. Agreements concluded under a shared 
competence usually become mixed. It means that this type of agreements will be open for 
conclusion by not only the EU but also its Member States.640 
Rosas proposed a clear and detailed typology of mixed agreements on the basis of the 
nature of the competence involved.641 In such proposition, there is a distinction between parallel 
and shared competence; and the EU’s participation in an agreement is similar to that of any 
other contracting party and has no direct effect on the rights and obligations of the Member 
States. Shared competence on the other hand, entails some division rights and obligations 
contained in the agreements.642 Coexistent competence is when an agreement contains some 
provisions falling under the exclusive competence of either the EU or its Member States so that 
the agreement can be divided into separate parts. There is also concurrent competence, in which 
the agreement in question forms a whole, which cannot be divided into separate parts.643 
Rosas also proposes a distinction between obligatory and optional mixed agreements, i.e., 
the facultative and the obligatory mixity. Situations, where it is required for the EU to conclude 
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an agreement as a mixed agreement, are referred to as obligatory mixity. This type of mixed 
agreements arises when the EU only have exclusive competence in certain fields and not over 
other fields, which form part of the agreement.  
Facultative mixity entails the situation in which the agreement was of such character that 
it could be concluded based on exclusive competence or implied exclusive competence but was 
nevertheless concluded as a mixed agreement. In other words, situations where concluding the 
agreement as mixed is a choice. Facultative mixity is usually more of a political choice. In such 
situation, the EU tends to rather choose a mixed agreement, mainly for political reasons.644 
Indeed, it has been suggested that any attempt to classify mixed agreements risks 
simplifying the phenomenon. The practice is extremely complicated and difficult because it 
interacts with a range of external EU powers, and a variety of international agreements.645 
The NGFTAs may cover subject matters, which fall within the Member States’ exclusive 
competence. If that is the case, it would consequently lead to that the agreements are obligatory 
mixity. However, if the agreement would cover only matters falling within the EU’s exclusive 
and shared competence, it would mean that mixity is a choice, and thus, the agreement would 
be facultative mixity.646 
The issue with concluding mixed agreements is mainly the ratification process. During 
this process, there is a risk of national parliamentary objections or referendums. In the 
ratification process, the Member States have the right to veto or nullify by a majority voting in 
the Council. This means that the Member States have taken better part in the negotiation and 
signing of the agreement and are also to be more visible during the process on the international 
scene.647 
This does not mean that such participation by the Member States would be purely 
negative for the EU. On the contrary, mixed agreements do not require a clear vertical 
delimitation of competence between the EU and its Member States. This place the EU in a 
better position, easily allowing it to have more ambitious agreement without endless battles 
over the competence questions.  
AG Sharpston expresses it as ‘(…) the mixed agreement is itself a creature of pragmatic 
forces – a means of resolving the problems posed by the need for international agreements in a 
multi-layered system’.648 
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Against this background, one can draw the conclusion that NGFTAs, in accordance with 
AG Sharpston, ‘(…) can be concluded only by the European Union and the Member States 
acting jointly (…)’.649 
A number of competence issues remain in this regard; namely the inclusion of portfolio 
investment in the chapter on investment and investment protection, or the termination of 
existing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) of Member States with contracting parties.  
Similarly, areas within transport but also in relation to establishing a mutual recognition 
of professional qualifications can be considered as areas which remain problematic under the 
NGFTAs. 
These agreements may also raise competence issues in relation to provisions to safeguard 
external financial position, specifically in relation to Member States, which are not part of the 
European Monetary Union.650 For this reason, it is important to thoroughly look if the NGFTAs 
are concluded as cases of obligatory mixity, facultative mixity, or no mixity at all. In many 
ways, a mixed agreement is a better political option, since it eases the EU’s navigation through 
the ‘jungle of external competences’.651 Where to draw the exact division for the EU’s external 
competence remains unclear and is left to the discretion of the CJEU.652 
1.1 Mandatory Mixity 
In circumstances where the EU has exclusive competence over one area of an agreement 
but no competence over another area, where such area fall under Member States exclusive 
competence, provides the obligation for the EU to conclude an agreement as a mixed 
agreement, in other words mandatory mixity arises. The NGFTAs are therefore mandatory to 
be concluded as mixed agreements in situations where an agreement falls partly within 
exclusive competences, and partly within Member States’ exclusive competences. This is in 
contrast to situations where the agreement contains areas which are within the shared 
competence between the EU and its Member States, where, in which case, it will fall under 
facultative mixity.  
Consequently, certain provision in an agreement may provide the necessity for the EU to 
open up to the ‘pastis doctrine’.653 In instances where the agreement contain competence which 
are exclusively shared it can lead to the necessity to conclude an agreement as a mixed 
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agreement, the Advocate General Kokott compared the competences to ‘(…) a little drop of 
pastis[that] can turn a glass of water milky.’654 Subsequently, it shows the necessity to 
distinguish between areas falling under shared competence between the EU and the Member 
states and areas which fall under shared exclusive competence of the Member States. 
1.2 Facultative Mixity 
When an international agreement has parts falling within shared competence, it may be 
concluded exclusively by the EU through the notion of ‘facultative EU-only’ agreements. An 
example, prior to the CETA agreement, can be the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
with Kosovo, which fell under shared competence but was still concluded as a mixed 
agreement.655 Furthermore, it has been observed that in practice, most agreements concluded 
through shared competence will be concluded as ‘mixed agreements’. It seems as a more 
convenient political option at times. 
However, an international agreement, apart from its annex, covers areas over which both 
the EU and its Member States exercise their respective competences, the agreement needs to be 
concluded as ‘mixed’, in the sense that both the EU and its Member States need to ratify the 
agreement jointly. In this regard, the EU is prevented to act alone. The EU Member States often 
insist on exercising their powers to ensure that the agreement is mixed. In practice, almost all 
EU’s agreements are mixed. The main problem occurs if the new Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
imposes provisions that overlap with the already existing agreement, which then can cause 
significant economic implications.656 In the case of dispute settlement, for example, it is decided 
that it should be decided by independent adjudicators.657 
In situations where the agreement covers an area of shared competence, it is optional 
whether or not to conclude the agreement as a mixed agreement. In this case, it is within the 
discretion of the Council.658 This applies irrespective of whether the shared competence of the 
agreement is put in combination with the areas falling under exclusive competence or not.659 In 
                                                   
654 C-13/07, AG Kokott in Commission v Council (n 419), para. 121. In this case there are individual provisions falling 
within the competences of Member States, that secondary, “infect” the agreement as a whole and trigger mixity (i.e. the 
“Pastis doctrine”). 
655 Peter van Elsuwege, 'Legal Creativity in EU External Relations: The Stabilization and Association Agreement Between 
the EU and Kosovo' (2017) 22 European Foreign Affairs Review 393. 
656 Harrison, ‘An Introduction to the Legal Framework for EU-Korea Relations’ (n 78), p. 15. The climate would be an 
example of change cooperation within the framework agreement, which undertakes measures to mitigate carbon emission. 
657 Ibid, p. 15. 
658 3/15, AG Wahl in Opinion on Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Disabled Persons (n 364), 
paras. 111-120; 2/15, AG Sharpston Opinion in Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 269), paras. 73-75. 
659Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (n 248), pp. 183-186; Klamert makes a very clear and detailed classification 
of the EU competences. 
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this regard, mixed agreements may be regarded as a political choice for the EU.660 They usually 
cover a wide range of areas within shared and exclusive competence. The reasoning why the 
CJEU decided that the NGSFTA should be concluded as a mixed agreement was due to that the 
agreement covers several provisions falling within shared competence, and one falling fully 
under the Member States’ competence, the agreement needs to be concluded as a mixed 
agreement.661 Since the agreements include similar width of subject areas, it is possible to draw 
the conclusion that also the TTIP or the EPA agreement would be concluded as mixed 
agreements. 
The fact that the competence to conclude an international agreement is shared between 
the EU and its Member States, in regard to the extent of the EU having exclusive competence 
and the Member States having shared competence within one agreement, cannot have a 
consequence on the competence of the EU to conclude such agreement in relation to both, the 
substantive or procedural validity of the EU’s decision to conclude it.662 For the allocation of 
competence, it is not within the responsibility of the CJEU to provide exact guidance on who 
has competence in relation to every single provision of the agreement.663  
With the procedural difficulties that may arise from the mixity, the CJEU has made clear 
that there is a need for unity within the EU external action.664 Naturally, mixity is not always a 
legal based decision. In essence,  
(...) if there is political consensus among the Member States that an agreement ought to be 
mixed, they will almost certainly manage to impose the mixed procedure, particularly by 
adding provisions which stand on their own and need Member State involvement.665 
This was further demonstrated in the conclusion of the CETA as a mixed agreement, 
where the Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said  
From a strict legal standpoint, the Commission considers this agreement to fall within 
exclusive EU competence. However, the political situation in the Council is clear, and we 
                                                   
660 The Member State may also in certain situation promote EU-only agreements instead of mixed agreements. This would 
run counter to the Member State’s own interest but in certain situation, example with association agreement, which are 
usually mixed agreement, in the case of the EU-Kosovo Association Agreement certain Member State wanted to avoid 
recognizing the Kosovo as a state and therefore preferred it to be an EU-only agreement. van Elsuwege, ‘Legal Creativity in 
EU External Relations: The Stabilization and Association Agreement Between the EU and Kosovo’ (n 655). 
661 2/15, AG Sharpston Opinion in Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 269), paras. 562-563, According to the AG, the EU shares 
its competence with the Member States. The Member States also have competence in regard to the termination of bilateral 
investment agreements concluded between the Member States and Singapore. 
662 2/00, Opinion on Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (n 321), para. 15. 
663 Ibid, paras. 6 and 17. 
664 1/94, Opinion on World Trade Organization Agreement (n 27), para. 107, Opinion 1/08, Opinion Amending EUs 
Commitments under GATS (n 402), para. 127. 
665 Maresceau, ‘A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements’ (n 212), pp. 11-29 at 16. 
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understand the need for proposing it as a ‘mixed’ agreement, in order to allow for a speedy 
signature.666 
Even though the choice would be politically based, the way of progressing to negotiation 
remains within a legal channel. The procedures are set out in Article 218 TFEU. Since the 
negotiation and conclusion of an agreement require a number of separate Council decisions,667 
(in most cases) taken by a qualified majority668, it becomes a decision made by the Member 
States. As AG Sharpston puts it ‘(…) the Member States acting in their capacity as members of 
the Council which authorise the appropriate EU institution to act (…)’.669 
Through the OTIF case, the CJEU tried to clarify the uncertainties surrounding the effect 
of the facultative mixity in Opinion 2/15 that was discussed in para. 255.670 The CJEU had 
indicated that mixity would be mandatory for agreements which covered partly or entirely 
shared competence, which is radically different to already established case-law. The CJEU 
concluded in Opinion 2/15 that the EU could not act alone in the shared area of non-direct 
foreign investment, and tried to clarify that in the OTIF case, it was solely linked to the specific 
circumstances. 
‘However, in making that finding, the Court did no more than acknowledge the fact that, 
as stated by the Council in the course of the proceedings relating to that Opinion, there was 
no possibility of the required majority being obtained within the Council for the Union to 
be able to exercise alone the external competence that it shares with the Member States in 
this area.’671 
In other words, this gives a clear understanding that it was not within the intention of the 
CJEU to radically change established case-law. It concludes that when there is shared 
competence over a policy area in an agreement, the existence of the competence itself does not 
indicate who is acting to ratify the agreement. It leads to a large political discretion. 
The existence of shared competence over a policy does not dictate who is acting in order 
to ratify it, which remains largely subject to political discretion of the legislator. The issues 
surrounding the NGFTAs illustrate the practical implications that the Member States’ 
parliamentary involvement can have on the ratification on NGFTAs. Belgium has requested the 
                                                   
666 Council of the European Union ‘EU-Canada Trade Agreement: Council Adopts Decision to Sign CETA’ (n 254). 
667 The Council is authorizing for the opening of negotiations, adopting negotiating directives, and authorizing the signing 
and conclusion of an agreement. 
668 Exceptions requiring unanimity according to Article 218(8) TFEU. 
669 2/15, AG Sharpston Opinion in Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 269), para. 74. 
670 C-600/14, Germany v Council (n 311), para. 68. 
671 Ibid, para. 68. 
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CJEU to decide on the compatibility of CETA’s investor-State dispute settlement provisions 
with EU law in Opinion 1/17.672 
Facultative mixity is of specific importance in order to balance on the one hand the 
concerns of the EU as a treaty-making actor, and on the other hand the effective implementation 
of the CCP. 
In Opinion 2/15, the CJEU concludes that since the EUSFTA falls partly within shared 
competence, it ‘(…) cannot be approved by the EU alone’.673 The CJEU stipulated that the 
ISDS mechanism ‘(…) cannot (…) be established without the Member States’ consent’.674 
This statement by the CJEU is more or less clearly indicating that the mechanism of 
facultative mixity would no longer be a choice at least not in the sense of the ISDS mechanism. 
It could therefore here be considered possible that the CJEU has taken the stand by the theory 
earlier mentioned in relation to the Council, the finalist theory, which is instead to include every 
measure that would be likely to influence the volume of flow of trade as part of the CCP.675 
In the OTIF case,676 the CJEU relied on Opinion 2/15 to substantiate its reasoning in 
relation to the exercise of its external competences in a field even though ‘(…) the Union had 
taken no internal action, by adopting rules of secondary law, in that field’, such as in the case 
of non-direct foreign investment.677 The CJEU further discussed certain effects surrounding 
facultative mixity, and the effects of Opinion 2/15. In Opinion 2/15, it was clarified that the EU 
cannot act alone in shared competence in areas of non-foreign direct investment and that this 
proposition in the previous opinion was solely related to the specific circumstances of the OTIF 
case and could not be considered to have become a general rule.678 
Such ramification of Opinion 2/15 needed to be clarified in the OTIF case. There have 
been, in many occasions, clarifications of prior cases in the CJEU decision-making, but the 
issue is rather more attached to the sitting of the Court. Opinion 2/15 was a Grand Chamber 
judgment, which altered the clear meaning found in the judgment of the full court. 
                                                   
672 Opinion of the Court of Justice, (Agreement EU-Canada), 1/17, NYP. 
673 2/15, Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 211), paras. 244, 282, and 304. 
674 Ibid, para. 292. 
675 Eeckhout, External relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (n 478), p. 19. 
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When it comes to mixed agreement, it is difficult to know when an international 
agreement should be concluded as a mixed agreement. In other words, it is not trivial to examine 
to which extents an international agreement should be considered as shared or exclusive. In 
general, the NGFTAs are not determined upon specific legal basis, but rather subject to the 
deliberations in the Council, which has been emphasised by both, AG Sharpston in Opinion 
2/15679 and AG Wahl in Opinion 3/15.680 This is linked to the fact that the notion of facultative 
mixity gives the EU discretion in relation to the question whether to conclude an agreement as 
an EU only agreement or within shared competence. 
The CJEU clarified that the EU has exclusive competence over most of the EUSFTA, and 
shared competence over non-direct investment and investor-state dispute settlement. The 
Member States’ involvement is required in the conclusion of an agreement, even though the 
CJEU means that the EU can conclude it by itself.681 
Through conferred competence, there may be aspects of agreements reserved to the 
Member States, in which the EU has no competence internally. In this way, the agreement 
would be dependent on the common accord of the Member States, where individual provisions, 
even though they are secondary, can be necessary to conclude an agreement within shared 
competence. However, the CJEU has made clear that ‘(…) individual clauses of an altogether 
subsidiary or ancillary nature’ cannot itself trigger mixity.682 The CJEU has stated that ‘when 
examining the nature of the competence to conclude an international agreement, there is no 
need to take account of the provisions of that agreement which are extremely limited in 
scope’.683 
1.3 Legal Basis for Determining an Agreement as Mixed 
It is necessary to discuss the mixed agreement in relation to the intent to achieve a unified 
interpretation also in mixed agreements, mainly due to that the discussions that these cases 
promoted. First of all, it is important to recall that the CJEU is required to determine the correct 
legal basis on the grounds of ‘‘objective factors amenable to judicial review’. These legal 
grounds can be rather abstract and may require legitimate demand for empirical evidence. The 
CJEU, through its economic-based analysis did very little to operationalize the relationship 
between the content of an agreement, the specific measures it requires as a function of its 
                                                   
679 2/15, AG Sharpston Opinion in Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 269), para. 74. 
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obligations, and on whether they would have direct or immediate effect on international trade 
and investment. 
Frequently, to consider the objective of the agreement has boiled down analysing the 
language of the preamble in an agreement, rather than examining and comparing the specific 
measure of the objectives which are pursued in the agreement. If this will be the case by the 
CJEU, if can be very problematic not only in regard to the appropriate legal basis for an act 
concluding an external agreement but also in relation to determining the areas of external action 
and the fields of international competence through the delineation of the competences of the 
CCP. 
However, reasoning in line with the view of Kleimann, the question should be posed 
whether the CJEU’s considering the direct and immediate effect and measure that affect trade 
by implication, given the state of regional and global economic integration and the 
corresponding regulatory environment may lead to additional clarity a clearer picture when 
determining the legal basis for the CJEU.684 
The CJEU’s way of interpreting the ‘direct and immediate effects on international trade’ 
as a case-by-case basis, shows the indeterminacy of the scope of the CCP, and at the same time 
the possibility for the CJEU to have a discretionary space of manoeuvre in its interpretation. 
Secondly, facultative mixity can be considered as more of a political choice, while 
obligatory mixity is established on the combination between Article 5(1), the principle of 
conferral, and Article 2 TFEU. The obligatory reasoning should not be confused with the ‘main 
purpose test’ for international agreements used in order to find the proper legal basis for EU’s 
external action.685 Such purpose test only applies in relation to where the necessary competence 
has been conferred upon the EU, either explicitly or implicitly, and is considered to be ‘beyond 
doubt’.686 
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2 Practical Implication from Concluding NGFTAs as Mixed 
Agreements 
Before a mixed agreement can enter into force, it needs to be ratified by all the parties, 
this includes all the EU’s Member States. There may therefore leas to create an ‘additional 
reinforced unanimity’. However, in practice is provides difficulties, where it can be regarded 
even as unworkable, since it may block the entry into force of the agreement and seriously 
affect the EU as while as well as the Member States that have already ratified the agreement.687  
The way the EUSFTA was constructed resulted in the necessity to conclude it as a mixed 
agreement. This was because the CJEU clarified that the EU has exclusive competence over 
most of the areas in the EUSFTA, and shared competence over non-direct investment and 
investor-state dispute settlement. The Member States’ involvement is required in the conclusion 
of an agreement, even though the CJEU means that the EU can conclude it by itself.688 
For the conclusion of the agreement, it is therefore necessary to clarify the distinction 
between a ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ mixed agreement. A ‘complete’ mixed agreement refers 
to when the agreement has been ratified within all Member States. Consequently, ‘incomplete’ 
mixed agreements refer when an agreement does not become a full fletched agreement, which 
is an outcome solely possible in relation to mixed agreements.  
2.1 Issues Stemming from Non-ratification of Mixed Agreements 
The agreement would appear ‘incomplete’ if one Member State refused to ratify and 
would thus impede the agreement to enter into force.689 These ‘incomplete’ mixed agreements 
can either be the consequence due to non-ratification where a Member State blocks the 
ratification procedure, or in a situation where the agreement was ratified but a Member State 
withdraws from the EU.690  
If a Member State chooses not to ratify an agreement, it would need to notify the other 
party according to the procedures concluded in the agreement.691 This naturally means that a 
party rejecting to ratify the mixed bilateral agreement would lead to that the agreement cannot 
enter into force even though all the other Member States together with the third party would 
have ratified the agreement. However, the issue is rather that the EU together with its Member 
                                                   
687Maresceau, ‘A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements’ (n 212), p. 12. 
688 2/15, AG Sharpston Opinion in Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 269), paras. 244 and 292. 
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States are contracting parties; and the EU ratifies the mixed agreement only after all Member 
States have completed the ratification. Essentially, this could lead to that one Member State 
could block the ratification process of the agreement. This could, in turn, mean that the EU 
would be impeded from exercising its competences, the exclusive competences.692 Article 2(1) 
is essentially precluding the Member States from vetoing application of the areas falling within 
exclusive powers.693 The CJEU has as well indicated that in terms of mixed agreement, both 
the EU and its Member State have to act within their respective competences.694  
The ratification procedure would for this reason only apply to cover the elements of the 
agreement falling within the competence of the Member State. This is because the Member 
State have been already given the possibility of rejecting or consenting with the entire 
agreement before the ratification procedure.695 Such choice, however, has to respect the EU 
rules on allocation of competences between itself and its Member States. It thus follows that 
when the Council would make its decision of concluding the agreement, it would cover only 
the elements falling within the EU’s competences. This leads to the consequence that the 
freedom of ratification given to the Member States is not absolute, and is in fact, clearly 
restricted by the EU’s allocation of competence. Moreover, the Member States are also obliged 
not to defeat the object and purpose of the agreement according to the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of the Treaties (VCLT).696  
2.2 Incomplete Agreement Due to a Member State’s Withdrawal 
It is possible that a bilateral mixed agreement is initially completed by all the parties, later 
becomes incomplete. This can happen through a withdrawal of one of the Member States of the 
EU. It can also happen through changes by a government in a particular Member State, which 
leads to changes of priorities. The obvious example here is Brexit. According to Van der Loo 
and Wessel, it would amount to a ‘complete incompleteness’.697 
However, looking at the situation from a more pragmatic angle, it would not really 
amount to an incomplete situation. The Member State, which is withdrawing, would, when the 
withdrawal is completed, clearly be considered as a third state since it would no longer be a 
member of the EU.  
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Furthermore, there are other legal issues that can come out from such withdrawal, and 
which can affect the situation of the third party bilateral mixed agreement. If for example, the 
withdrawing Member State would like to remain part to a mixed agreement, from an EU’s 
perspective, this could be possible in terms of administration. The withdrawing Member State 
would then, during the terms of the negotiation of the withdrawing agreement, state the rights 
and obligations it has, and that it could be able to join, but as a third party. The perspective can 
be a little more difficult; specifically, in regards to these bilateral mixed agreements, because it 
would lead to that the EU would be required to change the base of the agreement from a bilateral 
to a multilateral agreement.698 However, the withdrawing Member State would remain party to 
the treaty in force until the day of the actual withdraw from the EU, with a two-year period of 
withdrawal according to Article 50(3) TEU.699 
Moreover, it could as well trigger renegotiation initiated by the third party, because the 
third party would consider the withdrawal of the Member State to change the circumstances of 
the agreement; in this case, the withdrawal may alter the bargaining power of the EU, as a 
global actor. 
2.3 Division of Competence in Relation to Enforcement 
The discussion of the EU’s division of competence is also relevant for the execution stage 
of agreements, more precisely in relation to the question of responsibility. It is linked to the 
CJEU and its ability to rule on international agreements. In accordance with the principles 
applicable to mixed agreements, the CJEU retains exclusive jurisdiction over the provisions, 
which fall under exclusive competence. 
However, the CJEU has no jurisdiction over the agreement if part of if falls under 
exclusive Member States’ competence.700 In this case, the elements, which fall under exclusive 
competence, shall be the mixed nature of NGFTAs in relation to the EU’s ratification 
procedure. 
In order to negotiate, sign and ratify trade agreements under EU law, various institutions 
are required to be involved, together with the Member States.701  
                                                   
698 Guillaume Van der Loo and Steven S Blockmans, 'The Impact of Brexit on the EU’s International Agreements' (2016) 
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After the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament plays an important role in the 
conclusion of trade agreements. A mixed agreement has to be signed by both, the individual 
Member States and the EU, in order for both parties to express their consent.702 
The Council takes the decision on the signature and the provisional application, where it 
authorizes the president of the Council to designate the persons empowered to sign the 
agreement on behalf of the EU. A similar procedure will be done in each Member State 
according to their conditional procedures. In other words, all these procedural requirements 
need to be concluded before the agreement can enter into force.703 
Other forms of FDI, such as capital transfer and FDI in transport services, are still within 
the scope of the Member States. This means that these areas go under the competence of the 
Member States, which in turn means that the Member States would be internationally 
responsible under NGFTAs. 
The fact that FDI has been transferred into the EU’s exclusive competence does not affect 
the determination of international responsibility between the EU and its Member States in 
agreements signed prior to the Lisbon Treaty. This is because the question of competence is 
based on the principle of conferral on which competences are attributed; and it is not possible 
to ex post alter the competence basis on which the obligations were determined. Agreements 
on FDI concluded within shared competence prior to the Lisbon Treaty need to remain within 
shared competence. This naturally means that one has to consider the actors acting under shared 
competence when the agreement was concluded, in order to be able to determine whether the 
violation was manifest. In this regard, the EU is engaged only to the extent of which it had 
exclusive competence, while Member States are held responsible for their commitment in the 
fields of shared competence.704 However, the CJEU meant that the EU can exercise its shared 
competence as well.705 Concerning this matter, one can view the exercise of shared competence 
with the legal basis used for the adoption of the mixed agreement.706 
In this regard, it may be difficult to distinguish between the different competences, and 
to what extent the EU has exercised its power and assumed investment-related obligations. In 
fact, the legal basis is only one indication of the exercise of shared competence, and there are 
also other factors.707 Consequently, because of the difficulty in determining whether it is the 
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EU or its Member States that have exercised their shared competence, one can conclude that 
the obligations relating to the existing NGFTAs or even non-FDI obligation in future 
agreements, where the competence is attributed to both the EU and its Member States, cannot 
in this way lead to a manifest violation of competence rules.708 
Similarly, in relation to areas falling within implied exclusive competence when the 
agreement was concluded, Member States cannot be responsible for performing their 
obligations falling under implied exclusive competence, such as in the case of ERTA, where the 
exclusivity is a fundamental rule of EU law, which third states should consider when concluding 
mixed agreements. Applying this principle in the field of FDI has been unpredictable. This is 
because the competence of the EU can be rendered exclusive during the lifecycle of the 
international agreements, as a result of adopting internal rules after the international agreement 
was concluded. This leads to the conclusion that the violation of the rule would not be manifest, 
and since it is too complicated to be objectively evident to third parties.709 
However, in the report of the International Law Commission (ILC), the EU and its 
Member States are recognized for the responsibility of the international organisation also in 
areas of shared competence,710 but if such obligations were found in a mixed agreement, where 
there is no declaration of competence, it would be equally binding on both the EU and its 
Member States. The ILC recognized the EDF case,711 as a general principle of international law 
in relation to legal certainty. The rule of assumption in relation to establishing the obligations 
beyond the EU competence is binding.712 This naturally means that investments are related to 
its obligation in the EU IIA are existent to both EU and its Member States. 
In this regard, it is easy to draw the conclusion that because of the EU’s defined exclusive 
competence in the area of FDI, future agreements made by the EU regarding the question of 
responsibility will apply solely in relation to non FDI obligations, that is, capital transfers and 
FDI in transport services, since these areas are still remaining under the EU’s shared 
competence.713 
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2.4 NGFTAs and Issues in relation to Responsibility 
When discussing the issue of responsibility, distinguishing between financial and 
international responsibility is necessary. Financial responsibility is defined as the obligation to 
pay a sum of money awarded by an arbitration tribunal. It could also refer to the financial 
responsibility agreed as part of a settlement and would thereby include the cost which would 
arise from such arbitration.714 International responsibility, more generally, refers the violation 
of an international obligation. The violation is based on the legal relation between two states; 
firstly, the State where the unfulfilled obligation existed, which can demand reparation and 
secondly, the state to which the act is imputable. both individuals and corporations are 
considered ‘objects’ of international law, and may, invoke the question of responsibility in 
international law on the international plane in certain specific circumstances essentially in 
relation to human rights and investment where they can be held accountable for their own 
internationally wrongful acts.715 
The question of responsibility for the NGFTAs, the primary concern would surround the 
investors right but also the question of correct implementation of the agreement in question 
which would determine who would be responsible for such breach, whether it should be the EU 
or one of its Member States. There are many possible situations where both the EU and its 
Member States have certain competences and where the regulatory conduct may affect the 
rights of investors. For this reason, the division of competence play an essential role. The 
division of competence is specifically relevant in relation to mixed agreements that does not 
make any reference to such division.716 AG Micho, meant that these mixed agreement indicates 
for the third parties that the agreement does not fall wholly within the competence of the 
Community and that the EU is only assuming responsibility for the performance of the 
obligations which fall within its competence.717 In other words, irrespectively of whether such 
division has been declared to the third party, the division of competences is relevant for the 
determination of the responsibility of the EU and its Member States. 
By discussing the division of competence, and its importance in relation to international 
responsibility it does not indicate that the joint responsibility is ruled out. The lack of a clear 
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declaration of competence in the EU’s agreement, should be within the accordance of the EU’s 
division of power and should not under any circumstances be entrusted to a third party not 
belonging to the EU legal order. This is because such interpretation could severely undermine 
the autonomy of Union law.718 
After the Lisbon Treaty, foreign direct investment falls within the scope of the CCP, 
which means that it is under the EU’s exclusive competence.719 In this regard, breaches of 
international obligation in investment matters would fall within the EU’s responsibility. In 
general, this should apply irrespective of whether a Member State is involved, or who, between 
the EU and the Member States, made the wrongful conduct. The fact that the international 
responsibility should be dependent on the EU’s internal allocation of competence would be 
questionable in relation to international legal practice. Whether the EU or the Member States 
would be held responsible for wrongful conduct would depend on the legal regime established 
in the free trade agreement, under each respective investment chapter.720 
Whether these agreements were concluded as exclusive or mixed would also play a role 
in relation to international responsibility. An example of concluded mixed agreements is the 
CETA, with its provided ISDS mechanism. It remains to understand what the specific 
mechanism in each concluded mixed agreement is stating in regard to whom between the EU 
and its Member State would hold responsibility in such matters. The EU would therefore act as 
respondent in situations where a dispute exclusively concerns actions by its institutions, bodies, 
offices or agencies. In such dispute, the EU should bear the potential financial responsibility.721  
2.4.1 Mixed Agreements and Financial Responsibility  
There is a clear distinction between the international responsibility and the financial 
responsibility, which should be clarified. International responsibility refers to the responsibility 
in relation to the treatment which is subject to the dispute settlement following the division of 
competences between the EU and its Member States. The EU is responsible for defending any 
claims alleging violation of rules which fall under its exclusive competence. This applies 
irrespective of whether such violation was committed by the EU or its Member States. The 
essential is that the violation of rules fall within the EU’s exclusive competence.722 
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In relation to NGFTAs, which are usually concluded as mixed agreements, the division 
of competence is sometimes even more important, since these agreements do not normally refer 
to the different competences. The division of competence is the relevant factor to determine the 
question of responsibility due to ‘(…) the very fact that the community and its Member States 
had recourse to the formula of mixed agreements announces to third parties that the agreement 
does not fall wholly within the competence of the Community and that the EC is only assuming 
responsibility for the performance of the obligations which fall within its competence.’723 
The question of responsibility should be considered together with the VCLT. A State or 
an international organisation ‘(…) may not invoke their internal rules as justification for their 
failure to perform a treaty’.724 
Furthermore, once the EU has given its consent to an international organisation, it could 
only invalidate such consent in case it could be shown that there was a violation, which was 
manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law or fundamental importance.725,726 
The risk of interference in the EU’s institutional balance is important to consider. The 
possible interference between an investment tribunal, and the exclusive competence of the 
preservation of the system of vertical allocation of competence seems to be answered by the 
power the EU has, acting as a respondent in relation to the financial responsibility. This division 
of competence in the financial responsibility basically allows preserving the autonomy of the 
EU legal order regarding issues of competence. 
Financial responsibility, on the other hand, is related to the entity responsible for certain 
actions which are inconsistent with the provisions of the agreements. In this case, if it had been 
carried out by an EU’s institution, body, office or agency, the EU will be held responsible. 
Moreover, the EU would be also held responsible in situations where the Member States would 
have carried out an activity in order to fulfil its obligation under EU law. This relates to the 
case, where the Member States would violate provisions of the agreement, while carrying out 
their responsibility toward a directive adopted by the EU. The Member State would be held 
responsible in individual cases, where the violation is carried out by the Member State and is 
not an outcome of fulfilling obligations of EU law. In these cases, the Member State and the 
EU should bear financial responsibility for the treatment afforded by either of them.727 
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The Lisbon Treaty’s establishment of the entire FDI competence to be exclusive, 
indicates that the EU alone will bear responsibility for violation of FDI’s provisions in the 
NGFTAs. Capital transfers and FDI in transport services are nevertheless excluded from this 
rule. 
Whether an agreement is signed under exclusive or shared competence does not affect 
the responsibility of the EU toward the areas of FDI. The EU is therefore the sole responsible 
actor for performance and violation of the investment obligations.728 Article 46 VCLT has been 
previously used by the Member States to escape international responsibility. This was in 
relation to the GATT, which falls under the scope of the EU’s competence; and in this case, the 
Member States successfully escaped responsibility for their violation of FDI’s provisions by 
employing Article 46 VCLT.729,730 
In relation to the validity of the obligations that have been entered into by the EU, the 
Member States, or both, it is not always the division of competence that plays the most adequate 
role. In fact, in certain situations, the parties may have entered into agreements on a specific 
competence, but then years later, such competence may have been altered either through 
implied external competence or a change of treaty. 
In situations where an agreement includes a declaration of competence, both the EU and 
its Member States need to assume their full rights and obligations under the agreement. Even 
in this type of circumstances, the EU and its Member States are required to assume their rights 
and fulfil their obligations under the whole breadth of the agreement.731 However, this does not 
imply situations, where there is a fundamentally important manifest violation of competence 
rules, and where the principles of limited responsibility of international organisations are 
concerned. The link here to the principle of limited responsibility is only to the extent where 
there is a clear lack of competence to assume an obligation.732 
In 2014, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a regulation ‘(…) establishing 
a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement 
tribunals established by international agreements to which the EU is party’.733 In other words, 
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it established a framework for the management of investor-state disputes under these 
agreements. More specifically, it regulated whether the EU or its Member States should act as 
a respondent in a claim.  
Even though the CCP has been expanding,734 the mechanism that reserves the 
determination of competences to the EU remains the most suitable option in terms of investment 
agreements. In the CETA, in order to determine the respondent to an investment claim, it is 
mandatory to send a request to the Commission.735 The Commission should then, within 50 
days, take a decision on the respondent, which is binding on the investor-state tribunal.736 This 
rule is made to eliminate the risk of conflict between the allocation of competence of the EU 
and the investor-state tribunal. However, if the Commission fails to provide a decision within 
the 50 days, it is up for the investor to identify the responding party. In such situation, both the 
EU and its Member States are, in fact, prevented from contesting the inadmissibility of the 
claim or lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal.737 This can be regarded as a loophole in the system 
in case the Commission does not act, because, beyond the 50 days limit, any decision taken by 
the Commission is always subject to judicial review before the CJEU. 
On the one hand, such mechanism provides a safeguard for the arbitration process in the 
sense that the international arbitration mechanism would not suffer and lose the effectiveness 
because of legal or political struggles on the EU’s level. But on the other hand, it is in fact a 
violation of the principle of autonomy, because even though this can occur in limited 
circumstances, the investor-state tribunals may confirm the investor’s assessment of the 
respondent, i.e., the investors’ assessment on the allocation of competence within the EU. ‘The 
involvement of investment tribunals in the interpretation of EU law and the legal review of EU 
legal acts vis-à-vis broadly defined treaty standards is likely to violate the essential 
characteristics conferred upon the Court under Article 19 TEU.’738 
On the contrary, the CJEU could have a significant power to regulate the legality of future 
agreements and could also adjudicate, i.e. interpret the agreements. It can additionally declare 
acts of the institutions to be invalid for infringing such agreements and may rule that Member 
States violated EU law by acting contrary to the legal obligations enshrined in agreements.739 
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Regarding the determination of who will be considered respondent between the EU and 
the Member States, in the CETA, the determination of the respondent may be submitted around 
90 days after the request for consultation.740 In the EUVFTA, the notice of intent to arbitrate 
triggers an obligation of the EU determine the respondent within two months.741 
A Member State should act as a respondent to defend its actions in violation of the 
provisions in the agreement leading to the suffer of a foreign investor.742 However, the Member 
State still has the possibility to decline to act as respondent, in case the EU maintains a better 
technical expertise regarding the matter. However, in this case, the Member State would still 
remain financially responsible.743 Moreover, in exceptional circumstances, the EU can act as 
the respondent in disputes involving treatment afforded by a Member State, if such concerns a 
specific legal issue where the case also relates to, for example, a claim in WTO; and the EU 
needs to ensure consistent argumentation.744 The reason that the regulation of financial 
responsibility745 does not establish who will bear the responsibility between the EU and its 
Member States concerning the treatment given to a foreign investor, is because the 
responsibility can only be established as a matter of EU law. The determination of allocation 
of international responsibility can only be determined by international rules, customary or treaty 
rules, and it cannot be unilaterally imposed to third subjects through the adoption of EU’s 
regulations or other EU acts. This was made further clear in the preamble of the regulation, 
where it states that the regulation only addresses the allocation of responsibility ‘as a matter of 
Union law’, and that it affects, for this reason, only the relationship between the EU and its 
Member States.746 
Furthermore, the choice on who will be responsible in relation to international disputes 
between the EU and its Member State has to be regulated by the division of competence in the 
EU. This is also made clear in the regulation ‘[i]nternational responsibility for treatment subject 
to dispute settlement follows the division of competences between the Union and the Member 
States’. It moreover emphasises the responsibility of the EU in relation to claims made within 
its exclusive competence,  
                                                   
740 Article 8.21 (1) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the 
European Union and its Member States, of the other part. 
741 EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018), Article 9.15(2). 
742 Regulation 912/2014 Establishing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals (n 
714), preamble, recital 9. 
743 Ibid, preamble, recital 10. 
744 Ibid, preamble, recital 11. 
745 Ibid. 
746 ‘European Parliament and the Council, establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-
to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is party’ (n 742), 
para. 5 of the Preamble. 
  -145- 
‘[a]s a consequence, the Union will in principle be responsible for defending any claims 
alleging a violation of rules included in an agreement which fall within the Union’s 
exclusive competence, irrespective of whether the treatment at issue is afforded by the 
Union itself or by a Member State’.747  
In other words, the international responsibility is dependent, and has to correspond to the 
EU’s allocation of competence.  
Whether the EU has exercised its right to pre-emption needs to be questioned in relation 
to Regulation 912/2014.748 The regulation concerns the conduct of investment disputes, and the 
apportionment of financial responsibility between the EU and its Member States for 
international investment agreements where the EU is a party. The regulation makes clear that 
‘(…) the adoption and application of this Regulation shall not affect the delimitation of 
competences established by the Treaties’.749 
A joint declaration has been made as some kind of interpretative guide, which could be 
questioned in itself. However, this joint declaration reflects the weakness of the competence 
issue.750  
‘The adoption and application of this Regulation are without prejudice to the division of 
competences established by the Treaties and shall not be interpreted as an exercise of shared 
competence by the Union in areas where the Union’s competence has not been exercised.’751 
For this reason, should ‘(…) the rules on the apportionment of financial responsibility 
between the EU and its Member States (…) not affect the allocation of competences under the 
Treaties’.752 
2.4.2 EU’s International Responsibility 
The choice to set the agreements as mixed could have implication in terms of allocation 
of international responsibility between the EU and its Member States. If this type of agreements 
instead was concluded within the EU’s exclusive competence, this would naturally lead to that 
the EU would be bearing the international responsibility alone. This would also lead to the 
conclusion that the Member State will have neither rights nor obligations stemming from this 
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kind of agreements.753 In such case, the agreement would bind the Member State only under 
EU law according to Article 216(2) TFEU.  
If the argument was to be put differently, in the event that this type of trade agreements 
would have been concluded within exclusive competence, it would lead to other issues that 
need to be discussed. First of all, the Member States would not be parties of the agreement, 
which would in fact cause issues in relation to the dispute settlement mechanism. In other 
words, how a Member State could be requested to be the respondent in a dispute settlement 
mechanism, when it per se is not a party to the agreement. Under international law, this would 
result in issues, since it is clear that an actor who is not part to an agreement cannot breach it.754 
As an example, when a claim is submitted to an arbitral tribunal, it must include ‘(...) an alleged 
breach of this Agreement by the European Union or a Member State of the European Union’.755 
The Member State would not in this sense be responsible for the EU’s action. However, 
nothing would contradict the fact that the EU would remain responsible for the Member State’s 
actions. This means that the breach on the part of the EU may be a consequence of the conduct 
by a Member State.756 
In the Opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),757 it was 
recognized that: 
(…) an international organization which in a matter of its competence undertakes an 
obligation, in respect of which compliance depends on the conduct of its Member States, 
may be held liable if a Member State fails to comply with such obligation and the 
organization did not meet its obligation of ‘due diligence’.758 
In this case, it was the failure by the organisation to comply with its due diligence 
obligation, which triggered the question of responsibility. When a Member State acts as the 
respondent in a dispute settlement procedure operated by the treaty to which it is not a party, it 
becomes problematic to determine the legal status of that Member State. 
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However, it is not a requirement that a Member State acting as a respondent should bear 
international responsibility. The mechanism in the CETA, where the EU is allocated the power 
to decide on who will act as the respondent to the dispute settlement proceedings between itself 
and its Member States, is a mechanism in which the EU may operate its relationship with the 
Member State and does not in fact concern the allocation of international responsibility between 
the two. Such mechanism is an internal matter, where the EU has the power to distribute the 
burden to defend itself against claims of investors, or to pay adverse awards. In accordance to 
the view of international law, the Member State would be required to be viewed as similar to 
an EU’s organ, rather than as a Member State. If the EU is the only subject to the agreement, it 
is the sole bearer of the responsibility. However, the EU can, when operating within this dispute 
settlement mechanism, decide whether to act directly or through its Member State. 
2.4.3 The EU and the Member States Bearing Responsibility Together 
Having an agreement concluded as a mixed agreement, such as CETA, leads to that both 
the EU and its Member States can in principle bear international responsibility for the same 
breach of the agreement.  
Implicitly, it can be concluded that in a dispute settlement where a Member State acts as 
the respondent, it should be considered that the respondent should bear the international 
responsibility. This is a logical solution since the arbitrator will be called to judge whether the 
respondent has breached the agreement and determine the legal consequences that would stem 
from such responsibility.759 
It only provides that the EU should inform the investor as to who will act as the 
respondent. Moreover, the agreement provides certain criteria in case the EU does not inform 
the investor about the determination of the respondent. ‘[I]f the measures identified in the notice 
are exclusively measures of a Member State of the European Union, the Member State shall be 
respondent.’760 This provision is providing certain indications of the allocation of 
responsibility. The conclusion can be taken that, in principle, the determination of the 
respondent is based on the attribution of the contested measure. This is because, ‘(…) if the 
measures identified in the notice include measures of the EU, the EU shall be respondent’.761 
What remains questionable, however, is that it is not entirely clear when a measure can 
be regarded as ‘including measures of the EU’. By comparing it to the Regulation 912/2014, 
the phrase should be interpreted that the EU must act as the respondent when the measure in 
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question is a measure of the Member State implementing a binding act of the EU. In this way, 
it also reflects the competence-based approach to the allocation of international responsibility, 
which has been constantly advocated by the EU. 
Moreover, even when a specific measure is adopted at EU level, the Member States carry 
out a clear discretion in terms of their implementation. Most of the tasks established by EU 
rules are carried out by the Member States it can lead to the EU rarely being held responsible 
for its action on the international plane. A possible way to solve this issue could be to link 
responsibility to rule-making competence rather than to actual conduct - an approach currently 
put forward by the European Commission.762 
3 The EU Commission Accommodating to Issues on Mixed 
Agreements 
The negative effect stemming from a mixed agreement is important to consider since the 
EU namely in relation to finding ways in which to avail itself from these negative effects. One 
can consider two different techniques in practice. The first technique is to formally sign and 
conclude a so called ’interim agreements on trade and trade-related matters’ that constitutes a 
separate agreement incorporating those parts of the main agreement that are within Community 
competence. The advantage of this type of practice is that they can easily enter into force since 
they do not have to be ratified by other Member States. Subsequently, concluding these trade 
agreements may be easier and quicker in practice.  
Secondly, however less frequently used for mixed bilateral agreements is to provisionally 
apply certain provisions of the agreements. This provisional application has leads to accelerate 
the entry into force of parts of some mixed agreements. The provisions which are chosen to be 
subject to provisional application usually are determined through of an exchange of letters and 
are attached to the Council Decision concerning provisional application.763 
The CJEU’s observation in respect to the need for unity and rapid action in EU’s external 
action has shown not to be met by mixed agreements, because of the underlying procedural 
difficulties that it entails.764 The EU was confronted with the situation in relation to the CETA, 
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where the Belgian region, Wallonia, threatened the signing of the agreement,765 and blocked its 
ratification. It was proposed that such situation may be repeated in relation to other planned 
international agreements.766 There is a clear requirement for the Commission to address this 
problem.767  
The idea would be to split trade agreements into two parts: EU-FTA and EU-BIT. On the 
one hand, the EU-FTA would cover trade related matters as well as the liberalisation of FDI 
including pre- and post-establishment national treatment, post-establishment most-favoured-
nation treatment, and performance requirements that will be regulated by the FTA. On the other 
hand, the EU-BIT will establish ICS/ISDS, and regulate the protection of direct and indirect 
investment (including standards of investment protection, such as fair and equitable treatment, 
expropriation, post-establishment national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment, 
performance requirements). When it comes to future trade partners, the Commission 
recommends negotiating the agreement on the basis of exclusive competence, by deliberately 
excluding areas which are not within exclusive competence. This is because it would allow the 
EU to move forward quickly.768 
4 Intermediate Conclusion  
The EU is an international organization of limited legal capacity and according to 
international law can only assume obligations that fall within its attributed powers from the 
Member States. It is important to find the clarity between the divisions of competence, 
specifically in regard to mixed agreement.  
The NGFTAs are concluded so far as mixed agreements.769 Mixity has led to that Member 
States are provided with an indispensable place within such trade agreements. International 
trade agreements have to pass through three different stages in the EU’s external action, 
negotiation, conclusion, and execution.770 Consequently, in a mixed agreement, more questions 
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occur in relation to the Member States’ participation in the different stages, notably through the 
concerns of the EU as a treaty-making actor, and the effective implementation of the CCP.  
These concerns are important since they are directly linked to legitimacy and democratic 
scrutiny, and more generally, to the role of the domestic parliaments in the EU’s external 
relations. 
The easiest option for the EU would be EU-only agreements; however, this would lead 
to decreased decision-making power for the Member States and the Council. 
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CHAPTER V 
AUTONOMY OF THE EU LEGAL ORDER IN RELATION TO 
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM OF THE 
NGFTAS 
This chapter demonstrates how important the difference among agreements in regard to 
investment protection is, since the agreements, even though similar in nature, differ in terms of 
content and execution. For the development of the EU legal order, the concept of autonomy 
was instrumental. However, only much later, the concept started to develop as a concrete 
principle of EU external relation law.771 Firstly, the issues originating from the newly proposed 
Investment Court System (ICS) will be addressed, since they are significantly different in 
comparison to former investment arbitration systems. These issues are then contextualised in 
relation to the fact that the ICS is an arbitration system operating entirely outside of the EU’s 
judicial framework and can potentially deal with issues in relation to EU law.  
Thereafter, it is considered how the foreign investors can challenge EU acts and decisions 
before an ICS; in such circumstances, the tribunals may be faced with questions regarding EU 
law. Thus, the CJEU could be adversely affected, and this in turn provides challenges to the 
uniform interpretation and effectiveness of EU law, and the autonomy of the EU legal order. 
1 The Investment Court System in NGFTAs 
Formerly, the investment dispute settlement system was developed in order to facilitate 
foreign direct investment in developing countries, which lack an adequate judicial system and 
protection. To move investment arbitration from ad hoc arbitration to an investment court could 
clearly facilitate investment arbitration.772 
When settling investment disputes through arbitration, specifically between a state and 
an investor, the standard method has become investor-state arbitration. This is because, through 
this method, the investor gains access to an efficient procedure; and this way, the host state 
benefits by attracting more foreign investors.773 
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In general, through arbitration, when there is an issue concerning foreign investments, 
there are three different possibilities for foreign investors: to bring a claim before an investor 
tribunal, to bring a claim before a domestic court based on domestic or international standards 
of protection, or to bring a claim through private commercial arbitration. 
The ISDS was established to provide further protection to foreign investors, who often 
operate in the form of multinational firms. In this regard, if a foreign firm considers that it has 
been exposed to an unfair treatment in the host country, it can bring up the issue before a dispute 
resolution body. 
1.1 The Difference Between ICSID and ICS Mechanisms  
International investment agreements include reference to the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The way in which some of the ICSID rules are 
formulated makes it difficult to include them in EU’s agreements. For example, the Additional 
Facility Rules774 cover disputes that concern only investors and states, and not the EU.775 These 
rules do not give the investors the full range of legal protection that is available under the ICSID 
Convention but allow them to benefit from its institutional structure.776 
There are also other procedural rules related to investment dispute frameworks. 
Commercial arbitration rules, such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, can be used for the settlement of 
investment disputes. The rational to include other systems of investor-state adjudication is to 
ensure impartiality, and for the disputes not to be affected by politics. Tribunals of commercial 
arbitration are competent to decide on their own competence.777 For the ICSID tribunals, Article 
41(2) ICSID applies.778 The tribunal decides on whether it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute, 
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and subsequently renders the award. For states which are signatories to the ICSID Convention, 
the ICSID’s awards are final and automatically enforceable in the territory of the state.779 
In very limited circumstances, it is possible to have a revision or annulment of the award 
given in the ICSID procedure.780 Moreover, it is not allowed for an award to be appealed on 
substantive grounds; and domestic courts are entirely excluded from this process. 
1.2 Dispute Settlement System in the NGFTAs 
The EU further seeks to introduce an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system 
into the NGFTAs. It considers it necessary arguing that its ‘(…) absence would in fact 
discourage investors and make a host economy less attractive than others.’781 
In fact, a model based on the expression ‘one size fits all’ would be, according to the 
Commission, ‘neither feasible nor desirable’. The reason hereto is that such standard is not 
static but rather dynamic, and the development of the EU's action concerning investment should 
guide such standard through the negotiation.782 The flexibility of negotiation becomes even 
more important in relation to developing countries, which are keen to keep their regulatory 
autonomy.  
EU’s institutions seem to neglect to determine whether primary EU law allows the 
inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement provisions in EU’s agreements, and the conclusion 
of international agreements concerning ISDS, such as the ICSID Convention.783 As a general 
rule, the EU’s competence to enter into an international agreement contains provisions for the 
settlement of disputes arising from its application and is a self-evident implication of its legal 
personality. However, dispute settlement mechanisms adopted in EU’s agreements must 
conform to the jurisdictional limits set by Opinion 1/91,784 which was further clarified in 
Opinion 1/00 and Opinion 1/09,785 emphasising the link between dispute settlement, and the 
autonomy of the EU legal order. 
The CJEU recognizes that the  
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‘(…) competence of the European Union to conclude international agreements necessarily 
entails the power to submit to the decisions of a body which, whilst not formally a court, 
essentially performs judicial functions, such as the Dispute Settlement Body created within 
the framework of the WTO Agreement’.786  
However, also in Opinion 2/15, the CJEU does not engage in whether the dispute 
settlement is compatible with EU law, since it is outside of its scope.787 
Thus, the EU’s institutions need to be very careful when designing future EU’s IIAs, in 
order to ensure that investor-state arbitration respects the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
over matters of EU law. The fact that Article 207 TFEU covers all aspects of FDI regulation is 
not sufficient to justify the EU’s action that covers the entire spectrum of foreign investment 
regulation. The limitations that are intrinsic in Article 207 TFEU, as well as in other provisions 
of the TFEU, require a more elaborate analysis of the exact scope of the EU’s powers, based 
on the totality of relevant provisions. 
However, if we consider the KOREU as an example, the FTA does recognize that it may 
be desirable to conclude a further agreement on investment protection in the future. In this 
regard, Article 17.6 provides that:  
With a view to progressively liberalising investments, the parties shall review the 
investment legal framework, the investment environment and the flow on the investment 
between them consistently with their commitments in international agreements no later 
than three years after the entry into force of this agreement and at regular intervals 
thereafter.788 
The KOREU also implies that this review shall include the possibility of opening 
negotiations on general principles of investment protection.789 This is a clear indication that a 
review will not be limited to assessing the effectiveness of the existing provisions, but that the 
scope of the investment provisions may be extended to include the different types of protection 
standards that are currently found in BITs, such as fair and equitable treatment and the 
regulation of expropriation. Indeed, as noted, it is only through the negotiation of such 
provisions that a level playing field can be achieved. Another factor, which may drive the 
conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, achieves full parity with the FTAs already 
concluded by competitors’ nations.790 
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Given that the FTAs concluded by Korea with other states already contain standards of 
investment protection,791 it is likely that EU’s investors would want to achieve similar 
protection, from which they can all benefit.792 It is not only investors that are calling for the EU 
to exercise its new competence in the field of foreign direct investment, but also the European 
parliament has called for the Commission to take the necessary steps towards a progressive 
replacement of all existing bilateral agreements on investment of Member States with new EU’s 
wide agreements.793 
In the CETA, the definition of investment includes an ‘objective’ component recently 
recognized in international law, which also requires that the claimant’s activity in the host state 
meets certain economic characteristics. When the investment meets the definition in the 
investment agreement, the case can be brought to the tribunal. 
Investment is furthermore defined as ‘(...) every kind of asset that an investor owns or 
controls, directly or indirectly that has the characteristics of an investment’.794 This also 
includes the duration of the investment, commitment of capital or other resources, the 
expectation of gain or profit and/or the assumption of risk. For example, an enterprise, shares, 
bonds, loans, intellectual property rights and moveable property are example of what can 
constitute an investment. 
One of the objectives of the CETA is to eliminate ‘treaty shopping’ in relation to 
investment protection. Treaty shopping refers to when a claimant establishes standing, based 
on a ‘mailbox’ subsidiary, to benefit from the best investment protection. In order to circumvent 
this, the CETA provides the definition of investor as an enterprise of one of the parties to the 
agreement, which must conduct ‘substantial business activities’ in the territory where it is 
constituted. Effectively, this prevents shell companies without substantial business activities 
from benefitting through claims under CETA’s ISDS. 
1.3 Dispute Settlement Provisions in NGFTAs 
The ICS was included in the 2015’s TTIP proposal,795 and the CETA.796 If the agreement 
would not contain any provision of dispute settlement mechanism, the only available routes for 
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foreign investors wishing to sue the EU and/or its Member States, are the state-to-state 
arbitration and domestic judicial proceedings.797 The same applies to European investors 
wishing to sue the host partner state. 
The problem with this type of dispute resolutions is that once a claim is initiated before a 
tribunal, a domestic court can no longer intervene in the procedure. Such process may 
encourage investors to circumvent the judicial prerogatives of the CJEU. 
1.3.1 The Establishment of ICS in NGFTAs 
The former ISDS procedure is criticized for that the investors have too much influence 
over the arbitration process. From this angle, the ICS can be considered as a big reform in 
relation to the ISDS system. Moreover, the ICS has a significant political influence over the 
dispute resolutions. The ISDS is designed to have an investor-state dispute resolution, which is 
de-politicization, where politicians and governments are not allowed to be involved in the 
procedures.798 
The CJEU establishes that international agreements form an integral part of the EU legal 
order,799 and require consistent interpretation of secondary EU law.800 In essence, the task of 
the CJEU is to review the legality of the actions made by EU’s institutions or Member States, 
in the light of international agreements.801 In this regard, the CJEU is limited in its interpretation 
of an EU legal act. This means that in order for the CJEU to view the compatibility of such act 
with an EU’s investment agreement, the investment tribunal needs to have already rendered an 
award. The investment tribunal is, therefore, limited to adjudicate disputes, which only concern 
the interpretation and application of investment agreements; and the CJEU is not naturally 
bound to follow investment awards, where the incompatibility only concerns the agreements. 
The investment standards carry the potential to affect a wide range of EU’s policies, because of 
its extensive reach. The WTO dispute settlement body ‘(…) would inevitably determine the 
Court’s interpretation of the corresponding rules of Community law. Such an outcome would 
jeopardise the autonomy of the Community legal order in the pursuit of its own objectives.’802 
                                                   
797 Daniele Gallo and Fernanda G Nicola, 'The External Dimension of EU Investment Law: Jurisdictional Clashes and 
Transformative Adjudication' (2016) 39 Fordham International Law Journal 1081. 
798 Luca Pantaleo, ‘Lights and Shadows of the TTIP Investment Court System’ (2016) 1 CLEER Paper Series 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2782008> accessed 8 March 2018., p. 82. 
799 Article 216(2) TFEU. 
800 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 September 1996, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of 
Germany, C-61/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:313, para. 52, Judgment of the Court of Justice of 1 April 2004, Bellio F.lli Srl v 
Prefettura di Treviso, C-286/02 ECLI:EU:C:2004:212, para. 33,C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA (n 625), para. 35. Rosas, ‘The 
Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU Member States’ (n 626), pp. 1309-1311. 
801 Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (n 260), p. 292; Herrmann, ‘The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
in the Emerging EU Investment Policy’ (n 739), p. 574. 
802 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 September 2007, Ikea Wholesale Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise, C-
351/04, ECLI:EU:C:2007:547, paras. 78 and 79. 
  -157- 
The investment tribunal’s core task is to substantively assess the compatibility of legal 
acts with the broad investment protection standards established under the investment 
agreement. Investment tribunals do not, in these circumstances, replace domestic or EU courts 
in the application of EU law, in difference to the European Patent Court (EPCt) for example. 
According to Opinion 2/13, incompatibilities with the Treaty are directly invoked if an 
international agreement empowers a judicial body other than the CJEU with the assessment of 
EU law vis-à-vis broadly defined international standards.803 As far as the interpretation of the 
investment agreement is concerned, investment awards are considered to bind the CJEU, and 
consequently extend the interpretation of secondary EU law in the light of that agreement. The 
function of the investment arbitration is to review EU legal acts vis-à-vis investment standards 
that are stipulated in the investment agreement.  
The established judicial bodies are an indispensable element of the EU’s external 
relations,804 and the powers transferred under the Treaties should remain unaltered.805 It remains 
within the responsibilities of the CJEU to review the legality of EU law by virtue of Article 19 
TEU.806 The role of assessing the EU legal act is sometimes taken over by the investment 
agreements.807 The CJEU would be effectively restrained by the investment tribunal 
interpretation when exercising its judicial function under Article 19 TEU. However, the fact 
that direct effect is excluded from these recent types of agreements808 essentially limits the EU’s 
involvement through the CJEU in interpreting the agreement, since the agreement will not be 
fully integrated in the EU legal order.809 In practice, this is the case in the CETA, for example, 
where the agreement excludes private rights.810 Investors are here also excluded from initiating 
treaty-based claims before domestic courts or the CJEU. However, this would not prevent legal 
challenges to secondary law, and would therefore represent an insufficient safety mechanism. 
When contracting states express their consent to arbitration in ISDS, it merely shows that 
the investor-state tribunal is fulfilling the function of international adjudicative review of 
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domestic legislation.811 In fact, the provisions are designed to benefit a broad non-homogeneous 
group of elements that have no prior relationship with the state in regard to the investment.812 
The consent to start investment arbitration comes from the contracting states’ sovereign 
power.813 Consequently, investment arbitration includes broader and systematic implications 
on the regulatory policy-space of contracting states other than commercial arbitration. The 
investment tribunals under the EU’s investment agreements will express themselves on the 
compatibility of the regulatory acts of the EU or its Member States with broad and extensive 
investment standards. This means that investment tribunals exercise an adjudicative review of 
the legality of EU Treaties.814 
The ISDS is based on principles of fairness and impartiality to guarantee the right of 
governments to regulate in the public interest. In the ICS, the foreign investors are able to 
circumvent domestic courts, and sue States directly through the established international 
tribunal. Moreover, the ICS does not grant rights to the public or victims of investors’ actions; 
this naturally means that affected individuals do not have recourse to seek. Foreign investors 
can also choose not to engage in the ICS, but rather pursue the resolution of disputes through 
the ISDS. However, once they engage in the latter, they cannot seek resolutions through the 
former. 
1.3.2 The Composition of the ICS  
The composition of the Court is what differentiates the ICS from traditionally based ISDS 
arbitration mechanism.815 The investment court systems of the EU–Vietnam FTA816 and CETA 
have both a composition of two-level judicial structure. A two-level judicial structure simply 
refers to a system where, after the first judicial instance, there is a possibility to appeal. In the 
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EU–Vietnam agreement, the first tribunal is composed of nine members, whereas the Appeal 
Tribunal is composed of six members.817 The EUVFTA clearly states that  
(…) the Trade Committee shall, upon the entry into force of this Agreement, appoint nine 
members of the Tribunal. Three of the members shall be nationals of a Member State of 
the European Union, three shall be nationals of Vietnam and three shall be nationals of 
third countries.818 
However, it is furthermore explained that it is upon the party to choose who to appoint. 
In this way, the party to the agreement may as well choose to propose a member who has 
another nationality or citizenship. Either way, the members chosen by the party will be 
considered to be nationals or citizens of that party in the context of the EU–Vietnam FTA 
Article 12.12.819 
Moreover, in the context of the Appeal Tribunal, it is decided in the EU–Vietnam 
agreement that the tribunal shall be composed of six members out of which ‘(…) two shall be 
nationals of a Member State of the European Union, two shall be nationals of Vietnam and two 
shall be nationals of third countries.’820 
In the case of the CETA, the first instance tribunal has 15 members. The CETA provides 
that ‘[f]ive of the Members of the Tribunal shall be nationals of a Member State of the European 
Union, five shall be nationals of Canada and five shall be nationals of third countries.’ 
Additionally, in line with the EUVFTA in terms of proportion, it is further indicated that up to 
five members proposed by the party may be of any nationality and shall still be considered as 
nationals of the party for the purpose of this agreement.821 
Regarding the composition of the CETA Joint Committee, the agreement doesn’t include 
clear details. The member shall be appointed by a decision of the CETA Joint Committee.822 
The members of the appellant tribunal shall have similar qualification as those appointed for 
the tribunal.823 This means that they shall possess the qualifications required in their respective 
countries for appointment to judicial office or jurist of recognised competence. Furthermore, 
they should be equipped with expertise in public international law. It is moreover desired that 
the members should have expertise in international investment and trade and dispute resolution 
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linked to international investment or international trade agreements; though, this is not an 
obligation.824 Furthermore, the members need to have certain ethics requirement, such as being 
independent and not affiliated with any government. It is, however, clarified that government 
affiliation does not mean having remuneration from the government. It can be deducted from 
the context that it refers more to a political affiliation to the government. The members should 
not also take instructions from other organs, or even participate in consideration of any disputes, 
which may create direct or indirect conflict of interest.825 
Consequently, it is possible to draw the conclusion that neither the CETA nor the EU–
Vietnam FTA refer to members of the tribunal as judges. However, the CETA manifests that 
the members should be appointed by judicial office or jurist of recognised competence, which 
only means that they should possess a more excelled knowledge in order to judge on certain 
circumstances. 
Interestingly, the proposal for the TTIP did not word the same. In relation to the 
composition of the arbitral panel, it discussed the selection of ‘judges’.826 Referring to the 
arbitrational panel as ‘judges’ could change the context, specifically in the sense that in normal 
arbitration procedure, when the panel is elected, it is not necessary that its members are judges, 
they can be practitioners, academics, or politician. Their legal background is not of importance 
for the panel. 
1.3.2.1 Selection Process of the Panel Members 
As mentioned earlier, in the procedure for selecting the members of the panel, there is a 
clear categorization that is based on nationality; but the appointment system itself is not 
nationality based. If we take the EUVFTA as an example, the members that Vietnam has 
appointed were not required to be Vietnamese.827 This selection principle is also provided in 
the CETA.828 In both agreements, the selection of the members of the investment court is 
assigned to a special committee, which should be established under the agreements. This 
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committee is referred to as the Trade Committee829 in the EUVFTA,830 and as the CETA Joint 
Committee in the CETA.831 These committees are composed by the EU Trade Commissioner, 
and the Minister for International Trade of Canada in the CETA832, and the Minister for Trade 
and Industry of Vietnam in the EUVFTA.833 
For a decision to be made in these committees, it should be based on mutual consent. 
However, in the EUVFTA, there are other parties involved in the appointment of members to 
the tribunal and the appeal tribunal.834 In fact, this is accomplished upon the recommendation 
to the Trade Committee by the Committee on Services, Investment and Government 
Procurement.835 This differs from the CETA, since it is the CETA Joint Committee only that 
takes decisions on the appointment of members, with no other committee providing its input to 
the final decision.836 Consequently, it is possible to assume this type of appointment in the ICS 
as based on more of a compromise through political organs, than just a selection process of the 
different contracting parties.837 
1.3.2.2 The Party Autonomy of the Arbitrational Panel  
The principle of party autonomy is present in traditional ISDS mechanism due to its 
composition of the arbitrational panel. In the ISDS appointment process of the arbitrators in the 
arbitrational panel, the investor is empowered to actively participate in deciding on which 
arbitrators should be selected for the hearing of the case.838  
                                                   
829 It is also referred to as the Trade Committee in the KOREU. Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Korea 
‘7th meeting of the Trade Committee of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) ’ 
<https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/south-korea/38576/7th-meeting-trade-committee-eu-korea-free-trade-agreement-fta_en> 
accessed . 
830 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016, Chapter 17, Institutional, General and Final 
Provisions, Article 1.1 “The Parties hereby establish a Trade Committee comprising representatives of the [European] Union 
and Vietnam. 
831 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part, 8.27, para. 2. “Five of the Members of the Tribunal shall be nationals of a Member State 
of the European Union, five shall be nationals of Canada and five shall be nationals of third countries”. 
832 Ibid, Article 26.1, The Parties hereby establish the CETA Joint Committee comprising representatives of the European 
Union and representatives of Canada. The CETA Joint Committee shall be co-chaired by the Minister for International Trade 
of Canada and the Member of the European Commission responsible for Trade, or their respective designees. 
833 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016 Institutional, General and Final Provisions, Chapter 
17, Article 1.1. The Parties hereby establish a Trade Committee comprising representatives of the [European] Union and 
Vietnam. 
834 Ibid, Chapter 8, Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce, Sub-section 4, investment tribunal system, Article 12, 
para. 2. “...The trade committee shall…appoint nine Members of the Tribunal. Three of the Members shall be nationals of a 
Member State of the European Union, three shall be nationals of Vietnam and three shall be nationals of third countries”. 
835 Ibid, Chapter 8, Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce sub-section 5, conduct of proceedings, Article 34, para. 
2. 
836 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part, Article 8.28 para. 7. The CETA Joint Committee is competent to take decision in 
administrative and organisational matters regarding the functioning of the Appellate Tribunal. The overall task of the CETA 
joint committee is explained in more detail in Article 26.1, paras. 3-4. 
837 Robert W Schwieder, 'TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New (and Improved) Paradigm for Investor-State 
Adjudication' (2016) 55 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178, There is a risk, discussed in this article that the 
Committee would instead be absorbed by the State’s interest within its decision making. 
838 Pantaleo, 'Lights and Shadows of the TTIP Investment Court System' (n 798), pp. 80-81. 
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In relation to the selection system of arbitrators, the ICS differs completely from the 
traditional ISDS. In the ICS system, the tribunals are categorized evenly in accordance to their 
affiliation to the contracting parties. 
1.3.3 Procedural Requirements for the ICS 
The ISDS permits direct access to international arbitral tribunal in order to enforce the 
provisions of an agreement. Any investor can pursue an investment dispute when the ISDS is 
included in the agreement. The investor is only required to initiate the claim because of the 
implied consent, which stems from the signed agreement.839 Each agreement contains its 
specific procedural rules that govern the arbitration procedure. From a legal perspective, the 
decision-making procedure enfolds two interesting perspectives to discuss i.e. the three-layered 
decision procedure as well as the possibility to appeal. 
1.3.3.1 Three-Layered Decision Procedure 
The panel in the ICS further decides the cases in a three-layered organized system. This 
type of system is put into place in order to respect the overall composition of the panel. The 
decision is then chaired by a third country member.840 The president is selected by lot from the 
pool of third country members.841 It is thereafter the responsibility of the president of the 
tribunal to appoint the members to the individual panels. In this regard, neither the investor nor 
the respondent will have any impact whatsoever of the composition of the panel, which will 
hear the dispute. 
In relation to the appeal tribunal, it is less detailed in the CETA. The agreement provides 
no provision related to the composition of the appeal tribunal. In regard to the procedural 
settings, the Vietnam’s agreement embraces the division of three of the tribunal’s 
composition.842 
However, the procedural setting of the courts in the division of three is confirmed in the 
CETA;843 it refers to the ‘(…) three randomly appointed Members of the Appellate Tribunal’.844 
Additionally, the Joint Committee shall adopt a decision in relation to the administrative and 
organizational matters of the functioning of the Appellate Tribunal.845 
                                                   
839 Dolzer, Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (n 773), p. 257. 
840 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, Article 12, para. 6. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, Article 8.27, para. 6. 
841 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, Article 12, para. 8, EU-Vietnam FTA; Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, 
Article 8.27, para. 8. 
842 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, Article 13, para. 8. 
843 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part, Article 8.28, para. 5. 
844 Ibid, Article 8.28, para. 5. 
845 Ibid, Article 8.28, para. 7. 
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Consequently, it is not very clear whether the situation is the same as in the EUVFTA, 
where the composition of the panel hearing a particular case is determined by a third country 
member of the Appellate Tribunal, or if it is by the CETA Joint Committee through mutual 
consent. 
1.3.3.2 The Possibility to Appeal 
One of the most important features of the proposed ICS is the establishment of an 
appellate mechanism. One of the most criticised areas of ISDS mechanisms has been the lack 
of effective judicial review of arbitral decisions.846 
Generally, an appeal mechanism would enhance credibility, legitimacy, coherence and 
foreseeability of the ISDS system. However, at the same time, such permanent court system 
risks increasing (already existing) discrepancies in investment awards.847 
According to ICSID Articles 52 and 53, investment awards are subject to an internal 
judicial control, in which the annulment committee may decide that the award should be 
annulled either only in part, or in full. 
Similar to the appellant mechanism in the ICS, there is a mechanism in arbitral processes, 
under the ICSID convention, that provides a special annulment procedure, according to which 
special ad hoc panels may annul ICSID awards. Such annulment procedures exclude recourse 
to any other mechanisms challenging the ICSID award.848 
The appeal mechanism can be problematic from both, an international law perspective, 
and also an EU law perspective. It would be contrary to the ICSID convention, since the 
provisions of the new generation of FTAs are broadening the annulment mechanism in the 
ICSID conventions through the newly introduced appeal mechanism. The appellant tribunal 
may revise ‘provisional awards’ of the Tribunals (of first instance), not only on the grounds for 
an annulment, but also for errors in law, and on the assessment of facts (although only to a 
limited extent).849 
Whether such contradiction would constitute a permissible inter se modification under 
the criteria of Article 41 VCLT can be questionable. Such modification could be considered 
                                                   
846 World Investment Report ‘Reforming International Investment Governance’ 2015 <World Investment Report 2015 
Reforming International Investment Governance> accessed 25 March 2017, p. 150. 
847 Schwieder, ‘TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New (and Improved) Paradigm for Investor-State Adjudication’ (n 
837). 
848 Article 53(1) ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, “The award … shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other 
remedy except those provided for in this Convention”. 
849 European Commission Textual proposal to the EU negotiaion of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Parternship (TTIP), 
Article 29(1), section 3, EU’s proposal, ‘(…) (a) that the Tribunal has erred in the interpretation or application of the 
applicable law; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly erred in the appreciation of the facts, including the appreciation of 
relevant domestic law; or, (c) those provided for in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, insofar as they are not covered by (a) 
and (b).’; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European 
Union and its Member States, of the other part, Article 8.28(2), EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, Investment Chapter, 
section 3, Article 28(1). 
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‘(…) incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose’ of the ICSID 
Convention as a whole’.850 If the revision of awards would be constituted on broader grounds, 
it would lead in turn to a prolongation of proceedings. However, having broader ground would 
also lead to more coherent interpretation and application of the underlying investment rules. 
Since an appeal mechanism was in fact discussed in the secretariat discussion paper,851 it could 
mean that the concept would not in fact be completely contrary to the ICSID ISDS.852 
Annulment can be considered in situations where the panel is not constituted properly, 
when there is manifest excess of power, corruption, serious departure of fundamental rule of 
procedure, or in situations where there is a failure to provide reasons.853 
Non-ICSID awards can be set aside by domestic courts.854 Domestic arbitration acts 
provide only limited grounds for setting aside awards and do not make a substantive review of 
the award. Such grounds could be personal misconduct, procedural improprieties, and the lack 
of a valid arbitration agreement.855 
The ICS similarly provides for possibilities to appeal against an award rendered by the 
tribunal. This is possible in situations where it has been considered that the interpretation or 
application of the applicable law was erred, or when there is a manifestly error in the 
appreciation of the facts, including the relevant domestic law, which in the case of the EU as a 
contracting party, comprises also EU law.856 
The Vietnam FTA stipulates for a large area of competence for the appeal tribunal to, in 
its full or in parts, ‘(…) modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions’ of the Tribunal.857 
However, this is not the case in situations where the facts of the case do not allow for a final 
                                                   
850 An agreement on an inter se modification of the Convention between certain of its parties to allow for an appeals 
mechanism also would not be without difficulties. 
851 ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ‘Possible Improvement of the Framework for ICSID 
Arbitration’ (2004) Secretariat Discussion Paper October 22 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Possible%20Improvements%20of%20the%20Framework%20of%20IC
SID%20Arbitration.pdf> accessed 18 March 2018. 
852 While not analysing the compatibility under the Article 41 VCLT requirements in detail, the ICSID Secretariat clearly 
envisaged the possibility of an inter se agreement. ICSID ibid, Annex, para. 2. 
853 Catharine Titi, ‘The European Union's Proposal for an International Investment Court: Significance, Innovations and 
Challenges Ahead’ (2017) TDM1 Transnational Dispute Management <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2711943 > accessed 8 
March 2018., pp. 9-10. 
854 Dolzer, Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (n 773), pp. 300-301. 
855 This could be the case in many domestic legal orders, for example in Sweden, Swedish Arbitration Act, SFS 1999:116, 
and Section 34. 
856 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, Article 28, para. 1. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, Article 8.28, para. 2, 
Pantaleo, 'Lights and Shadows of the TTIP Investment Court System' (n 798), pp. 89-90, Pantaleo emphasises the differences 
between the underlying objectives of appeal mechanism of a private and public purposes. The appeal tribunal in the ICS 
includes a broader review, where the appreciation of facts, goes beyond what is necessary to guarantee overall credibility, 
legitimacy and coherence of the dispute resolution mechanism. 
857 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, Article 28, para. 3. A decision of the Appeal Tribunal is considered final in 
accordance with ibid, Article 29, para. 3. 
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decision to be taken; in such circumstances, the case is to be referred back to tribunal.858 The 
appeal procedures in the CETA are decided by the Joint Committee.859 In relation to the TTIP 
proposal, the appeal procedure has a more complex setting.860 
1.4 Enforcement of Investment Awards in NGFTAs 
The awards have been carefully drafted by the negotiators in view of the possibility for 
an ICS award to appear as an ICSID award. However, it has to be assured that the other ICSID 
contracting parties would recognize such as ICSID awards enforceable under the ICSID 
Convention. The modifications made in the ICS can be considered as modifications compatible 
with the ICSID Convention pursuant to Article 41 VCLT861; in other words, whether the awards 
can be qualified as awards under the New York Convention regarding ICS as a form of 
arbitration, and the outcome of the ICS dispute settlement as constituting enforceable awards. 
The enforcement of ICS awards is also dependent on the provisions of the underlying agreement 
to which third parties are not bound.862 The enforceability of the ICS awards has been given a 
lot of attention in the EU’s negotiations. As concluded in the final agreements, awards cannot 
further be subject to ‘(…) appeal, review, set aside, annulment or any other remedy’.863 
It is in fact the enforcement system that is the crucial advantage of the ICSID arbitration. 
In ICSID arbitration, the awards are binding and compel the parties to ‘(…) abide by and 
comply with the terms of the award’.864 
The exclusive nature of the ICSID enforcement rules provides that the grounds for non-
recognition and non-enforcement under the New York Convention cannot be raised before 
national courts.865 Moreover, each contracting state to ICSID arbitration ‘(…) shall recognize 
                                                   
858 Ibid, Article 28, para. 4. 
859 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part, Article 8.28, para. 7 (b). 
860 Titi, 'The European Union's Proposal for an International Investment Court: Significance, Innovations and Challenges 
Ahead' (n 853), pp. 11-12. The question whether the TTIP appeal tribunal has the power of the final decision is important. 
However, it seems that the cases are to be referred back to the tribunal where the tribunal will have the binding and detailed 
instructions as to the modification or reversal of the provisional award. 
861 Article 41.1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ‘Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude 
an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone if: The possibility of such a modification is provided for by 
the treaty; or The modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty’. 
862 Titi, 'The European Union's Proposal for an International Investment Court: Significance, Innovations and Challenges 
Ahead' (n 853), p. 27. 
863 European Commission Textual proposal to the EU negotiaion of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Parternship (TTIP), 
section 3, Article 30(1), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the 
European Union and its Member States, of the other part, Article 8.28(9)(b). EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, Investment 
Chapter, Section 3, Article 31(1). 
864 Article 53(1) ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, ‘The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be 
subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and 
comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant 
provisions of this Convention’. 
865 Maritime International Nominees Establishment v Government of Guinea, para. 4.02. In this decision, it appears that the 
Convention excludes any attack on the award given by national courts. 
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an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations 
imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that 
State.’866 The awards should for this reason follow the enforcement provisions of the ICSID 
Convention. 
As the wordings seems inspired by the ICSID Convention, it is important to clarify 
whether the permissible modifications of the ICSID Convention could lead to the agreements 
being sufficient to provide enforcement of an ICSID award under Articles 53 and 54 of the 
Convention. 
Under general treaty law, the modifications made from ICSID in order to create the ICS 
can be considered as permissible modifications according to Article 41 VCLT, which provides 
for inter se modifications. However, the consequence hereto is that parties to the treaty that 
have not modified the ICSID Convention remain only bound by the original Convention, and 
do not need to accept any changes. This naturally means that they would not be under an 
obligation to enforce the modified awards under the ICSID Convention rules. This type of 
ICSID modification would not affect other ICSID contracting states. Since the ICS proceedings 
would not have to be enforced by the other contracting states, as the ICSID awards would put 
these other states in a disadvantaged position, it is important for this reason to see whether the 
awards can be regarded as arbitral awards susceptible of recognition and enforcement under the 
New York Convention.867 
The purpose of the New York Convention is the enforcement of arbitral awards.868 The 
fact that there is no real party autonomy in the ICS system may provide the awards given by 
the ICS, it come to be considered as judicial decisions rather than arbitral awards in accordance 
with Article I of the New York Convention.869 
Arbitral awards which are defined as ‘(…) arbitral awards made in the territory of a State 
other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and 
arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal’,870 are recognized and 
enforceable as foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention.  
                                                   
866 Article 54(1)ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules. The only practical obstacles to such enforcement measures are 
state immunity from execution rules as provided for in Article 55 of the Convention. 
867 United Nations New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [1958] 
UNCITRAL The New York Convention. 
868 Ibid, Part 1, United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, New York, 20 May – 10 June 1958, 
Article I ‘(…) the purpose of concluding a convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and to 
consider other possible measures for increasing the effectiveness of arbitration in the settlement of private law disputes’. 
869 Ibid. 
870 Article I(1) ibid., ‘It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their 
recognition and enforcement are sought’. 
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There is no requirement to be a member of the UNCITRAL in order to have UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules that apply to dispute settlement.871 For this reason, arbitration proceedings 
against both, the EU and its Member States, may be conducted according to UNCITRAL rules. 
The main issue would lie in whether national courts in the New York Convention 
contracting States will consider ICS awards as awards made by an arbitral body. The ICS seems 
to be more like a form of arbitration with judicial features.  
In the CETA, TTIP, and the EU–Vietnam FTA (EUVFTA),872 it is stated that the offer of 
consent by a Contracting Party together with its acceptance by an investor through the 
submission of a claim constituting an ‘agreement in writing’ for purposes of the New York 
Convention.873 This is because the New York Convention requires ‘an agreement in writing’ 
for the purpose of recognition and enforcement under the Convention according to Article II.874 
Taking previous jurisprudence875 into account, it would be very unlikely to believe that national 
courts would not accept this. 
Furthermore, a reservation limiting the application of the New York Convention to 
‘commercial’ disputes876 should not impede the actual enforcement of investment awards,877 
because it has a broad definition of the notion ‘commercial arbitration’ which expressly also 
includes a reference to ‘investment’ according to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration.878 
                                                   
871 European Parliament Resolution of 6 April 2011 on the Future European International Investment Policy (n 98), para. 33. 
Here can be noted that the European Parliament ‘cannot use’ the UNCITRAL arbitration rules since the EU ‘as such’ was not 
a member of ‘[this] organization’ was misguided. 
Burgstaller, ‘Dispute Settlement in EU International Investment Agreements with Third States: Three Salient Problems’ (n 
775), p. 560. 
872 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016 
873 European Commission Textual proposal to the EU negotiaion of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Parternship (TTIP), 
Section 3, Article 7(2)(b), The consent under paragraph 1 and the submission of a claim under this Section shall be deemed to 
satisfy the requirements of: … Article II of the New York Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards for an ‘agreement in writing’; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of 
the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part Article 8.25(2)(b), EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement, Investment Chapter, Article 10(4)(b). 
874 United Nations New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Article II (1) 
‘Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all 
or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether 
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration’. 
875 An example of such earlier jurisprudence in this regard could be the Iran–US Claims Tribunal were some national courts 
initially had problems enforcing the tribunal’s awards because of the lack of ‘an agreement in writing’ directly between the 
disputing parties, but was eventually accepted. Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc. and others, 
US District Court (Central District of California), Decision of 14 January 1988, published in Albert J. van den Berg (ed.), 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, vol. XIV (1989), pp. 763, 765. 
876 United Nations New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Article I(3) The 
New York Convention permits Contracting Parties to make a reservation to the effect that they apply the Convention ‘only to 
differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the 
national law of the State making such declaration’. 
877 United Mexican States v Metalclad, Canada, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2 May 2001 [2001] BCSC 664, 5 ICSID 
Reports 236, 247, para. 44; United Mexican States v Feldman Karpa, Canada, Ontario Court of Appeal, 11 January 2005, 9 
ICSID Reports 508, 516, para. 41; Czech Republic v CME Czech Republic BV, Sweden, Svea Court of Appeal, 15 May 
2003, 9 ICSID Reports 439, 493. 
878 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration with amendments as adopted in 2006 (n 777). 
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The NGFTAs state that Each party ‘shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this 
Agreement as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligation within its territory as if it were a 
final judgement of a court in that Party’,879 while ‘[e]xecution of the award shall be governed 
by the laws concerning the execution of judgments in force, where such execution is sought.’880 
In the EUVFTA, it is provided, according to Article 31(2), that each party shall recognize 
an award and enforce it in similar manners to when it is a final judgement in the party’s State. 
It is the same rule as is provided in the ICSID convention Article 53 and cannot be overturned 
by domestic court decisions. 
Both the EU-Singapore FTA (EUSFTA) and CETA refer directly to the enforcement 
provisions in the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention. The choice between the 
ICSID convention and the New York convention depends on the arbitration rules that are 
addressed.  
All the three agreements seek to go beyond disputes in which investor-state arbitral 
awards qualify for enforcement under the New York Convention.881 Furthermore, the CETA 
and EUVFTA take the same approach in regard to clarifying that a final award under the 
respective agreement shall qualify as an award under the ICSID Convention.  
1.4.1 Competence Based Approach in Assessing the Conduct of the Parties 
The issue of division of responsibility has already been discussed in the previous chapter. 
Here the different approach linked to the autonomy claim is clarified. Considering the adoption 
of this kind of rules in relation to the reports of the panel of the WTO, one can clearly see that 
there is a type of support linked to a more competence-based approach when assessing whether 
the conduct was to be attributed to the EU or the Member State.882  
When the EU’s acts are binding a Member State, the conduct of an organ of the Member 
State must in any case be attributed to that State. This is the view also taken by the European 
                                                   
879 European Commission Textual proposal to the EU negotiaion of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Parternship (TTIP), 
section 3, Article 30(2), ‘Each Party shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Agreement as binding and enforce the 
pecuniary obligation within its territory as if it were a final judgement of a court in that Party.’; EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement, Article 31(2), Investment chapter, section 3, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between 
Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, Article 8.28(9)(d) and Article 8.41. 
880 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part, Article 30(3), section 3, EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, Investment Chapter, 
Section 3, Articles 8.28(9), (d), 8.41(4) and Article 31(5). 
881 Article 9.27 (4) EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018), Article 8.41 (5) 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its 
Member States, of the other part, and Article 31 (7) EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016 
882 Pieter Jan Kuijper, 'Attribution - Responsibility - Remedy: Some Comments on the EU in Different International Regimes' 
(2013) 46 Belgian Review of International Law 57. 
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court of human rights.883 It is furthermore reflected in the Draft Agreement on the accession of 
the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights Article 1, para. 4, which states that  
[f]or the purposes of the Convention, of the protocols thereto and of this Agreement, an 
act, measure or omission of organs of a Member State of the European Union or of persons 
acting on its behalf shall be attributed to that State, even if such act, measure or omission 
occurs when the State implements the law of the European Union, including decisions 
taken under the Treaty on European Union and under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.  
It is made clear from this provision that the idea that the conduct of an organ of a Member 
State must be attributed exclusively to that state, irrespective of whether it was while 
implementing an EU act, or during an act in fields of exclusive competence of the EU.  
The proposition of EU is that ‘(…) the purpose was to make explicit the attribution rule 
whereby acts of Member States are and remain only attributable to them even if they are acts 
of implementation of EU law’.884 Consequently, the draft agreement makes it possible for the 
Member State to be held responsible, together with the EU. This could be the consequence of 
a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights that stems from an EU act, for 
example. The Member State shall not according to the draft agreement preclude the EU from 
being responsible as a co-respondent for a violation resulting from such an act, measure or 
omission, in accordance with Article 36, para. 4 of the Convention, and Article 3 of the 
Agreement.885 
The EU representative clearly explained that Article 1, para. 4 of the draft agreement is 
‘(...) based on the distinction between attribution of an act and the responsibility for the violation 
that may derive from it. The co-respondent accepts to take responsibility for an act which is not 
attributable to it (...)’.886 
Moreover, the CJEU did not raise any objection to the way in which the draft agreement 
addressed the question of the attribution of conduct amounting to a breach of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in Opinion 2/13. The Court only commented that question of 
apportionment of responsibility between the EU and its Member States, in such regard, must 
                                                   
883 For the relevant case law see the ILC’s commentary to Article 64 of the ARIO, UN United Nations, ‘Report of the 
International Law Commission, 63rd Session’ (2011) A/66/1081 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/63/> accessed 16 April 
2018., pp. 168-169. 
884 Council of Europe Ministers’ Deputies ‘Information Documents, Second Negotiation Meeting between the CDDH ad hoc 
Negotiation Group and the European Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ 2012 <https://rm.coe.int/16805c9abd> accessed 17 April 2018. 
885 Article 1, para. 4, United Nations Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations [2011] International 
Law Commission A/66/10, para. 87. 
886 Council of Europe Ministers’ Deputies ‘Information Documents, Second Negotiation Meeting between the CDDH ad hoc 
Negotiation Group and the European Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (n 884). 
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be resolved solely ‘(...) in accordance with the rules of EU law governing the division of powers 
between the EU and its Member States and the attributability of that act or omission’.887 
The ITLOS opinion gave relevance to the allocation of competence by stating that ‘(…) 
the liability of an international organization for an internationally wrongful act is linked to its 
competence’.888 However, this statement cannot be taken out of context. According to this 
mechanism,889 it is the party, in this sense the organization or the Member State, which has 
competence that must bear responsibility for the breach of the Convention. When concluding 
an agreement on matters falling within its competence, ITLOS concluded that it may accept 
obligations which also cover the conduct of the Member States. It does not appear that a 
Member State’s conduct would be attributed to the organisation. It observed that: 
(…) in cases where an international organization, in the exercise of its exclusive 
competence in fisheries matters, concludes a fisheries access agreement with an SRFC 
Member State, which provides for access by vessels flying the flag of its Member States to 
fish in the exclusive economic zone of that State, the obligations of the flag State become 
the obligations of the international organization.890  
In this regard, if an organisation would accept an obligation under which the Member 
State will pursue a certain conduct, and the Member State would fail in its actions, it would be 
clear that the organisation would be held responsible. Even though this is the case, it cannot 
lead to a direct and automatic conclusion that the conduct of the Member State would be 
attributed to the organisation. However, it is the conduct itself that triggers the responsibility. 
In this sense, it is clear that it is not possible to rely on the existence of a special rule for the 
issue of attribution of competence and responsibility between the EU and its Member States. It 
is not possible to find confirmation for such rule in international practice, since there is no 
consistency in these issues. In the European Convention of Human Rights, it seems that the 
conduct of an organ of a Member State must be attributed to that state, even if this conduct is 
aimed at implementing EU law. However, in the context of the WTO, the WTO panels appear 
to accept the view that the conduct of Member States, in implementing EU acts, must be 
                                                   
887 2/13, Opinion on Accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (n 449), paras. 230 and 234. 
888 Advisory Opinion, 2 April 2015, 'Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission 
(SRFC) International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas(n), para. 168. 
889 Council Decision (EU) 2016/455 of 22 March 2016 authorising the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European 
Union on the elements of a draft text of an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction 
[1982] OJ L 79/32, The special mechanism is established under Annex IX. 
890 Ibid, p. 172. 
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attributed to the EU.891 This is namely because of the importance the EU exclusive competence 
has shown to play in the context of the WTO and for third States. 
1.4.2 The NGFTAs Solving Previous Issues of Responsibility 
A dispute settlement mechanism, such as the one in CETA, allows an investor to bring a 
claim against the EU or a Member State for a breach of its obligation under the treaty.892 It is 
possible that this mechanism will be considered as a model for future trade agreements. In 
investment arbitration, the question of responsibility is too wide, since it is a question that will 
be raised in all cases. In this regard, the procedure of bringing an investment claim becomes 
important to consider, since it can give clear indication as to whether it is the EU or the Member 
State which will be held responsible in the allocation of responsibility. 
Chapter 2 of the EUSFTA confers dispute settlement on alleged breach of investment 
protection, which causes loss or damage to the claimant or established company.893 
In the EPA, the dispute settlement concerns the interpretation and application of the 
provisions of the agreement.894 And in the EUVFTA, the dispute settlement relates as well to 
the interpretation or application of the provisions of the agreement, and if it is in breach, the 
link between the breach and the inconsistency must be shown. However, there is no indication 
for the loss or damage as in the EUSFTA.895 
In the CETA, if the investor intends to initiate arbitration proceedings, ‘(…) the investor 
shall deliver to the European Union a notice requesting a determination of the respondent’.896 
Thereafter, the EU must inform the investor as to whether the EU or the Member State will act 
as respondent to the case. In the event that the EU does not reply within 50 days on who will 
act as a respondent, the investor may choose one. It is established this way in order to avoid the 
risk of external interference in the division of responsibility between the EU and its Member 
State.  
The CETA provisions in relation to the section process of the respondents clearly states 
that ‘[t]he European Union shall, after having made a determination, inform the investor as to 
whether the European Union or a Member State of the European Union shall be the 
                                                   
891 Kuijper, ‘Attribution - Responsibility - Remedy: Some Comments on the EU in Different International Regimes’ (n 882), 
Kuijper provides different factors that may explain these different legal regimes. 
892 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part, Section F of Chapter 8. 
893 EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018), Chapter 3, Article 3.1. 
894 Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership, Article 21.2. Unless otherwise provided 
for in this Agreement, this Chapter applies with respect to the settlement of any dispute between the Parties, concerning the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of this Agreement. 
895 EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (authentic texts as of April 2018), Chapter 14 on Dispute settlement, 
Section 1, Article 2. 
896 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part. 
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respondent’.897 This amounts to that it is not upon the parties concerned to decide about the 
respondent, but in fact, it is a determination which should be done by the EU. The way the EU 
determines such issues will clearly be executed following a competence-based approach. 
Conveniently, for the EU, it seems to meet the concern about the risks in relation to the 
allocation of international responsibility between the EU and its Member State. The conclusion 
is simply that the mechanism in the CETA is not put there as a coincidence, but as a new more 
general trend for this type of trade agreements.898 
When determining responsibility in these types of agreements, the issues in relation to 
the EU’s autonomy is if the agreement would provide for provisions which may define directly 
or indirectly, the internal competences within the EU. If this was the case, it could amount to a 
breach in relation to the EU’s autonomy. In the CETA, the EU can choose the respondent; 
however, the criteria on how such determination should be done is not specified in the 
agreement, which leave the EU the discretion to decide on its own distribution of competences. 
Since the agreements do not include how the EU deals with the allocation of competences 
between itself and its Member States, the same naturally goes for their obligations. This leads 
to that in a case where there is no clear partition between the EU and its Member State, both 
would bear the responsibility in a case of breach.899 
If an external arbitration tribunal would interfere, when assessing the question of 
responsibility may as well result in that the external arbitration tribunal interferes in the internal 
division of competence, which would result in breaching the EU autonomy. This result in a 
clear issue with It was clearly stated by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 that  
(…) a decision on the apportionment as between the EU and its Member States of 
responsibility for an act or omission constituting a violation of the ECHR established by 
the ECtHR is also one that is based on an assessment of the rules of EU law governing the 
division of powers between the EU and its Member States and the attributability of that act 
or omission.900 
The EU is the only party who is recognized with power in the first stage of investor 
dispute settlement in relation to determine the respondent. This leads to avoiding the risk of 
external interference. 
                                                   
897 Ibid, Article 8.21.3. 
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1.4.3 Judicial Review of Investment Awards  
If such agreement would be concluded within exclusive competence, it means that in 
relation to an investor state arbitration, the EU and not individual Member States would 
function as the respondent.901  
In circumstances where an FTA would be concluded as a mixed agreement, it would also 
be possible that the Member States act as respondents. However, this only applies for certain 
demands as provided in Article 2(1) TFEU. The EU would in these circumstances act as 
respondent in exclusive matters. If, nevertheless, an investment tribunal was to carry out such 
an assessment, it would lead to engaging in interpreting primary EU law, since the respondents’ 
status is governed by the principle of sincere cooperation,902 and the financial responsibility is, 
in this regard, seen as an expression of that principle.903 It is not only the Member States that 
can act as respondents to investment disputes, the Regulation also provides that the European 
Commission has substantial powers to assume the respondent status, following a ‘(…) full and 
balanced factual analysis and legal reasoning.’904 The regulation follows internal allocation of 
competence.905 The Commission, however, remains the authority to intervene in cases where 
the EU’s interests are at stake, even when the disputed treatment is afforded by the Member 
State.906 
In this regard, the regulation gives the power to the Commission to intervene and serve 
as a gateway to a single-respondent system. It differs from the EU’s representation in the WTO 
dispute settlement body.907 In terms of arbitration, the regulation would not be applicable; the 
investor state tribunal would therefore look at these investment agreements only for guidance. 
Essentially, investment disputes, which are brought by a Member State against a third 
country, would not include the assessment of an EU legal act. This is however not always the 
case. In the MOX Plant case,908 Ireland considered that the UK had failed in its obligation under 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in relation to protecting the 
                                                   
901 Regulation 912/2014 Establishing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals (n 
714). 
902 Article 4(3) TEU. 
903 Regulation 912/2014 Establishing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals (n 
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907 Burgstaller, ‘Dispute Settlement in EU International Investment Agreements with Third States: Three Salient Problems’ 
(n 775); European Commission, Communication Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, (n 
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marine environment, and therefore initiated proceedings in the International Arbitral 
Tribunal.909 The Commission considered the dispute to involve interpretation of the Treaty, and 
therefore, instituted infringement proceedings against Ireland on the basis of Article 344 TFEU. 
The CJEU ruled that Article 344 TFEU was applicable, and that the arbitration was considering 
matters, which concerned the interpretation and application of the Treaty.910 
This result is a restricted situation for the Member States. In fact, it clearly limits the 
Member States’ competence to settle disputes concerning the interpretation and application of 
the Treaties through arbitration. In the case of threat, the FTAs should be concluded within 
exclusive competence; Article 344 TFEU does not limit the EU’s competence. Furthermore, 
the EU Treaties do not regulate the way under which dispute settlements should be carried out 
for FTAs and investor-state arbitration. For the abovementioned reasons, Article 344 can be 
considered as a clear limit to the investment arbitration, and therefore, there should be no reason 
not to include investor-state arbitration in international investment agreements.911 
2 ICS in NGFTAs in Relation to EU Autonomy 
The principle of autonomy was developed through CJEU jurisprudence. Primarily, 
autonomy was used to refer to the internal threat to the EU in relation to its Member States; 
‘(…) the EC Treaty has the character of an autonomous constitution and, as a result, it 
constitutes the exclusive source of Community law.’912 Similarly, in the Costa case, the CJEU 
made a strong link between the principles of autonomy and the EU through stating that it is 
‘(...) an independent source of law’ that ‘(…) cannot be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions’.913 This was further developed over time, where the internal autonomy led to 
protection of the external dimension of autonomy. 
There has become a new emerged threat for the application of EU law, with the ever-
growing range of international tribunals outside the domestic legal order of any particular State. 
Such threat stems from the arbitral tribunal established in NGFTAs. The first discussions for 
the negotiations were meant to establish similar systems to the ones existing in BITs. However, 
even though they operate completely outside the EU’s institutional system, they can decide 
                                                   
909 The UK’s decision to authorize the construction and operation of a plant to make mixed oxide fuel (Mox) gave rise to 
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910 C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (n 625), paras. 125-127. 
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upon the interpretation or applicability of EU law. It was also discussed in relation to investment 
tribunals, such as the question on whether the interpretation of an investment tribunal in the 
ICSID would in fact undermine the uniformity of the EU legal order.914 
Issues of EU law have been also raised before other kinds of external court systems, such 
as the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the World Trade 
Organisation Dispute Settlement Body. There have also been issues taken up in relation to the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) administrative tribunal.  
The danger of such application or interpretation of EU law would be to affect the uniform 
application of the EU law, namely because these tribunals cannot make a preliminary reference 
to the CJEU, because they are not considered as ‘courts of Member States’ (uniform 
application).  
Moreover, it raises issues because the error in applying or interpreting EU law cannot be 
corrected, or even be attributed to any individual Member State; and for this reason, also the 
Commission cannot bring an infringement proceeding against them (responsibility). 
2.1 ISDS in Relation to EU’s Competence 
The changes stemming from the Lisbon Treaty provided a shift in the allocation of 
competence, in relation to foreign direct investment, from the Member States to the EU.915 The 
attribution of competence becomes an important question in this regard. If compared with 
traditional BITs, where there is a control that the contracting party cannot bring up the claim in 
front of investment tribunals of which the investor is not a national, in an EU multi-layered 
system, it is different since the allocation of the respondent status requires an assessment of the 
attribution of competences between the Member States and the EU.916 
The decision to include ISDS in the NGFTA is very controversial. The arguments used 
against the inclusion of ISDS are basically that it would undermine the regulatory autonomy 
and the democratic process. This is because when a private actor brings a claim against a 
regulatory initiative, it could have an effect of adversely impacting their economic interests, 
and in this way, it could in consequence be a treat to litigation, which in turn could prevent the 
policy makers to a certain extent. 
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The lawyers and arbitrators involved in the ISDS play an important role in the 
interpretation of the Treaties.917 Naturally, in certain situations, arbitral awards have been made 
in favour of the open market, and the role of the State has been reduced.918 Consequently, there 
is a need for a changed system where more transparency of arbitral proceedings should be 
introduced so that the states can reclaim ownership of international investment law, and lead to 
less impartiality of arbitrators and inconsistency of arbitral awards. This is, naturally, more 
relevant in agreements concluded with developed countries, where there is a high level of 
investment protection, because it could lead to that foreign investors bypass domestic courts 
and submit claims directly before an ad hoc arbitration tribunal. In the NGFTAs, the EU 
maintains ISDS, but makes a few changes. The reform proposal by the EU has led to enhancing 
transparency and limiting investor access to ISDS through the definition of investor.  
The EU considered that the ISDS mechanisms should be improved919 in areas concerning 
transparency in order to increase legitimacy and accountability of proceedings, making all 
documents publicly available.920 The EU also considers that improvement should be made in 
setting out rules of conduct in order to ensure that the arbitrators are independent and 
impartial.921 Furthermore, the EU is working to promote a better consistency when interpreting 
the investment provisions, where the parties should issue binding interpretations on the issues 
of law resulting from the agreements. The establishment of an appellant mechanism at the 
bilateral and multilateral levels922 has also been discussed, for example, in relation to the 
CETA,923 in order to provide a body for a more consistent interpretation of international 
investment law.924 
2.1.1 ISDS within Shared Competence 
The CJEU concluded that ISDS should be within shared competence, simply because the 
system in itself would in a way remove disputes from the national jurisdiction of the Courts of 
the Member State and would in this way threaten the sovereignty of the Member State.925  
                                                   
917 Muthucumuraswamy Sornarajah, ‘Evolution or revolution in International Investment Arbitration? The Descent into 
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Since the CJEU did not in fact consider the ISDS, one can perhaps draw the conclusion 
that the CJEU considers it to be compatible with the Treaties.926 If instead, the CJEU believed 
otherwise, it could have simply stopped the proceeding with the statement that it is incompatible 
to the Treaty and decided not to further examine the competence. In this case, the question 
posed was clearly on the competence, and not on the compatibility. The Advocate General even 
stated that  
(…) this opinion of the Court relates only to the nature of the competence of the European 
union to sign and conclude the envisaged agreement. It is entirely without prejudice to the 
question whether the content of the agreement’s provisions is compatible with EU law.927 
There is common line of rejection around many judges and German association of judges, 
who have objected the ICS. One can consider that this may be mainly because of that the 
Member State’s courts play an important role as the ‘guardians’ of the EU legal order. In fact, 
it is the Member State’s key role to care for a uniform application and interpretation of EU law 
through the mechanism of preliminary ruling procedure.928 
Even in relation to the Intra-EU bilateral investment Treaties, the ISDS is a great concern for 
the Commission. The legal service even contested the jurisdiction of the investment tribunals. 
In the Achmea case which concerned the incompatibility of intra-EU investment bilateral 
investment treaties the within the EU legal order.929  
The system of investment dispute resolution in the Achmea case served as a preferential 
alternative to the EU judicial system under Articles 19 TEU and 267 TFEU. Such inter-state 
system directed at foreign investment could in fact jeopardize the uniform and consistent 
application of the EU law within the internal market. The Achmea case produced a stop to 
such intra-EU BITs activity.  
The question has naturally occurred, whether the investment chapter in the CETA could 
amount to similar conclusions. In this case, the CJEU rejected that an arbitral tribunal 
established under an international agreement between two Member States could be considered 
part of the judicial system of the EU.930 The precise question to pose is whether the outcome 
of a case, which concerned a bilateral treaty between two Member States as contracting 
parties, can be applicable as well in relation to international investment Treaties and third 
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parties. It is important to at least highlight that there is a possibility that the CJEU may 
confirm the reasoning in its pending Opinion 1/17.931 
In this case, the Commission expressed its concern in relation to the question of 
compatibility. It states:  
There are some provisions of the Dutch-Slovak BIT that raise fundamental questions 
regarding compatibility with EU law. Most prominent among these are the provisions of 
the BIT providing for an investor-state arbitral mechanism (set out in Article. 8), and the 
provisions of the BIT providing for an inter-state arbitral mechanism (set out in Article. 
10). These provisions conflict with EU law on the exclusive competence of the EU court 
for claims which involve EU law, even for claims where EU law would only partially be 
affected. The European Commission must therefore (…) express its reservation with 
respect to the Arbitral Tribunal’s competence to arbitrate the claim brought before it by 
Eureko B.V. (See para. 193 of the Award).932 
When discussing the possible implication stemming from the Achmea judgment, it is 
important to first of all address that the ICS as provided in the CETA, and the ISDS in Achmea 
are not in fact the same, and therefore, cannot be directly compared. However, by closely 
considering the differences and similarities, it could be possible to make a fair comparison. 
The ICS, as was thoroughly explained earlier, is a modernized system of the ISDS. By 
improving the internal coherence of investment law and the independence of arbitrators, as well 
as reducing the private autonomy system within the selection process, the ICS meets higher 
rule of law standards. 
However, the reason behind the ISDS being declared incompatible with Achmea was 
because the CJEU stated that the autonomy was infringed in the Achmea judgment; such 
statement was justified by the fact that what constitutes the EU legal order is the ‘essential 
characteristics of the EU and its law’.933 
The CJEU added that the Article 8 of the BIT between the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic  
(…) is such as to call into question not only the principle of mutual trust between [EU] 
member states but also the preservation of the particular nature of the law established by 
the Treaties, ensured by the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, 
and is not therefore compatible with the principle of sincere cooperation.934 
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However, this case surrounds a BIT, where the establishment of the arbitral tribunal was 
accomplished by the Member States. This can be considered as a different situation in relation 
to the NGFTAs, simply because the BITs are essentially different from commercial arbitration 
proceedings. The BIT tribunal derives from a treaty through which the Member States agree to 
remove the jurisdiction of their own courts. This means that they also remove the jurisdiction 
from the system of judicial remedies. However, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU 
requires them to provide sufficient remedies to ensure effective legal protection in the fields 
covered by EU law.935 The NGFTAs which constitute investment arbitration is fundamentally 
different. Investment arbitration  
(…) derive[s] from a treaty by which [EU] member states agree to remove from the 
jurisdiction of their own courts, and hence from the system of judicial remedies which [EU 
law] requires them to establish in the fields covered by EU law, disputes which may 
concern the application or interpretation of EU law.936 
The autonomy of the EU legal order could only be preserved by a functional judicial 
system that is capable to ensure consistence interpretation of EU law.937 If one were to remove 
disputes from the CJEU, to adjudicate them in arbitrational courts, the whole idea of a 
functional judicial system is lost, and so the idea of preliminary ruling procedures.938 The 
arbitration mechanism was considered by the CJEU to interpret EU law, because of its objection 
that Article 8 of the BIT was incompatible with EU law.939 If, however, an arbitral tribunal 
would have to prevent interpretative decisions of EU law, there would be no concern. This was 
done in the NGFTAs by excluding that the CJEU is bound by the tribunal’s interpretations.940 
These are fundamental concerns which apply to NGFTAs, which will be shown in the CJEU’s 
pending case Opinion 1/17. 
2.1.2 ISDS Provisions not in Conflict with Article 344 TFEU 
In relation to dispute settlement between a state and an investor, Advocate General 
Wathelet answered that such procedure would not come within the scope of Article 344 TFEU. 
He made an analogy to Opinion 2/13, where the CJEU found the terms of accession to be 
incompatible with EU law; meaning that the disputes arising in this case were solely between 
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the Member States themselves, or between the Member States and the EU.941 AG Wathelet 
therefore meant that the situation with disputes between individuals and States would lead to a 
different outcome, i.e., not in contrary to Article 344 TFEU.942 
Article 344 TFEU was interpreted in the MOX Plant case as limiting the possibilities for 
the Member States to settle their disputes outside its jurisdiction.943 This reasoning has been 
considered by the majority not to be transposable to ISDS proceedings.944 Such reasoning was 
considered when the ISDS proceedings would include two EU Member States as parties. This 
reasoning has its roots in the fact that Article 344 TFEU prohibits a Member State from 
submitting to an investment tribunal ‘(…) any dispute with another Member State involving 
questions relating to the interpretation or application of the [t]reaties’. The provision is clearly 
referring to inter-state dispute and does not mention anything in regard to legal conflicts 
between Member States and private individuals, and thus, it cannot be regarded as binding 
private individuals. Since the ISDS mechanism is considered to be outside the scope of the 
CCP, one can conclude that the incorporation of the ISDS mechanism would not in itself violate 
Article 344 TFEU.945 
Moreover, considering the Treaty from a more general perspective, there is no such 
provision providing the CJEU with exclusive competence to adjudicate dispute between the 
Member State and individuals.946 Consequently, it could be considered very unlikely for the 
CJEU to consider the ISDS to be incompatible with EU law. 
Article 344 TFEU restrains only the competence of the Member States, and not the 
competence of the EU, in settling disputes outside the EU legal order. Therefore, if such 
agreements were to be concluded within EU exclusive competence, Article 344 TFEU should 
definitely not apply because of the absence of the Member States’ involvement.  
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If on the other hand, such agreements are concluded as mixed, where the Member States 
would have an active role, it may in fact amount to that an ISDS mechanism would constitute 
a violation of Article 344 TFEU. 
Keeping in mind the opinion made by the CJEU in relation to the European patent court, 
it was clear that Article 344 TFEU does not prevent Member States from creating a court for 
settling disputes between private parties. However, based on this, one cannot draw the direct 
conclusion that the same provision does not apply between a state and a private party.947 For 
this reason, it cannot be certain that an ISDS mechanism would not constitute a violation in 
relation to Article 344 TFEU.  
On the other hand, some scholars are convinced that the application of the MOX Plant 
case should apply by analogy to the ISDS. There ‘(…) is no certainty regarding the question of 
whether the reach of Article 344 TFEU is limited to disputes between Member States ‘(…) and 
could not include disputes between a Member State and an investor.948 The analogue 
application of Article 344 to investor-state disputes would be presented in the context of intra-
EU BITs. This would be by drawing up the investor-state dispute as a dispute between two 
states. This would be accomplished by arguing that it can be considered as a dispute between 
the individual investor’s home Member State and a host Member State. This is because the 
individual from the home state bringing the claim against the host state would desire to enforce 
obligation between the host state and its home state.949 In this regard, the individual approached 
could be considered transferable to the home State. The consequence here would be to provide 
the ISDS mechanism ‘(…) in an intra-EU BIT can, to the extent EU law is the subject of the 
dispute, also conflict with Article 344 of the TFEU’.950 However, since Article 344 TFEU 
applies to disputes between Member States, this situation is possible in relation to inter-EU 
disputes. If one were to consider a Member State and a third state, Article 344 should not apply, 
and consequently, in this regard, the MOX Plant case would not be transposable to ISDS. 
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2.2 Protecting the EU Autonomy 
An international agreement such as the NGFTAs may not affect the power of the CJEU, 
if it can be shown that the system in place does not provide an adverse effect on the autonomy 
of the EU legal order.951 
To preserve the autonomy, it is necessary that there is a procedure ensuring uniform 
interpretation of the rules of international agreements. However, when resolving disputes, it 
must not have the effect of binding the EU and its institutions to a particular interpretation of 
EU law, where such interpretation would apply in their exercise of internal powers in the EU.952 
Concluded international agreements become integral parts of the EU legal order according to 
Article 216(2) TFEU.953 International agreements are subordinated to the Treaty, but are 
considered to be higher in rank than the secondary EU law according to hierarchy of EU 
norms.954 
In this regard, decisions and interpretations of international courts and tribunals would 
affect secondary EU law to the same extent as the international agreement in question.955 
However, such interpretation could not affect the interpretation of primary EU law.956 
For example, a decision by such international judicial body, which enters the EU legal 
order at the same level as the agreement, would require a consistent interpretation of secondary 
EU law, but not of the Treaties.957 
The European Court of Justice is the guardian for making sure that the principle of 
conferral is respected through the action for annulment or the preliminary ruling concerning the 
validity of the acts of the institutions. 
In the Van Gend en Loos judgment, the CJEU declared that Member States ‘(...) have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limits fields’. This relates to establishing the 
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957 Schmalenbach, ‘Struggle for Exclusiveness: The ECJ and Competing International Tribunals’(n 956), pp. 1048-1049. 
  -183- 
character of the former European Community as a new legal order of international law on the 
basis of autonomy, and the principles of primacy and direct effect. 
2.2.1 External Interference with the Internal Division of Powers 
The EU’s main concern in relation to the question of the allocation of international 
responsibility between the EU and the Member State appears to be the potential external 
interference in the EU’s internal division of powers. The CJEU emphasised its concern in 
relation to the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, where the Court 
permitted the Court of Human Rights to decide on the question of responsibility; in other words, 
to decide on whether the EU or its Member States were considered responsible for an act or 
omission that violated the European Convention on human rights. The CJEU decided that this 
would amount to ‘(…) adversely affecting the division of powers between the EU and its 
Member States’.  
The Energy Charter is another example where the division of responsibility was at 
question. The Energy Charter together with the statement by the EU at the time of its 
ratification, simply provided that the investor needs to seek clarification from the EU on whom 
to challenge. An international investment treaty, which has been concluded as a mixed 
agreement, could not just simply eliminate the potential of risk in interference in the division 
of responsibility. In the Energy Charter, the investor is further given the possibility to initiate 
the proceedings against both the EU and its Member States. In this regard, by deciding over 
who must bear the responsibility between the EU and its Member State, there may be a risk that 
the investment tribunal is in fact interfering with the internal division of powers between the 
EU and its Member State. 
In relation to the CETA, where the provision has left it to the EU to take a decision as to 
who will act as the respondent, it appears that such a risk is greatly weakened. Leaving the EU 
to make such a decision would consequently permit it to foster a competence-based approach 
to the problem of allocating international responsibility. In other words, this would lead to that 
in cases in which the contested measures were taken by the Member States for the purpose of 
implementing EU acts, the EU has to accept bearing the responsibility. However, it seems that 
there is no possibility under the CETA to have a joint or several responsibilities of the EU and 
its Member States. 
2.2.2 Powers of EU Institutions  
In relation to the EU accommodating to it international commitments there is still the 
need to attempts to conceptualize the position of the CJEU’s superiors character on deciding on 
EU law issues in relation to the Member State domestic court system through a theoretical 
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concept of constitutionalism.958 It has, however been criticized, and some researchers mean that 
the focus should instead be put on the foundations of the institutional aspect of the autonomy 
of the EU.959 
The essential character of the powers of the EU and its institutions would not be possible 
to change through an international agreement.960 It remains the Court’s exclusive task to review 
the legality of the acts of the EU’s institution, which is why the agreement or interpretation 
made of the agreement may not interfere with such task. 961 It is in particular relevant in relation 
to when an agreement would confer powers on the Court or the Commission, in relation to 
contracting parties, which are not the EU Member States.962 
In this regard, it would be considered ‘unacceptable’ that such court would deliver 
preliminary rulings, which are ‘(…) purely advisory and without any binding effects.’ Mainly 
because this would ‘(…) change the nature of the function of the Court of Justice as it is 
conceived by the Treaty’.963 
The CETA tribunal established in the agreement has as a function to assess the 
compatibility between the provisions laid down in the investment agreements, and the legal acts 
of the EU and its Member States. According to Article 8.41, the awards given by the tribunal 
shall be binding on the parties to the dispute. The EU is bound by the international agreement 
it has concluded according to Article 216(2) TFEU.964 Since international commitments prevail 
over EU secondary law, it naturally means that a decision taken by the tribunal would have to 
be implemented by the EU even though it would be contrary to EU secondary law. This could 
in turn alter the essential character of the powers of the EU’s institutions. To confer power on 
an international body to assess whether the EU has respected its commitments under an 
international agreement is not in itself contrary to EU law. For example, there are external 
bodies which do not form part of the EU.965 Examples hereto is the Court of Justice of the 
European Free Trade Association States which is more commonly known as the EFTA Court 
(EFTAct) and the EPCt.966 Another example that is more directly applicable to the ICS is the 
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WTO dispute settlement body. The EU is a member of the WTO, and is therefore required to 
respect its commitments, which include respecting the decisions taken by the dispute settlement 
body. Looking at this from a more general perspective, it is possible to see that such mechanism 
would in fact infringe the institutional principle or even lead to an alteration of the powers of 
the EU’s institutions. 
The CETA tribunal would operate in a comparable manner. It would, in a similar way to 
the dispute settlement body, also assess the compatibility of EU acts in light of the relevant 
international agreement. In the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, the EU may even in certain 
situations be under the obligation to modify its law to accommodate to a third country.  
The CETA would not have direct effect.967 If one were to consider an international review 
of the EU’s action, such as the one in the WTO, as incompatible with the EU Treaties, it would 
mean that the EU could not agree to participate in any dispute resolution mechanism in its 
international relation, which in turn would leave the EU outside the global trading system.  
However, it can still be questioned whether the investment protection mechanism would 
affect the legislative and regulatory powers of the EU’s institution and Member States.  
The jurisdiction of the CETA tribunal is only competent to decide whether there has been 
a breach of the provisions of section C concerning non-discrimination, and section D 
concerning in particular FET, and the prohibition of expropriation according to Article 8.18 
CETA.968 Moreover, the Tribunal may only award monetary damages, as provided in Article 
8.39.969 The EU or its Member States would be able to maintain any measure even though the 
tribunal considers it contrary to the investment protection principles in the agreement. The 
award would only be binding in the case at hand, and therefore, would not have erga omnes 
effects.970 
It could, nevertheless, be argued that because of the financial award, the EU legislature 
and regulatory authorities might consider themselves constrained, and therefore accommodate 
to the decisions taken by the tribunal anyway. However, this would presuppose that the 
competent institution itself decides not to regulate due to the fear of a financial award, even 
though this cannot be considered as a formal interference between the division of competence 
of EU’s institutions. From this argumentation, it would not be possible to deduct that the 
investment protection would be incompatible with EU law. However, the financial award could 
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lead to pursuing legitimate policy objectives in line with domestic law, which in turn may affect 
the powers of EU’s institutions.  
As provided in Article 8.9 of CETA,971 the right to regulate in order to achieve legitimate 
policy objectives, and ‘(…) the mere fact that a Party regulates (…) in a manner which 
negatively affects an investment or interferes with an investor’s expectations, including its 
expectations of profits does not amount to a breach of an obligation’. 
The Investment Chapter in the CETA imposes high thresholds for establishing the 
violation: Article 8.10972 on fair and equitable treatment (‘fundamental breach of due process’, 
‘manifest arbitrariness’), and Annex 8-A concerning the interpretation of the concept of indirect 
expropriation (‘manifest/y excessive measures’).973 
The CETA Joint Committee adopts interpretations of investment protection provisions, 
which would be binding on the Tribunal in future cases as provided in Article 8.31.974 This 
could amount to a serious concern. The provisions could be applied to remedy interpretations 
of investment protection standards that do not respect the parties’ shared understandings of their 
meaning. 
A regular review of the obligations by the parties is provided in Article 8.10975 with 
respect to the fair and equitable treatment standard. However, this review is limited to remedial 
powers to compensation. It remains for the parties to agree on interpretations of investment 
protection in relation to the limitation of the express provision on the right to regulate, and the 
restrictive wording of investment protection standards. In accordance with the European 
Parliament’s legal assessment, it could be viewed that the envisaged investment protection 
mechanism cannot be considered the essential character of the powers of EU’s institutions, 
because the risk of a deferent effect is not present.976 
2.2.3 Uniform Application of EU Law  
It is possible to consider autonomy in the sense of the integrity of the EU Treaty in order 
to ensure its effective implementation in the Member States.977 The EU’s character is 
considered sui generis, since it has become ‘(…) increasingly artificial to describe the legal 
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structure and processes of the Community with the vocabulary of international law (…)’.978 
The increasing engagement in international fora has triggered questions regarding legal and 
institutional relationship of the EU with international law.979 
Autonomy was first mentioned as a principle in the early 1990s, confirming that earlier 
cases had implicitly referred to it as a constitutional principle.980  
The base for the development of an autonomous EU legal order was initially laid down 
by the CJEU through introducing a constitutional value for the relationship between the EU and 
its Member States.981 The relationship between the EU legal order and international law was 
redefined982 by differentiating the two orders proposing that the Treaty ‘(…) is more than an 
agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states.’983 The 
Treaty should therefore rather be defined as ‘(…) a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields 
(…)’.984 In this regard, the EU law was considered to be a legal order distinct from the Member 
States’ legal order, and in this sense, autonomous. Autonomy in this regard refers to the extent 
to which organisations are being independent actors on their own right on the international 
plane, and also to the development of the legal order to be ‘impermeable’ to external influences. 
In other words, ‘[a]utonomy as institutional independence is also what gives the organization 
the possibility of acting as an independent member of the international community.’985 
In the Costa v. E.N.E.L case, the concept of autonomy was considered in regard to the 
relationship between the EU and the Member States’ national law.986 This case can be 
considered to have marked a turning point, since the ‘new legal order’ of international law 
phrasing from Van Gend en Loos changed into the EU legal order. 
The EU legal order was clearly separated from international law and considered entirely 
different. The EU law is applied through national law because of its supranational source, 
whereas international law is applied through an act of a state which makes the international law 
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applicable.987 ‘By contrast with ordinary international Treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its 
own legal system, which (…) became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States 
(…).’988 
The cases of Van Gend en Loos and Costa were in relation to the establishment of the 
internal market and provided an image of an autonomous EU legal order in existence of 
independent external legal processes; not only domestically, but also in relation to international 
law.989 
At the time of the EEC Treaty, the EEC Treaty itself was considered an international 
agreement, and should for this reason, be applied in accordance with the principles of 
international law. However, each Member State having significantly diverging domestic 
regulations on the effect and applicability of international agreement led to the limiting of the 
effectiveness of the Treaty, which was necessary for a full establishment of the internal 
market.990 
2.2.4 Allocation of Power to the EU Unaltered 
The principle of autonomy has, according to the CJEU, also been understood to comprise 
the allocation of powers between the EU and its Member States, in the way that is should 
prohibit institutional arrangement that would allow external bodies to delineate the competence 
of the EU from those of the Member States.991 
It is of essence that the allocation of powers between the EU and its Member States 
remains unaltered.992 In certain situations, it can become more difficult. For instance, an 
international court is competent to determine who will be the responsible contracting party, the 
respondent in a proceeding, the EU or the Member States. However, such determination made 
by an international tribunal would be likely to have an impact on the allocation of competences 
between the EU and its Member States according to the CJEU in Opinion 1/91. This would in 
turn result in being incompatible with the autonomy of the EU legal order.993 
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In Opinion 2/13, the European Court of Human Rights had the arrangement to determine 
the respondent in its proceedings, and this was considered to affect the competence, and thus 
was regarded as incompatible with the Treaties.994 
However, the CETA has tried to avoid such issues as in Opinion 2/13, in the way that it 
will rather be an EU’s institution to determine the respondent in a procedure, and not a judicial 
body acting outside the EU’s institutional framework. The CETA provides in Article 8.21995 
that it is the EU which is competent to determine whether the EU or a Member State should act 
as the respondent in a process. The EU’s decision on the determination of the respondent should 
then be binding on the tribunal. As provided in the provision, there is no further precision in 
regard of which institution of the EU should function as the competent to determine the 
respondent. The reason hereto is basically that the international agreement may in principle not 
interfere with the allocation of competences within the EU in regard to the procedure as well 
as the criteria for the determination of the respondent in investment disputes under international 
agreements according to the EU Regulation (EU) No 912/2014 establishing a framework for 
managing financial responsibility.996 
In this aspect, it can be concluded that in relation to the delineation of competences, the 
CETA’s Investment Chapter respects the autonomy requirements under EU law.997  
2.3 International Courts’ and Tribunals’ Limits of Interpreting the EU 
External autonomy can be seen from two different angles. On the one hand, the EU 
functions as a self-referential system, where it is independent of international law. The CJEU 
claims that the autonomous order is to effectively exclude international law from having an 
impact on the interpretation and application of EU law within the respective domestic legal 
orders of the Member States.998 On the other hand, the EU autonomy functions through the 
protection of institutional structures and prerogatives, where the CJEU’s attempts are to extend 
the concept of autonomy, in order to further include international regimes into the institutional 
framework. 
The concept of autonomy has developed over time not just to be present vis-à-vis the 
Member States, but also between the EU law and the public international law. The autonomy, 
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in relation to both the national and international law, is guarded by the CJEU, which pursuant 
to Article 19(1) TEU, is granted binding jurisdiction to interpret and apply EU law.999 
2.3.1 Comparison the ICS to Other External Court Systems 
There is a very fine line between an investment tribunal that deals with the clauses in the 
FTAs, and an investment tribunal that applies and interprets EU law.1000 For further analysis of 
such, it is necessary to distinguish the different systems for arbitration, and the way they 
function. 
2.3.1.1 Comparison to the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement 
In relation to the EEA agreement, the CJEU noted that in circumstances, where a system 
of courts is included in an international agreement, also in relation to dispute settlement between 
the contracting parties, decision stemming from such courts will be binding on the EU insofar 
as the agreement is an integral part of the EU law.1001 This was not, however, the case for the 
EEA agreement, since the agreement was written in such a way that it was identical to the 
wordings of the EU provisions, including rules that govern secondary legislation in relation to 
internal rules on economic and trading relations, and fundamental provisions of the EU legal 
order.1002 It naturally means that in circumstances, where the CJEU retains its interpretive 
privilege, the interpretation of EU law will lead to an incompatibility of the international 
agreement with the principle of autonomy. To view the exact impact, Opinion 1/09 should be 
considered.1003 This case concerned the CJEU’s assessment of the EPCt in the light of its 
conformity with the Treaty, where the focus remained on the institutional implications rather 
than the EPCt’s jurisdiction to deliver binding interpretations on EU legislation. The CJEU 
considered it essential to replace domestic courts in the task of interpreting and applying EU 
patents law, holding that it ‘(…) would deprive those courts of their task, as ‘ordinary’ courts 
within the European Union legal order, to implement European Union law and, thereby, of the 
power provided for in Article 267 TFEU.’1004 
In Opinion 1/91, the court concluded that the draft agreement, which meant to establish 
the EEA aiming for the Member States of the EEA to fully participate in the internal market 
without EU’s membership,1005 would be ‘(…) likely to adversely affect (…) the autonomy of 
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the [EU] legal order (…)’.1006 The matter of establishing international courts and tribunals under 
EU agreements is developed through the restrictive opinions of the CJEU.1007 The EEA 
agreement tried to reproduce provisions from the internal market, establishing an independent 
judicial body, the EEA court, to interpret the EEA agreement in case of disputes. In this regard, 
the EEA court was essentially interpreting the provisions of the EEA agreement, which were 
identical to the ones in the EU Treaty provisions. The CJEU argued that such interpretation 
would restrain the CJEU in the interpretation and application of the Treaty internally, affecting 
the uniformity of both, the EEA court and the CJEU, separately.1008 However, after the 
modification, EFTAct was considered compatible with EU law while interpreting the EEA 
agreement in Opinion 1/92.1009 
From a legal point of view, the EU would not have to be bound by any interpretation of 
the EFTAct, however, the fact that there would not be a homogenous interpretation made the 
CJEU reject the EEA draft agreement. After revising the agreement,1010 it was decided to 
establish the EFTAct jurisdiction of which covered the limited territory of EEA’s countries with 
the possibility to make preliminary ruling by binding nature to the CJEU for interpretation.1011 
The principle of autonomy applies as a principle to internal matters where the domestic 
courts are required to interpret and apply EU law in national courts. Similarly, the principle 
applies in relation to the external application, where international courts and tribunals are 
precluded from exercising any activity to interpret EU law.1012 
Opinion 1/91 demonstrates the CJEU’s attempts to protect the integrity of the EU law 
externally. By referring to its own judicial prerogatives under the Treaty, it hinted at a more 
institutional dimension of the autonomy principles.1013 
The principle of autonomy has been largely developed1014 since Opinion 1/00.1015 The 
European Common Aviation Area aimed at extending the air transport of the EU’s internal 
market, by also including the EFTA countries, in addition to some Central and Eastern 
European states. The draft agreement was inspired by the EEA; however, instead of having an 
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independent judicial body, a joint committee was established to overlook the interpretation and 
application of the agreement by national authorities and domestic courts.1016 This Opinion 
systematically developed the principle of autonomy, by providing a clear and precise definition 
of the different elements. 
In this regard, there are certain limitations for an international court or tribunal to conform 
to the principles of autonomy. Opinion 2/13 concerns the EU’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights pursuant to the Accession Agreement. The case discusses the 
principles of primacy and autonomy in relation to the Accession Agreement.1017 The opinion 
demonstrates the relationship between EU law and international law, and between the CJEU 
and other international courts and tribunals. The CJEU argued, viewing the case from a 
pluralistic viewpoint,1018 that the EU is an autonomous legal regime that exists independently 
of international law.1019 
Contrary to the EU’s commitment reflected in the Treaties,1020 in certain situations, the 
CJEU manifests limits to EU’s development as an international actor. The draft agreement on 
the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights was in fact ‘(…) liable 
adversely to affect the specific characteristics of EU law and its autonomy.’1021 
2.3.1.2 Comparison to the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
It is important to first highlight the difference between the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, and the ISDS mechanism. In the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, there are no 
possibilities for an individual complaint mechanism for private individuals.1022 Moreover, there 
is a clear room for diplomatic negotiation in situation where a violation of the WTO 
commitments has been established.1023 The reports by the WTO appellate body are fully binding 
to all WTO members to implement, however, the CJEU has clearly denied them direct effect 
under EU law.  
This leads to the conclusion that neither WTO law, nor the decisions of the WTO 
Appellate Body can be enforced through EU law. One could suggest that the clear difference 
                                                   
1016 Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community: Legal Reasoning and Legal dDscourses (n 1007), p. 86. 
1017 2/13, Opinion on Accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (n 449). 
1018 Because of the emphasis on a separation rather than an integration; it is possible to conclude that the CJEU would argue 
for more of a dualistic coexistence. 
1019 Gráinne de Búrca, 'The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi' (2010) 51 Harvard 
International Law Journal 1, The same rhetoric by the CJEU is to be found also in the case of Kadi, Joined Cases C-402/05 P 
and C-415/05 P, Kadi (n 427). 
1020 Article 21, TEU. 
1021 2/13, Opinion on Accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (n 449), para. 200. 
1022 European Parliament Legal Service ‘Legal Opinion: Compatibility with the Treaties of Investment Dispute Settlement 
Provisions in EU Trade Agreements’ (n 976), para. 13 and 1/94, Opinion on World Trade Organization Agreement (n 27). 
1023 Steffen Hindelang, 'Repellent Forces: The CJEU and Investor-State Dispute Settlement' (2015) 53 Archiv des 
Völkerrechts 68, p. 80. 
  -193- 
between the WTO and the ICS is that the investment arbitration system will have a somewhat 
stronger enforcement mechanism.1024 In the ICS, the respondent Member State must enforce 
awards delivered by the investor-state body.1025 
It can be concluded that in fact, in many instances, the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism has indeed examined EU law or EU instruments. The EU can protect itself from 
such scrutiny through a denial of direct effect.  
2.3.1.3 Comparison to the EU Adhesion to the ECHR 
The ISDS’s spillover effect can be considered to be overstated. It could rather be 
considered that the ‘spillover effects’ arising from ISDS are similar to those flowing from the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and from any other dispute settlement mechanism.1026 
However, if one considers the very nature of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism that are very different in its substance. 
The ECtHR it is not at all an institution, which is exclusively established in order to 
protect the right of investors.1027 The ECtHR should instead serve to protect all rights and duties. 
The possibility of accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) is provided through Article 6(2) TEU together with protocol 8, which states that the 
accession has to preserve the specific characteristics of the EU legal order. These two articles 
can be considered to be the result of Opinion 2/94.1028 
There is an elaborated system, in which the ECtHR refers questions on the interpretation 
of EU law to the CJEU, as established in the Accession Agreement. This system looks similar 
to a preliminary ruling procedure and will similarly in this way preserve the autonomy of the 
EU legal order. The proposed agreement was rejected by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13.1029 The 
CJEU stated that the exclusive nature of the procedure for settling those disputes, in relation to 
the jurisdiction of the CJEU, should preclude any prior of subsequent external control.1030 
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A similar system was intended for the dispute settlement tribunals in the NGFTAs, giving 
the court a possibility to send questions in relation to the interpretation of EU law.1031 However, 
as was the result of Opinion 2/13, such system would not be considered sufficient for the CJEU 
to guarantee the preservation of the specific characteristics of the European legal order. 
Moreover, since these are two different contexts, it might be the case that they cannot be 
compared. It can be argued for sure that Opinion 2/13 at least shows the CJEU’s reluctance to 
external court systems, and its determination to protect the autonomy of the EU legal order. 
2.3.2 Direct effect of the NGFTAs 
The CJEU has established certain conditions of when to conclude that a provisions of a 
free trade agreement, accession or development association agreement have direct effect.1032 
Such provisions should be regarded directly effective when the provision contains a clear and 
precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of 
any subsequent measure.1033 
The CJEU, opts in general for direct applicable international agreements, in 
circumstance where the nature and the broad logic of the nature of the agreement would not 
preclude it.1034 In this regard, the purpose of the agreement, the will of the parties and also 
the question of reciprocity should be considered.  
In the recent trade agreements concluded post-2008, direct effect has been expressly 
precluded from the agreement, which means that the agreement cannot apply in domestic EU 
and Member State legal order.1035  
In other words, by expressly including such, the will of the parties was not to include 
direct effect. To include direct effect in this type of agreements could in itself be considered 
problematic. This is because if such agreement would be considered to have direct effect 
automatically, Korean operators, i.e. those providing goods or services to the EU, would be put 
in a better position compared to EU’s operators or operators from other countries which do not 
trade with goods or services linked to the KOREU agreement. The proposition was given by 
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the Commission and it was ultimately accepted by the Council that decided that the agreement 
should not provide direct effect.1036 It would moreover mean that individuals would have the 
possibility to invoke the provision of the agreement before either EU courts or domestic courts 
of the Member States. Such provision allowing for direct effect could therefore allow both the 
CJEU and the domestic court to correct supranational legislation.  
However, it does not preclude that the provision that the provisions which are based on 
the WTO could, in relation to their link to the WTO may be directive effective in this regard 
the nature and the structure of the WTO agreement should be considered together with the 
whether the provision is considered ‘clear precis and conditional”.1037 
2.3.3 Indirect Effect 
However, the NGFTAs may also have an indirect effect on the EU. The indirect effect 
stems from a way of consistent interpretation doctrine.1038 This interpretive principle is based 
on the interpretation of EU law in domestic courts where the primacy of EU agreements over 
EU secondary legislation, meant that EU’s secondary legislation should as far as possible be 
interpreted consistently.1039 This logic is close to the logic within domestic courts dealing with 
international obligations, where such international obligation is to shape the interpretation of 
inferior norms in order to avoid to breach international obligation to evade international 
responsibility.1040 However, this approach is limited, specifically when there is a clear conflict 
between the domestic measures and the international agreement. 
International agreements are seen as an integral part of the EU legal order. It is considered 
to be above and primary to provision of EU’s secondary legislation and also Member States’ 
national law. This naturally results in that ‘(…) such provisions must, so far as possible, be 
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements.’1041 Since a lot of agreements 
have direct effect, the consistent interpretation is not often applied.1042 
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However, in relation to the NGFTAs, it may be an extremely useful instrument, in order 
to guard a better unity when applying the agreements. The CJEU has certain situations in which 
it was required to interpret the provisions in conformity with WTO.1043 With this line of 
reasoning, it seems possible to conclude that the NGFTAs, as international agreements, can 
lead to that EU’s secondary and national law will be subject to interpretation. This interpretation 
would then naturally be in conformity with the NGFTAs. However, the indirect effect is not a 
complete substitute to direct effect.1044 
Consequently, the effect from this type of agreements may affect also other actors at the 
domestic level, who have to comply with the obligations assumed under the agreements and 
are not necessarily limited to their legal effect. This becomes important, specifically in relation 
investor-state arbitration, where non-compliance to the agreement can mean expensive 
violations.1045 
2.4 ICS Procedure and Compatibility with EU Law Autonomy 
The question in relation to the EU’s competence on whether the ISDS mechanism is 
compatible with the protection offered by the CJEU will be closely examined in this section. 
Firstly, this section will examine the ISDS provisions by considering whether they could alter 
the sui generis nature of the EU legal order, whether the MOX Plant case-law could in fact be 
transposable to the issue of the ISDS, and whether Article 344 TFEU can constitute certain 
limitations in this regard. Secondly, it will consider the autonomy of the EU in relation to the 
ISDS. 
The CJEU has always accepted the WTO dispute settlement. The Court’s reaction has 
thus been different in relation to the ECtHR. The Commission argues that the EU is already 
subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and is negotiation the ECHR accession. For 
this reason, the ISDS should be compatible with EU law. When regarding the compatibility of 
the ICS, it is not possible to use the two examples as clear-cut evidence of that the ISDS 
mechanism would be in line with EU law. However, these examples can instead make us better 
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understand the mechanism and view a clear picture of what could be the issues of the ICS and 
ISDS. This section will provide more of a profound analytical discussion on the CJEU’s 
reactions to external court system. 
More importantly is the autonomy of the EU legal order. In fact, as the Trade 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström recognized, the principle of autonomy can be considered a 
real limitation in the EU’s approach to investment protection. In fact, it would not be the 
conferral jurisdiction on a court or a tribunal in itself that would cause the issue with autonomy 
but rather the potential ‘spillover effects’ that a decision by such court or tribunal would later 
generate.1046 To move investment arbitration from ad hoc arbitration to an investment court 
could clearly facilitate investment arbitration.1047 
The compatibility of ISDS proceedings should be considered in relation to the EU’s 
institutions and bodies. The question of compatibility was put forward in the legal opinion of 
the European parliament.1048  
The CJEU’s interpretation of the principle of autonomy of the CJEU in Opinion 1/09, 
does not leave much space for an ISDS mechanism. In the CETA and EUSFTA, the ISDS is 
put to only apply the agreement and other rules and principles of international law applicable 
between the parties to the agreements. In this way, it would exclude domestic law that means 
both, the EU law and Member States domestic law.1049  
As provided in the TTIP: 
 (…) for greater certainty, (…) the domestic law of the Parties shall not be part of the 
applicable law. Where the tribunal is required to ascertain the meaning of a provision of 
the domestic law of one of the Parties as a matter of fact, it shall follow the prevailing 
interpretation of that provision made by the courts or authorities of that Party.1050 
As this provision clarifies, it is up to the contracting parties to make the interpretation of 
their domestic law, and that only such interpretation will be considered in the tribunal. 
However, it should be excluded that there may be an adverse spillover effects to a decision 
made from an investor-state tribunal.1051 
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The ISDS mechanism may as we have seen have spillover effects on EU law. The 
possibility to overcome such would be to limit remedies that foreign investors are exposed to. 
The CJEU needs to contain their competence and remain ‘(…) competent to determine – de 
iure and de facto – the legality of the acts of EU institutions under EU law as required in Opinion 
1/00’.1052 The consequence could, however, be that the protection of foreign investors would 
be undermined. 
2.4.1 The Effect of Arbitration Procedures on EU Autonomy 
The EU’s future investment agreements, such as the NGFTAs, demonstrate that the 
judicial activity of investor-state tribunals is similar to an adjudicative review of EU’s legal acts 
vis-à-vis the investment agreement. 
One could reason that the principle of autonomy has developed into a de facto protection 
of the Court’s own judicial prerogatives at the cost of creating an obstruction to the EU’s 
development as an international actor.1053 The fact that such activity is similar would result in 
that the CJEU is restrained in its task to interpret the EU secondary law in the context of EU’s 
agreements. It can affect the essential characteristics of EU law consisting of the principle of 
autonomy, since the investment tribunals would engage in a judicial activity, which is reserved 
to the CJEU under the Treaty. 
The interpretation of the principle of autonomy by the CJEU could pose a problem in 
itself for EU’s further international development if the recent trends provide so. The fact that 
the EU should fulfil its international obligation is also important from a political perspective.1054 
Whether such political perspective, that international trade and investment agreements 
represent, will be sustainable remains to be seen.1055 In fact, there is a need for the CJEU to 
overlook the interpretation and application of the principle of autonomy.1056 
Both agreements, the EEA1057 and ECAA,1058 concern more or less literal reproductions 
of EU Treaty provisions. The EPCt was explicitly charged with the competence to interpret and 
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apply EU patents law. Another example is the EU Accession Agreement, where the legal 
provision in relation to the ECHR was not only provided by EU Treaties, but also developed in 
the protocol of the TFEU.  
Such cases, however, do not limit the application of the principle of autonomy to 
international courts and tribunal.1059 In this sense, the CJEU is regarding the cases more from a 
constitutional perspective. Instead of concentrating on the protection of the EU integrity, it 
focuses on the autonomy of the EU, and the protection of institutional prerogatives. 
Since Opinion 1/00, the CJEU employed the aspects of safeguarding the allocation of 
competence as an umbrella term for the application of the principle of autonomy.1060 Opinion 
1/09 is based on the institutional dimension of autonomy, protecting the powers of the CJEU to 
provide interpretations of EU law by virtue of having recourse to the role of domestic courts.1061 
Furthermore, it suggests that as long as its judicial activity circumvents ‘judicial dialogue’ 
between domestic courts and the CJEU, the principles do not presuppose that an internal court 
or tribunal is given an express mandate to interpret and apply EU law.1062 In this regard, other 
courts or tribunals cannot transfer the jurisdiction from the CJEU to review EU law for the 
purpose of interpreting provisions of international agreements; particularly not in relation to 
areas that are covered by the EU’s exclusive competence. In Opinion 2/13, the CJEU clarified 
that the ECtHR cannot view whether the EU law is consistent with the ECHR, because this 
would breach the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret EU law.1063 
In this case, it is clear that the principle of autonomy is imperative when it comes to 
assessing the compatibility between the ISDS provisions in EU investment agreements. In fact, 
the activity of investment tribunals is more akin to international judicial review than it is to 
private arbitration, since it considers that the investor-state tribunal’s core task under EU 
investment agreements is to determine the compatibility of EU’s legal acts with international 
standards of investment protection. Given the wide interpretation that the CJEU uses in its 
argumentation, the important aspect to look at is whether the ISDS provisions may actually 
affect the principle of autonomy, and the essential characteristics of powers conferred upon the 
Court under the Treaties.1064 
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As the principle of autonomy was primarily used to refer to internal threats to the EU in 
relation to its Member States, however, should be considered also in relation to external 
interferences to EU law. The conditions for safeguarding the EU autonomy, three conditions 
have been identified through case-law.1065 Firstly, the EU and its Member States should not be 
bound by a particular interpretation of EU rules referred to in such agreements. It should 
secondly not be possible to alter the power between the EU and its Member States. The third 
condition establishing the essential character of the powers of the EU’s institutions should also 
remain unaltered.1066 
Not to bind the EU and its Member States by a particular interpretation of rules, referred 
to in an agreement, is something considered as ‘particularly important’ for the CJEU.1067  
The CJEU has an important position to safeguard, and not to alter the allocation of power 
to the EU and its Member States and the essential character of the EU’s institutions.1068 
International courts or tribunals cannot bind the EU and its institutions, if they make 
interpretation of EU law.1069 Decisions given by international courts and tribunal should also 
not affect the essential characteristics of powers that are conferred by the Treaties upon EU’s 
institutions.1070 This includes both the interpretation of the allocation of competence between 
the EU and its Member States, as well as the requirement not to alter the essential characteristics 
of powers allocated to the institutions under the Treaty. The question on how it would be 
possible for the interpretation of an external judicial body to bind the CJEU is not easily 
conceivable. In order to be able to make such an assessment, the attention must first be given 
to the institutional structure of a court or tribunal in the NGFTAs. 
2.4.1.1 ICS Composition Threatening Recognition and Enforcement of its Decisions 
Both, the EUVFTA and CETA, refer to the New York Convention in relation to the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. However, the actual composition of the ICS 
can in fact directly threaten the recognition and enforcement of its decisions in the sense that it 
is more of a judicial composition than an arbitral composition, which in turn would make it fall 
outside the scope of the Convention.1071 
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In fact, in order to guarantee their independence and availability on short notice, the 
arbitral members of both the tribunal and the appeal tribunals are compensated financially 
through their ‘retainer fee’. In this regard, the EUVFTA and CETA will determine the 
remuneration of the judges at a later stage.1072 
The TTIP proposal departs from these solutions by a retainer fee of 2000 Euro for judges 
of the tribunal, and 7000 Euro for members of the appeals tribunal.1073 In line with Regulation 
14, para. 1, Administrative and Financial Regulations of the ICSID Convention, the members 
of the tribunal should be paid with a daily fee for their activity in the panels.1074 In the 
agreements, the decisions for remuneration should be determined by a decision of the 
committees. In both agreements, there are no references for any such calculation of any daily 
fees. 
In the TTIP’s proposal, the retainer fee for members of the tribunal was considered only 
to be one third of the amount provided for members of the WTO appellate Body. Regarding the 
guarantee of the independence of the members of the tribunal, there has been a lot of criticism 
against an insufficient amount. 
The relevant question is then not whether an investment tribunal could interpret the 
NGFTA, but rather whether the investment agreement per se could have issues that fall within 
the scope of EU law. 
If the investor-state tribunal is requested to determine whether the precisions of an EU 
secondary law instrument violates the investors right in regard to an investment protection 
provision established in the agreement,1075 it would naturally lead to analyse and interpret the 
applicable EU law.1076 
The arbitral tribunal considered that the arbitral award was not affected by the States 
accession to the EU, and that the States still remained responsible in their obligation under the 
BIT, ICSID Convention and the New York Convention.1077 
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The award was further challenged by the Commission,1078 and then brought in front of 
the CJEU to determine whether an arbitral award against Romania can be considered as an 
illegal State aid as supported by the Commission.1079 The question was therefore whether they 
would violate EU law if they were to comply with the arbitral award and compensate the 
damage suffered by the investor. In this sense, it would not be the arbitration itself, but rather 
the application of the arbitral award. This clearly demonstrates that the principle of autonomy 
of EU law may be violated even in circumstances where an investment tribunal strictly apply 
international law. 
There could also be the possibility that throughout the assessment of the claims brought 
by an investor, an investment tribunal may be considered to directly apply EU law. In fact, the 
investment chapter can contain applicable law clauses, which provide for treaty standards and 
encompass the law of the host State,1080 which in turn, would consequently mean that they may 
rule on EU law. As put in Opinion 1/09, the external jurisdiction should not call the CJEU’s 
exclusive task of interpreting, applying and reviewing the legality of the acts of the EU.1081 
2.4.1.2 The Procedure in the ICS  
The contradiction of an ISDS system in respect to the EU autonomy seems not to derive 
from the MOX Plant established case-law, but rather from the principle of the autonomy of the 
EU legal order. This would be the case since an arbitral tribunal established under ISDS’s 
clauses, or a tribunal of the ICS would in one way or another take part in, have the potential to 
interpret and apply EU law, or even consider international obligations which in one way or 
another involve EU law issues. Such effect of potential spillover of the interpretation and 
application of EU law could in this way alter the EU autonomy. 
In relation to the international dispute settlement mechanism, the case-law of the CJEU 
indicates both, the limits for ISDS, and also the central design features of an ISDS mechanism 
which the NGFTAs must have in order to meet the requirements established by the Court. The 
accession to the ECtHR and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism are examples that could 
not easily be echoed in international dispute settlements, and specifically in the context of ISDS, 
mainly because of the great risk of spillover effects. Moreover, it is also very possible that the 
Member States and third states involved in the NGFTA would not consider the ISDS 
mechanism as it is provided in the current state of NGFTAs as an effective mechanism. 
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Consequently, one can draw the conclusion that there are considerable obstacles to the ISDS 
within the EU legal system. 
The ISDS mechanism could only be accepted where it would not generate adverse effect 
on the EU autonomy. Incorporating the ISDS mechanism in NGFTAs could lead to an 
interference with the respective powers of the European institutions, and/or a distortion of the 
allocation of jurisdiction between the EU and its Member States.1082 
The CETA states that ‘(…) Tribunal may consider, as appropriate, the domestic law of a 
Party as a matter of fact. In doing so, the Tribunal shall follow the prevailing interpretation 
given to the domestic law by the courts or authorities of that Party’.1083 The fact that the CETA 
may consider domestic law as a matter of fact throughout its proceedings, leads us to a clear 
case of the possibility to interpret domestic law. However, ‘(…) any meaning given to domestic 
law by the Tribunal shall not be binding upon the courts or the authorities of that Party.’1084 The 
more important question to ask in this regard is whether such provision can be regarded 
sufficient in terms of an external tribunal interpreting domestic law. This section will further 
deal with this from a perspective of domestic law, since the EU in this sense is the contracting 
party.  
Considering another point of view, once an international agreement comes into force, it 
becomes regarded as an integral part of the EU law.1085 This naturally shows the difficulties in 
drawing the limits, as the domestic law of one of the parties can be considered as a matter of 
fact in the proceedings of a tribunal. 
When carefully examining the CJEU case-law, one can distinguish a shift of focus by the 
CJEU from the protection of the integrity of EU law to the protection of the EU institutions. In 
fact, the safeguarding of the allocation of competence under the Treaty plays a big role for the 
principle of autonomy, since Opinion 1/00. For example, in Opinion 1/09, the CJEU 
argumentation is based on the harmonious interpretation of EU law, but the judgment itself is 
based on the institutional dimension of autonomy, more precisely, the protection of the CJEU’s 
power of interpreting EU law. The CJEU stated that the Member States 
(…) cannot confer the jurisdiction to resolve … disputes on a court created by an 
international agreement which would deprive [national] courts of their task, as ‘ordinary’ 
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courts within the European Union legal order, to implement European Union law and, 
thereby, of the power provided for in Article 267 TFEU.1086 
The CJEU continued by acknowledging that the EU’s competence  
(…) in the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude international 
agreements necessarily entail the power to submit itself to the decisions of a court which is 
created or designated by such agreements as regards the interpretation and application of 
their provisions.1087 
Moreover, the CJEU stated that ‘(…) an international agreement with third countries may 
confer new judicial powers on the Court provided that in so doing it does not change the 
essential character of the function of the Court as conceived in the [EU Treaties].’1088 
The CJEU ended by approving that  
‘(…) an international agreement may affect its own powers that the indispensable 
conditions for safeguarding the essential character of those powers are satisfied and, 
consequently, there is no adverse effect on the autonomy of the [EU] legal order.’1089 
For these reasons, it can be concluded that the CJEU did not, in Opinion 1/09, make it 
impossible for dispute settlement mechanisms, such as investor-state arbitration in the future; 
however, only to the extent that the autonomy of the EU legal order will be maintained.1090 In 
more precise terms, in order not to set aside the autonomy of the EU legal order, it would be 
more likely that the CJEU would not accept that such investment tribunal would apply and 
interpret EU law,1091 if however these tribunal cannot be considered to be ‘courts or tribunals 
of a Member State’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.1092 
In order for the autonomy not to be neglected means that the principle of autonomy cannot 
be neglected in the sense that an international court or tribunal would circumvent ‘judicial 
dialogue’ between domestic courts and the CJEU.1093 
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Furthermore, the CJEU does not suggest that international courts or tribunals should 
transfer the jurisdiction to review EU law, particularly not in areas where the legal review 
concerns exclusive EU’s competences. Instead, the CJEU declared in Opinion 2/13 that even 
when a court would declare an incompatibility of EU law with international standards, it would 
raise issues in relation to the EU autonomy. The relevance of the EU autonomy provision is 
extremely important, specifically in regard to the compatibility of the ISDS provisions in the 
EU’s investment agreements with the EU Treaties. This is because the investor-state tribunal 
would mainly determine the compatibility of EU’s legal acts with international standards of 
investment protection. The activities of investment tribunals can be more easily compared to 
international judicial review, than to private arbitration, because of the nature of investor-state 
arbitration. The nature or power which reflects the investor-state arbitration is mainly some 
kind of sovereign power, rather than private commercial capacity of the parties. Consequently, 
when a tribunal investigates ISDS provisions, it would affect the essential characteristics 
conferred upon the CJEU. 
To provide a more practical example, an investor-state tribunal could decide that the 
reclamation for state aid granted by a Member State would violate standard rules stated in the 
NGFTA, and thereafter, award damages to the State. 
By first glance, it seems as if the EU autonomy would not be threatened since the example 
is amounting to a ‘(…) selective non-application of EU State aid law’.1094 However, the CJEU 
would still consider the autonomy of the EU legal order threatened, because an international 
dispute settlement body would have interpreted non-EU law, which in turn has a spillover effect 
on the autonomy of EU law,1095 such as in the case of Micula v. Romania.1096 In this case, the 
arbitral award had condemned Romania to compensate two Swedish investors, the Micula 
brothers.1097 The award instituted that Romania had infringed a bilateral investment treaty 
between Romania and Sweden by revoking an investment incentive scheme in 2005, four years 
prior to its scheduled expiry.1098 
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2.4.2 ICS not Addressing Constitutional EU-Law Requirement 
An investment court system, such as the one proposed in the NGFTAs, has failed to 
effectively address constitutional requirements under EU law. The investment courts, such as 
in the CETA and EUVFTA, seem to have the essential task on assessing EU law, which would 
clearly contradict the EU’s principle of autonomy. Furthermore, as a procedural prerequisite 
for the consistency of international dispute settlement mechanism with the EU treaties, there is 
a need for the CJEU to be initially involved in relation to questions concerning the interpretation 
of EU law. 
The threshold for an international investment agreement to be found compatible with EU 
law is quite high, as Opinion 1/09 and Opinion 2/13 clearly show. The CJEU can solely rule on 
the interpretation and application of the Treaties; and it is the only authority that can review the 
legality of the acts of the EU’s institutions. Through claiming such exclusive jurisdiction, the 
CJEU also automatically confirmed the autonomy, and the need for its uniform application. The 
principles of autonomy represent the very foundation of the EU legal order, providing in this 
way, the limitation between international law and its EU counterpart. This exclusive jurisdiction 
can be as established through Article 344 TFEU and Article 19 TEU. The ICS could also 
provide issues in relation to the function of the EU’s internal market, more specifically, in 
relation to issues of discrimination.1099 
In a more elaborated example, in relation to the CETA, Canadian investors could bring a 
claim on behalf of their EU’s incorporated companies. Such a company would, in this regard, 
be Canadian-owned Danish firm that could have more privilege over of a Spanish company 
which operates in Denmark. In this case, the Canadian owned Danish company would have the 
possibility to an alternative form of disputes settlement, and such option would not be available 
for the Spanish company. 
Even though one might consider some kind of exaggeration in relation to the potential 
spillover effects,1100 or even limited spillover effects,1101 the majority continues to emphasize 
that there is a great risk of incompatibility with the principle of autonomy. 
This would clearly be the case if the court or tribunal was to interpret EU law in a manner, 
which would be binding upon the EU institutions.1102 Nevertheless, this would not be the case 
if the court or tribunal solely interprets the NGFTA. However, there could remain a risk, and 
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therefore, there is a need to examine whether a court or tribunal could potentially be put in a 
position to interpret and apply EU law through interpreting certain obligations under the 
NGFTA which somehow involve EU law issues.  
2.4.3 ICS in Relation to Constitutional Principles and Fundamental Rights 
The European Economic and Social Committee stated that there are  
(…) considerable EU treaty-related and constitutional law concerns regarding the relations 
of ISDS ruling with the EU legal order. Private arbitration courts have the capacity to make 
rulings which do not comply with EU law or infringe the CFR [Charter of Fundamental 
Rights]. For this reason, the EESC considers that it is absolutely vital for compliance of 
ISDS with EU law to be checked by the CJEU in a formal procedure for requesting an 
opinion, before the competent institutions reach a decision and before the provisional entry 
into force of any IIAs, negotiated by the EC.1103 
It is important that international agreements concluded by the EU respect the 
constitutional principles of the EU, such as the foundational values referred to in Article 2 TEU. 
Article 9 TEU provides that the EU shall observe ‘(…) equality of citizens, who shall receive 
equal attention from its institutions’, and Article 18 TFEU prohibits discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality. 
The general principle of equality is a fundamental principle of EU law and ‘(…) requires 
that similar situations shall not be treated differently unless differentiation is objectively 
justified.’1104 What the CJEU has pointed out is necessary to be respected by the EU when 
concluding international agreements.1105 
Fundamental rights are part of the EU’s fundamental principles. Article 20 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights declares that ‘[e]veryone is equal before the law’. The principle of non-
discrimination in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights also needs to be considered 
when the EU concludes an international agreement. 
The question that could be raised between fundamental principles and the investment 
protection mechanism applied in the CETA, would be regarding the equality before the law, 
and the principle of non-discrimination. This would be relevant since only persons who form 
party to the agreement can submit a claim against the other party. Such legal remedy is not 
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available to domestic investors, or investors from other Member States, but only to foreign, 
third country investors who are part to the agreement. 
The principle of equal treatment provides that differing situations must not be treated in 
the same manner, unless such treatment is objectively justified. This means that not every 
situation would be treated in the same way, but each situation which can be considered 
comparable needs to be treated the same.1106 
In regard to the treatment between foreign and domestic investors, it should be recalled 
that the CETA provides that Canadian investors would be granted specific rights in the EU, 
while this would be reciprocally ensured as well in Canada, where European investors would 
be granted specific rights. As in any trade agreement, the CETA would have specific rights 
granted to persons of the other party. 
A foreign investor cannot be considered the same as a domestic investor in the sense that 
the positions of foreign investors as well as the conditions, which they are confronted with, are 
different in regard to a domestic investor. This is because investors that are investing in a 
foreign market may face more obstacles in the sense that the conditions for investing may be 
less adapted to foreign investors than to their domestic counterparts. 
Moreover, the treatment that a foreign investor might receive in the other countries where 
they are investing, concerning political, administrative or judicial authorities may be biased. 
This simply leads us to the conclusion that investors of one trading party may naturally be 
resistant to take the risk of investing in another country, because of the differences and obstacles 
they may face. 
An international agreement is there to promote mutual investments between the parties to 
a trade agreement, and at the same time, averse the potential risk of investing in a foreign 
market, which in turn would ensure legal certainty, and in this way also raise investment flows 
between the parties. In other words, the investment protection mechanism available only to 
foreign entities, such as the one in the CETA, can in fact be justified by the nature of the trade 
agreement. The conclusion can therefore be taken that foreign investors would be compatible 
with the constitutional principles of the EU, and the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Charter. 
2.5 Balance between the right of investors and host states’ right to regulate 
If the investors would be able to invoke the NGFTA’s protection standards against the 
national domestic measures, these provisions come together with direct effect, it would lead to 
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a larger chance of invoking investment arbitration domestically, although invoking 
domestically might also mean that judges are not very familiar with international investment 
law. In this regard, the domestic courts are conditioned on the CJEU and the preliminary ruling 
procedure would be a possibility and the protection for investors is enforced since the investors 
have the chance to invoke their rights before domestic courts. On the other hand, the issue of 
competent judges to interpret standards will be a question, which remains unanswered. 
These types of concerns actually led to suspending the negotiation on investment 
protection and the ISDS chapter.1107 The attempt by the TTIP’s negotiation seemed to also 
safeguard the Member States right to regulate and to limit the scope of investors’ rights in the 
reformed ISDS mechanism,1108 as was moreover proposed in the EU’s concept paper, entitled 
‘Investment in TTIP and beyond, the path for reform’.1109 
However, it has been considered that the reform has gone too far in the attempt to try to 
secure an adequate balance between the right of foreign investors and the right of Member 
States to regulate in their way to ensure the establishment of a legitimate and transparent ISDS 
mechanism.1110 
2.6 Judicial Function Reserved to the CJEU 
The judicial function of investor-state tribunal should be reserved to the CJEU, and not 
made available to EU’s investors in the internal market. The domestic courts are not involved 
once investment arbitration has commenced, and procedural frameworks provide for any means 
of judicial review of investment awards.1111 Whilst simultaneously guaranteeing uniform 
interpretation of EU law, it is essentially impossible for the EU to comply with its international 
legal obligations in the enforcement of investment awards. The fact that domestic courts are 
excluded from the investment arbitration process aggravates this issue. In Opinion 1/09, the 
domestic courts assumed responsibilities under Article 267 TFEU in their role as ordinary 
courts of the EU legal order. In fact, this mechanism of preliminary ruling presents an indirect 
control of the CJEU over the interpretation and application of EU law. In relation to investment 
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arbitration, the CJEU has neither direct nor indirect control over the interpretation of EU law 
that is carried out by investment tribunals in the process of their adjudicative review.1112  
From Opinion 2/13, one can draw the conclusion that the principle of the prior 
involvement mechanism for the CJEU has become an independent element of the principle of 
autonomy.1113 
2.6.1 The Risk of an Investment Tribunal Interpreting EU Law 
The interpretation of EU law by international tribunal, which sit outside any of the 
Member States has shown to be a new threat to the EU. The International Court of Justice, the 
European Court of Human Rights,1114 the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
Body,1115 investment treaty tribunals,1116 and even the ILO’s administrative tribunal1117 are all 
examples of international judicial bodies that had issues of EU law raised before them.  
There is no real possibility for the CJEU to ensure harmony in its decision in relation to 
EU law, and at the same time there is no principle that would enable a check of its jurisprudence.  
The tribunals are not the courts of any Member States, which means that they are not 
allowed to ask for a preliminary ruling procedure.1118 
They are not responsible for any individual Member State and cannot therefore be brought 
into an infringement proceeding by the Commission if they make mistakes in their 
interpretation.1119 This means that there is a possibility for systems such as the ICS to wrongly 
interpret EU law.1120 
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2.6.2 Possibility of Preliminary Ruling Mechanism for NGFTAs 
However, when discussing the preliminary ruling procedure, it is very important to keep 
in mind the function of investors’ possibility to challenge EU acts, and national acts which may 
involve EU law. In this regard, the ICS can be further considered as interpreting and giving 
meaning to EU law.  
An important observation is that in order for proceedings in the ICS to take place, the 
CETA does not require exhaustion of domestic remedies. For this reason, it is possible to delude 
that the risk of divergent interpretation would be lessen. Similarly, this may lead to that the 
domestic courts would keep their function of applying EU law.  
If an investor submits a claim to the tribunal in the CETA agreement according to Article 
8.22,1121 only the tribunal will adjudicate the dispute, with the exclusion of the courts of the 
EU’s Member States. 
2.6.3 Preliminary Ruling Procedure 
It is unlikely that investment agreements would include preliminary reference 
mechanisms. If such mechanisms would be binding in it, it could represent a violation of the 
principle of autonomy, due to the CJEU’s or domestic courts’ lack of involvement.1122 One has 
to keep in mind that any tribunal has the essential characteristics of powers conferred upon the 
CJEU under Articles 19 TEU and 267 TFEU. In Opinion 1/91, the CJEU considers the fact that 
the EU’s agreements cannot transfer the power to interpret the allocation of competences to 
international courts and tribunals.1123 Nevertheless, for determining the respondent to a dispute 
before the ECtHR, such assessment is inherent in the attribution of responsibility according to 
Opinion 2/13.1124 
Considering the same question in relation to the arbitration tribunals of the BITs, the intra-
BIT would provoke issues in relation to the Europeanization with subordination of intra-BIT’s 
arbitral tribunal. AG Wathelet drew a parallel between the international arbitral tribunal, and 
the Member States’ domestic courts and tribunal; meaning that they are equal. He furthermore 
argues that because they are equal arbitral tribunal, they should as well be granted the possibility 
                                                   
1121 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part, Section F, Resolution of investment disputes between investors and states, Procedural 
and other requirements for the submission of a claim to the Tribunal, Article. 8.22. 
1122 Pietro Ortolani, 'Intra-EU Arbitral Awards vis-à-vis Article 107 TFEU: State Aid Law as a Limit to Compliance.' (2015) 
6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 118, pp. 125–28; Tietje, Wackernagel, ‘Enforcement of Intra-EU ICSID 
Awards: Multilevel Governance, Investment Tribunals and the Lost Opportunity of the Micula Arbitration’ (n 31), pp. 221-
23. 
1123 1/91, Opinion on European Economic Area EEA Agreement I (n 447), paras. 34-36. 
1124 2/13, Opinion on Accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (n 449), paras. 221, 224 and 
225. 
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to request preliminary rulings from the CJEU in relation to EU law.1125 However, this is not as 
easy as it may sound, specifically in relation to the definition and conditions of what constitutes 
a domestic court defined by the CJEU, since such courts are created on the basis of international 
Treaties, and are supposed to interpret international public law. The Advocate General went 
further in his argumentation, stating that intra-EU BITs arbitral tribunal should be fully bound 
by the CJEU’s jurisprudence, applying and interpreting relevant EU law, and the part of 
international law which is an integral part of the EU. 
The counter argument is clearly that the entire idea behind dispute settlement disappears 
if there would be a possibility to make preliminary ruling procedures, since the effectiveness 
would vanish. Usually, international arbitral tribunal are not formally bound or subordinated to 
any court or tribunal; however, it is possible that they consider, or even follow the jurisprudence 
of other international courts and tribunal. This view may be possible since arbitral tribunals 
have their seat in the EU and are established under UNCITRAL arbitration rules. Nevertheless, 
the ability to apply this approach on arbitral tribunals established under ICSID rules is 
questionable. Taking this argument, a step further, in relation to the NGFTAs, which are 
following a modified version of the ICSID rules, there could be a possible solution. 
It is important to consider in this regard that Article 19(1) TEU requires that the Member 
States provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection ‘in the fields covered by 
Union law’. The principle of effective judicial protection constitutes a general principle of EU 
law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, enshrined in 
Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR, and “reaffirmed” by Article 47 of the EU Charter. 
The judicial system has a key stone in the preliminary ruling procedure in Article 267 
TFEU, through which the EU secures uniform interpretation of EU law, and ensures 
consistency and its autonomy.1126 The arbitral tribunal in Article 8 of the BIT could, through its 
mechanism for settling disputes between an investor and a Member State, prevent those 
disputes from being resolved in a manner that ensures the full effectiveness of EU law, even 
though they might concern the interpretation or application of that law.1127 
In principle, when an international agreement provides for the establishment of a court 
that is responsible for the interpretation of its provisions and will then be binding on the EU’s 
institutions including the CJEU, it would become incompatible with EU law. The competence 
of the EU and its capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entail the power to 
                                                   
1125 Opinion of Avocate General Wathelet in Judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 September 2017, Slowakische Republik v 
Achmea BV, C-284/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:699. 
1126 2/13, Opinion on Accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (n 449), para. 176; C-
284/16, Achmea (n 930), para. 37. 
1127 C-284/16, Achmea (n 930), para. 56. 
  -213- 
submit a Court that is created or designated by such agreements in regard to the interpretation 
and application of provisions. This provided that the autonomy of the EU and its legal order are 
respected.1128 
The main issue in relation to the BIT’s tribunal in the Achmea case is that the established 
tribunal, which is not part of the EU’s judicial system, was concluded by the Member States, 
and not by the EU. For this reason, it calls into question not only the principle of mutual trust 
between the Member States, but also the preservation of the particular nature of the EU law 
ensured by Article 267 TFEU. Consequently, it is not compatible with the principle of sincere 
cooperation,1129 and may have adverse effects on the autonomy of EU law.1130 In the case of 
the NGFTAs, the ICS mechanism would be concluded in the course of EU’s trade agreements.  
In relation to the preliminary ruling procedure in Article 267 TFEU, a problem is directly 
created between the CJEU and the Member State when an external body starts interpreting and 
applying EU law. 
In the situation of the EU’s patent court, the CJEU laid down in Opinion 1/09 that such 
an external international court outside the EU’s institutional framework could be incompatible 
with the EU treaty, because the CJEU should have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear action 
brought by individuals, and to interpret and apply EU law.  
The type of external court system, as the patent court provided, could deprive the courts 
of the Member States of their powers to reply, in relation to the interpretation and application 
of EU law, through preliminary ruling, to questions referred by domestic courts.1131 
In the first EEA draft agreement, preliminary reference mechanism was included; it was 
considered that the CJEU’s opinion should be advisory rather than binding in nature, which in 
turn would alter the essential characteristics of a preliminary reference.1132 
This aspect has become more significant for the CJEU in Opinion 1/09, because of the 
need to assess the compatibility with the autonomy of the EU legal order.1133 The preliminary 
reference plays, in these circumstances, a central and yet independent role. The CJEU 
considered that the establishment of EPCt would deprive national courts to request preliminary 
ruling from the CJEU. The reason is that the draft agreement provided for a preliminary ruling 
                                                   
1128 Ibid, para. 57; 1/91, Opinion on European Economic Area EEA Agreement I (n 447), paras. 40 and 70; Opinion 1/09, 
Opinion Establishing European Patent Court (n 448), paras. 74 and 76; 2/13, Opinion on Accession to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (n 449), paras. 182 and 183. 
1129 C-284/16, Achmea (n 930), para. 58. 
1130 Ibid, para. 59. 
1131 Opinion 1/09, Opinion Establishing European Patent Court (n 448), para. 89. 
1132 1/91, Opinion on European Economic Area EEA Agreement I (n 447), paras. 59, 61-64. Para. 59 acknowledges 
jurisdiction under an international agreement, and para. 61 declares that it is unacceptable that the nature of its intervention is 
altered. 
1133 Opinion 1/09, Opinion Establishing European Patent Court (n 448). 
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mechanism in order for national courts to refer questions directly to the European Patent Court. 
This would naturally deprive the national court to refer preliminary ruling questions to the 
CJEU.1134 
In this regard, having two systems of courts providing preliminary ruling would ‘(…) 
alter the essential character of the powers which the Treaties confer on the institutions of the 
European Union and on the Member States and which are indispensable to the preservation of 
the very nature of European Union law’.1135  
In Opinion 2/13, in relation to the accession agreement of the EU to the ECHT, it was 
provided that the interpretation of an EU law’s provision (including provisions for secondary 
law) ‘(…) requires, in principle, a decision of the Court of Justice where that provision is open 
to more than one plausible interpretation’. This case was in relation to the context of assessing 
the procedure of the CJEU cases brought before the Court of Human Rights against the EU. 
This procedure was done in a more subsidiary nature, where the ECtHR provided more of a 
control mechanism, and the CJEU would not be allowed to interpret EU’s secondary law. For 
these reasons ‘(…) most certainly be a breach of the principle le that the Court of Justice has 
exclusive Jurisdiction over the definitive interpretation of EU law.’ 
In Opinion 2/13, the accession agreement of the EU to ECHR was rejected.1136 The CJEU 
emphasised the importance of the CJEU’s involvement. The CJEU rejected the draft agreement 
because of provisions that allow referring questions concerning the interpretation of EU 
primary law only. In fact, the prior involvement mechanism must extend to the review of all 
EU law for its compatibility with the ECHR.1137 If not, ‘(…) there would most certainly be a 
breach of the principle that the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction over the definitive 
interpretation of EU law’.1138 
In certain circumstances, the international agreement must provide for a preliminary 
reference mechanism because of ‘[t]he necessity for the prior involvement of the Court of 
Justice in a case (…) in which EU law is at issue satisfies the requirement that the competences 
of the EU and the powers of its institutions, notably the Court of Justice, be preserved (…)’.1139  
Earlier case-law did not include such mechanism to be an element of the principle of 
autonomy; but it suggested instead to safeguard the essential characteristics of the CJEU under 
Article 267 TFEU, when the agreement includes a preliminary reference mechanism. 
                                                   
1134 Ibid, para. 81. 
1135 Ibid, para. 89. 
1136 2/13, Opinion on Accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (n 449), Schill, ‘Opinion 
2/13 - The End for Dispute Settlement in EU Trade and Investment ’ (n 808), p. 379. 
1137 2/13, Opinion on Accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (n 449), paras. 245, 247. 
1138 Ibid. para. 246. 
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In principle, it is clear that the EU treaties permit state-to-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms in international agreements. In this regard, the EU courts are not granted the power 
to hear such disputes.1140 Hence, the CJEU does not have the power to hear such disputes. 
However, the situation is radically different if it concerns claims which involve EU law. 
The CJEU has the power to resolve such cases though preliminary ruling mechanism in Article 
267 TFEU.  
2.6.4 Limited Remedies for Foreign Investors 
The CJEU has the full and exclusive power to provide interpretations of EU law, and to 
ensure the uniform interpretation of EU law.1141 According to Article 267 TFEU, a national 
court cannot bring the matter before the CJEU to obtain a preliminary ruling if a question of 
interpretation of EU law would be raised during the proceedings before the tribunal. In order to 
evaluate whether it is consistent with the principle of autonomy in EU law, it is necessary to 
take the agreement in question into account. First of all, it should be highlighted that the CETA 
is a trade agreement between the EU and its Member States on the one part with its own 
particularities, such as its new creation of investment protection; it is therefore very different 
from earlier opinions given by the court, such as Opinion 1/09.1142 
The jurisdiction of the tribunal is in fact limited to consider the claims brought before it 
in relation to whether there has been a breach of the investment protection standards related to 
the interpretation or application of the provisions of the CETA’s Investment Chapter, according 
to Article 8.18 CETA.1143 The tribunal will, furthermore, not have any jurisdiction to rule on 
the legality of measure under the domestic law of the parties according to Article 8.31.1144 In 
practice, it would mean that even if the tribunal would make assessment of the EU law in its 
rulings, it would not in fact affect the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Primarily, this is because the 
only effect that could be derived from these circumstances to the EU would be from a financial 
nature. As an example, this can be a payment of compensation to the investor concerned in an 
investment protection dispute.  
The tribunal may also consider the domestic law of the disputing parties as ‘matter of 
fact’ according to Article 8.31.1145 In such circumstances, it is upon the tribunal to ‘(…) follow 
the prevailing interpretation given to the domestic law by the courts or authorities of that Party 
                                                   
1140 According to the provisions related to the Court of Justice of the EU to be found in part 6, title 1, chapter 1, section 5. 
TFEU. 
1141 2/13, Opinion on Accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (n 449), paras. 244-248. 
1142 Opinion 1/09, Opinion Establishing European Patent Court (n 443). 
1143 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part. 
1144 Ibid. 
1145 Ibid. 
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and any meaning given to domestic law by the Tribunal shall not be binding upon the courts or 
the authorities of that Party’.1146 
Subsequently, the tribunal would be obliged to adopt the interpretation given by the CJEU 
to the proceedings in the tribunal. The CETA investment court would not infringe the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CJEU to provide a definite interpretation of EU law and would not therefore 
present adverse effects in its dispute settlement body, which would be considered as an obstacle 
to the CJEU in relation to autonomy.1147 However, the CJEU’s earlier discussion on the 
possibility of the agreement altering the essential character of powers of the EU’s institution, 
should be consider also in these circumstances.1148 The CJEU meant that since the EEA 
agreement applied bot the EU law and that of the agreement, it would lead to the consequences 
that the EFTAct would interpret also EU law when interpreting the provisions of the 
agreements. The CJEU also mean that such procedure would also bind the EU and its 
institutions in their exercise of powers.1149 Certain modification which clarified the task of the 
EFTAct to only interpret the EEA agreement in respect to the EFTA countries. Opinion 1/92, 
clarified that these modifications was considered compatible to EU law.1150 
The investment protection system in the CETA provides that the EU’s measures would 
be found to be contrary to investment protection principles through which private parties could 
claim compensation. Because the interpretation of the specific provisions of the CETA’s 
Investment Chapter cannot in fact bind the CJEU courts in their interpretation of provisions of 
EU law, it would lead to that such mechanism would not contravene the principles established 
in Opinion 1/91 and Opinion 1/92. 
The fact that it is the private parties that may bring a claim before the CETA's 
international external court system cannot be considered incompatible to the EU case law, as 
established in Opinion 2/13 concerning the accession of the EU to the ECHR, and Opinion 1/09 
concerning the creation of the EU Patent Court. For this reason, the CETA’s investment court 
system cannot be considered incompatible to the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order.  
2.6.5 The compatibility of ISDS mechanism 
Article 344 TFEU can be considered as a manifestation of the principle of autonomy, in 
the sense that the rule is designed as to protect and preserve the integrity and the unity of EU 
                                                   
1146 Ibid, Article 8.31. 
1147 European Parliament Legal Service ‘Legal Opinion: Compatibility with the Treaties of Investment Dispute Settlement 
Provisions in EU Trade Agreements’ (n 976), para. 50. 
1148 Opinion 1/09, Opinion Establishing European Patent Court (n 448). 
1149 1/91, Opinion on European Economic Area EEA Agreement I (n 447), para. 41;1/00, Opinion Establishing a European 
Common Aviation Area (n 785), para. 13. 
1150 1/92, Opinion on European Economic Area EEA Agreement II (n 963). 
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law. A second manifestation is the CJEU’s judicial monopoly since it safeguards the right 
application of EU law. However, the principle is equal to these manifestations but even in 
cases where the CJEU would not explicitly invoke autonomy, it remains as an underlying 
force which can still be motivating the decision of the CJEU.  
Examining the ISDS mechanism and whether it is compatible to EU law, it is necessary 
to discuss this in relation to the EU’s autonomy.  
The CJEU’s reasoning is necessary to consider in order to understand the external 
dimension of Article 344 TFEU. Article 344 TFEU usually concerns cases between Member 
States. It reads: ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.’ 
It means that the Member States have agreed not to submit disputes, which relate to EU law to 
dispute mechanisms, in order to preserve and protect the integrity and unity of the EU law. It is 
important to protect the Courts judicial monopoly, even in situations where the Court does not 
directly invoke autonomy, the underlying principle helps to explain the Court’s reasoning, but 
also the approach that the CJEU takes when receiving international law in the EU legal 
order.1151 
In trade and investment agreement, different types of agreements establish certain rights 
and obligations vis-à-vis third countries. In this regard, Article 344 TFEU cannot be limited by 
a strict reading to apply only to intra-EU relations. Article 344 TFEU restricts Member States 
from engaging in disputes before other judicial bodies than the CJEU, where the subject matter 
of the dispute falls within EU competence; especially where the dispute is ‘(…) between two 
Member States in regard to an alleged failure to comply with Community-law obligations’.1152 
Similarly, state-to-state disputes between Member States and third countries can also 
concern material aspects of Treaty interpretation, which would trigger an application of Article 
344 TFEU.1153 The MOX Plant and Opinion 2/13 primarily developed the application in the 
context of principle of autonomy. In the case of MOX Plant,1154 the Arbitral Tribunal in 
question, UNCLOS, stayed the proceedings and ordered the parties to inquire whether the CJEU 
had jurisdiction, because of their involvement of EURATOM and EU environmental 
legislation.1155 By virtue of Article 344 TFEU, the CJEU concluded that Member States are 
                                                   
1151 Odermatt, 'When a Fence Becomes a Cage: The Principle of Autonomy in EU External Relations Law' (n 36), p. 3. 
1152 C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (n 625), para. 128. 
1153 Burgstaller, ‘Dispute Settlement in EU International Investment Agreements with Third States: Three Salient Problems’ 
(n 775), p. 562. 
1154 C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (n 625), In this case Ireland initiated arbitral proceedings against the United Kingdom 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against the operation of a nuclear facility 
reprocessing spend plutonium in the MOX Plant. 
1155 Nikolaos Lavranos, 'MOX Plant Dispute - Court of Justice of the European Communities: Freedom of Member States to 
Bring Disputes before another Court or Tribunal: Ireland Condemned for Bringing the MOX Plant Dispute before an Arbitral 
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prevented from initiating disputes before courts and tribunals other than the CJEU in matters 
covered exclusively by the EU’s competence.1156 In this regard, Ireland was in breach of its 
obligations under the Treaty by referring the dispute to the UNCLOS tribunal. In this regard, it 
concerns mixed agreements, which structurally would allow for the intuition of dispute 
settlement procedure between Member States.1157 Opinion 2/13 restricts the CJEU reasoning in 
MOX Plant, and it means that the intra-EU application of Article 344 TFEU would be 
concerned. Article 344 TFEU would thereby function as an expression of the principle of 
loyalty,1158 a protection for the autonomy, but would, at the same time, represent an obligation 
to facilitate the CJEU in its exercise of its competences.1159 
However, the CJEU excludes the possibility that Article 344 TFEU should be able to 
modify, in any way, the very foundations of the EU legal order as was mentioned in Opinion 
1/91 MOX Plant,1160 and Kadi.1161 The CJEU moreover emphasised a strong protection of 
fundamental rights, investigating the EU’s internal legislation on fundamental principles of EU 
law.1162  
However, opting for a very strict interpretation would lead to limit the EU in its external 
action. Article 344 TFEU cannot necessarily be considered as limiting the NGFTAs from 
inserting such a dispute settlement mechanism. The compatibility of ISDS proceedings should 
be considered in relation to the EU’s institutions and bodies. The question of compatibility was 
put forward in the legal opinion of the European parliament.1163  
The CJEU’s interpretation of the principle of autonomy of the CJEU in Opinion 1/09, 
does not leave much space for an ISDS mechanism. In the CETA and EUSFTA, the ISDS is 
put to only apply the agreement and other rules and principles of international law applicable 
between the parties to the agreements. In this way, it would exclude domestic law; both, the EU 
law and Member States domestic law.1164  
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Communities, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, ECLI:EU:C:2008:11, para. 16. 
1163 European Parliament Legal Service ‘Legal Opinion: Compatibility with the Treaties of Investment Dispute Settlement 
Provisions in EU Trade Agreements’ (n 976). 
1164 European Commissioner for Trade ‘Concept Paper, Investment in TTIP and Beyond – the Path for Reform. Enhancing 
the Right to Regulate and Moving from Current ad hoc Arbitration towards an Investment Court’ (n 772), p. 10. 
  -219- 
As provided in the TTIP: 
(…) for greater certainty, (…) the domestic law of the Parties shall not be part of the 
applicable law. Where the tribunal is required to ascertain the meaning of a provision of 
the domestic law of one of the Parties as a matter of fact, it shall follow the prevailing 
interpretation of that provision made by the courts or authorities of that Party.1165 
As this provision clarifies, it is up to the contracting parties to make the interpretation of 
their domestic law, and that only such interpretation will be considered in the tribunal. 
However, it should be excluded that there may be an adverse spillover effects to a decision 
made from an investor-state tribunal.1166 In other words it would not be the conferral jurisdiction 
on a court or a tribunal in itself that would cause the issue with autonomy but rather the potential 
‘spillover effects’ that a decision by such court or tribunal would later generate.1167  
3 Intermediate Conclusion 
The CJEU has developed certain conditions in relation to the EU autonomy in Opinion 
1/91 on the imminent conclusion of the EEA Agreement; it was further elaborated in Opinion 
1/00 on the Common Aviation Area, and in Opinion 1/09 on the establishment of a European 
Patent Court.1168 These cases have shown that as long as a dispute settlement mechanism does 
not give binding interpretation of EU rules, decide on the delimitation of competences between 
the EU and its Member States, and alter the institutional regime, it is considered to be 
compatible with the treaties.1169 The CJEU has developed certain conditions in relation to the 
EU autonomy in Opinion 1/91 on the imminent conclusion of the EEA Agreement; it was 
further elaborated in Opinion 1/00 on the Common Aviation Area, and in Opinion 1/09 on the 
establishment of a European Patent Court.1170 These cases have shown that as long as a dispute 
settlement mechanism does not give binding interpretation of EU rules, decide on the 
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13(3) entitled ‘Applicable law and rules of interpretation’. 
1166 Uwera, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in Future EU Investment-Related Agreements: Is the Autonomy of the 
EU Legal Order an Obstacle?’ (n 1051), p. 133. 
1167 Hindelang, ‘The Autonomy of the European Legal Order’ (n 916), p. 190 Hindelang, ‘Repellent Forces: The CJEU and 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (n 1023), p. 73. 
1168 1/91, Opinion on European Economic Area EEA Agreement I (n 447), 1/00, Opinion Establishing a European Common 
Aviation Area (n 785); Opinion 1/09, Opinion Establishing European Patent Court (n 448). 
1169 Angelos Dimopoulos, 'The Compatibility of Future EU Investment Agreements with EU Law' (2012) 39 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 447, pp. 447-472. 
1170 1/91, Opinion on European Economic Area EEA Agreement I (n 447), 1/00, Opinion Establishing a European Common 
Aviation Area (n 785); Opinion 1/09, Opinion Establishing European Patent Court (n 448). 
  -220- 
delimitation of competences between the EU and its Member States, and alter the institutional 
regime, it is considered to be compatible with the treaties.1171 
The EU’s constitutional framework is based on the principle of autonomy of the EU legal 
order. There is a requirement for the EU to respect international obligations, including those 
arising from concluded international agreements, such as NGFTAs. This chapter is dedicated 
to a thorough examination of the investor protection solutions provided in the NGFTAs, i.e., 
the dispute settlement mechanisms and their compatibility with EU law. The difficulty arises 
from the operation of dispute resolutions, because of its parallel proceedings to the EU legal 
and judicial system.  
The CJEU needs to contain their competence and remain ‘(…) competent to determine – 
de iure and de facto – the legality of the acts of EU institutions under EU law as required in 
Opinion 1/00’.1172 The balance discussed between autonomy and the disputes settlement 
mechanism is important to consider. As clarified the ISDS mechanism may have a spill-over 
effects on EU law. It is a fine balance to consider because the possibility to overcome such 
could result in limiting remedies to foreign investors which would lead to their protection being 
undermined. Moreover, finding a narrow interpretation to the principle of Autonomy may result 
in limiting the EU’s external relations with third countries in relation to trade.  
The option of having a system, which provides for ISDS but not for direct effect, is neither 
optimal for investors nor for the civil society. However, it seems to be the option that is 
generally preferred and applied in NGFTAs. In these agreements, the ISDS is possible but 
individuals may not rely on the awards before domestic courts. Simply put, it means that a 
foreign investor will be denied the possibility to bring a claim against the EU’s or Member 
State’s measure for their incompatibility with the NGFTA before either CJEU or the Member 
States’ domestic courts. Within domestic and EU law provision, the investor could still rely on 
prohibition of discrimination, expropriation without compensation, etc. However, standards 
such as FET are difficult to find in domestic legislation.  
This discussion evidently leads to the question of effective enforcement of the ISDS 
awards. If the enforcement of the award is ineffective the provisions would amount to be 
insignificant, and therefore not necessary to be included in negotiations. For this reason, it is 
important that the non-direct effect of the ISDS does not end up hampering the enforcement of 
the awards. The CJEU made clear that decisions of an international body, which concern 
compatibility of domestic measures with an international agreement and which do not grant the 
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right to privately enforce the award, and consequently such rights will also not be granted to 
private parties.1173 
  
                                                   
1173 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 9 September 2008, Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter binds together the previous parts of the thesis by summarizing the 
discussions in a conclusion. It addresses the analytical discussions, which have been presented 
to highlight the significance and implication the NGFTAs can have on the EU’s external action 
and trade. The categorisation used throughout this thesis is to be understood as a way of 
providing a whole picture for the NGFTAs. 
The NGFTAs are new legal instruments that throughout this thesis have been considered 
from two different perspectives; the competence perspective, and the autonomy perspective in 
order to determine where exactly to conclude the limits in relation to what can be regarded to 
fall within the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The legal system around the NGFTAs 
makes it necessary to examine the new Investment Court System (ICS), where issues related to 
investors’ protection and EU autonomy play a significant role. 
While it is not an established terminology, the term NGFTA can be used to describe 
agreements that were negotiated after the shift in the EU’s trade policy. NGFTAs constitute a 
collective assembling of agreements, where all have the same objectives, and are concluded in 
the spirit of the EU’s intention to play a leading role in international trade. The EU’s ambition 
for an enlarged bilateral network is clearly shown through the inclusion of direct investment in 
the CCP. The agreements, where investment is included, can be viewed within the context of 
various, and at times conflicting, trade and non-trade objectives. 
1 The NGFTAs as a New Legal Instrument 
The NGFTAs are considered as a new legal instrument due to their novel and ambitious 
nature. The agreements clearly stand out with its use of international standards in areas that 
provides a deeper regulatory integration between the parties. However, the agreements are not 
entirely similar and have different surrounding circumstances. It can be explained through the 
fact that the NGFTAs are being continuously developed. The EU–Korea FTA, for example is 
considered to be the first, after the change in policy, and the first agreement towards the 
development of the NGFTAs. The ICS (Investment Court System), is another example of the 
consciously developing trade agenda, and was introduced at a later stage, in relation to the 
CETA agreement. 
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Consequently, this new model of NGFTAs is introducing a deeper regulatory integration 
in trade and investment with an encompassing width of the agreements, in both trade and non-
trade related issues. However, through the creation, execution, aims, and objectives it can be 
concluded that each agreement are unique, and should be considered on a case-by case basis. 
As legal instruments for the EU’s external action, the NGFTAs provide consequences for 
the EU’s condition on the international level. EU law contains specific characteristics that stem 
from an independent source of law, which is built up through the treaties and primacy over the 
law of Member States. 
The respect for international law and its principles has become of higher importance to 
the EU1174 and should not, in its attempt accommodate to international law or undermine the 
autonomy of its legal order.1175 It can be considered that the CJEU in a way has promoted itself, 
in relation to international dispute settlement, as  
‘(…) the guardian of the treaties but also as the ultimate gatekeeper, which decides whether 
and if so, to what extent and under which conditions and limitations, international law may 
enter the European legal order’.1176  
It becomes of specific importance to safeguard the autonomy of the EU legal order, 
particularly in relation to the compatibility of the dispute settlement mechanisms with EU 
law.1177 
International courts and tribunals can, in certain circumstances, limit the interpretation of 
EU law. Preliminary ruling mechanism can provide a solution to this problem. Is it, however, 
possible for all types of internationally established courts or tribunals? This pragmatic process 
of trade advancement in the EU’s external relations should at the same time maintain the EU’s 
common values, consistency and autonomy.1178 Concluding trade agreements should not be 
done at the expense of restricting the EU’s own regulatory power and autonomy. It remains 
undisputed that the agreements are in nature very different; and one can regroup them in 
different setting. 
                                                   
1174 Article 3(5) TEU “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and 
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, 
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in 
particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”. 
1175 Odermatt, 'When a Fence Becomes a Cage: The Principle of Autonomy in EU External Relations Law' (n 36). 
1176 Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘Designing an International Investor-to-State Arbitration System After Opinion 1/09’ in Marc 
Bungenberg and Christoph Herrmann (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law - Special issue: Common 
Commercial Policy after Lisbon, vol (Springer 2013), p. 207. 
1177 Govaere, ‘Beware of the Trojan Horse: Dispute Settlement in (Mixed) Agreements and the Autonomy of the EU Legal 
Order’ (n 1065), pp. 187-207. 
1178 Taivankhuu Altangerel, 'The Principle of Balance: Balancing Economic, Environmental and Social Factors in 
International Economic Law' (2004) 1 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 4, p. 5. 
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1.1 Competence in Relation to NGFTAs 
The EU uses the NGFTAs as tools in order to pursue bilateral commitments with its 
strategic partners.1179 The agreements have a very large spectrum of areas, trade and non-trade 
related area, that are addressed through various provisions in the agreement, and cannot for this 
reason be considered as homogeneous. When considering the limits in the attributed 
competence within the wide subject range of the NGFTA, the interpretation of Article 206 
TFEU and 207 TFEU could be considered rather a sliding scale than fixed categories.1180 The 
chapters in this type of agreements have shown to be more complex and all-encompassing and 
may therefore create spill-over effect into other areas. 
The NGFTAs provide an interaction between the various competences; and it is not a 
trivial task to establish the limits between what can be considered within exclusive and shared 
competence, and implied exclusive competence. However, by considering the CJEU’s 
argumentation in the Opinion 2/15 it is possible to envisage the possible areas that fall within 
the respective EU competences. 
The areas that fall within the EU’s exclusive competence pursuant to Article 3(1) TFEU, 
are areas or provisions, which include government procurement, intellectual property rights, 
competition, foreign direct investment, trade and sustainable development, state-state dispute 
settlement and the termination of Member State BIT. Moreover, the EU’s exclusive competence 
also include provisions that govern trade in goods, trade and investment in renewable energy 
generation and also trade in services except for transport service. 
In relation to the exclusive nature of the competence in relation to commercial policy, it 
can clearly be considered that Member States will have less room to enter independently into 
international agreements which leads to harmonization of technical standards. This may be 
regarded as a reflection of the changing nature of trade, which is related to removing technical 
barriers through harmonization, and also traditional aspects of external trade such as customs 
duties, but to a lesser extent. This also unavoidably reduces the presence of the Member States 
on the international scene. If it was otherwise, however, there would be a risk that EU’s 
commercial policy ‘(…) would be destined to become nugatory in the course of time’.1181 
The CJEU manifested in Opinion 2/15 that the areas which are concerned for the EU’s 
implied competence pursuant to Article 3(2) TFEU are areas in relation to trade in maritime, 
rail and road transport services commitments on government procurement in the field of 
                                                   
1179 Marc Bungenberg, ‘Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon’ in Christoph Herrmann and Jörg 
Philipp Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Springer 2010) (n 124), p. 126. 
1180 Petersmann, Multilevel Constitutionalism for Multilevel Governance of Public Goods: Methodology Problems in 
International Law (n 133), p. 43. 
1181 1/78, Opinion on International Agreement on Natural Rubber (n 24), para. 44. 
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transport. The court considered that the EU’s implied competence within the NGFTAs pursuant 
to Article 3(2) TFEU in particular circumstances that ‘may affect common rules or alter their 
scope’ should, according to the CJEU in Opinion 2/15 be interpreted in a less strict manner than 
what the AG Sharpston did. The conclusion of the CJEU clearly led to provide the possibility 
to conclude the agreement within exclusive competence.  
Moreover, areas which would fall within the shared competence between the EU and the 
Member States, has been considered areas such as non-direct foreign investment, in particular 
portfolio investment and dispute settlement between investor and states. It was reasoned this 
way due to the non-direct foreign investment, such as portfolio investment, has no intention to 
influence the management and control of an undertaking and the regime governing dispute 
settlement between investors and states, are fields which are not considered to fall within the 
EU’s exclusive competence and the Singapore FTA.  
For this reason and in relation to how the agreement was at the time it was concluded, it 
was considered necessary to conclude it as a mixed agreement. However, the outcome of this 
case made the EU to split the agreements into two supporting agreement; one part within 
exclusive competence and the other part to be concluded as a mixed agreement. Opinion 2/15 
distinguishes the different competences of the EU and proposes in which circumstances an 
agreement should be concluded as a mixed agreement. The CJEU stated that the EUSFTA 
should be concluded as a mixed agreement; this statement gave uncertainty to the rule relating 
to facultative mixity. However, it was thereafter clarified that the statement was in particularly 
related to the EUSFTA. This provides some uncertainty since the discretion of the CJEU is not, 
in this case, based on objective factors. It is therefore clear that it is not quite possible to make 
an overall comparison between the NGFTAs. It is in fact necessary to consider the agreements 
on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, it is not only the question of competence but also the 
objectives that have shown to have a great impact in these type of trade agreements. 
1.2 The Changed Paradigm in EU’s Objectives 
In Opinion 2/15, it was moreover considered that the close link to the agreement’s trade 
objectives such as the chapter on sustainable development, played a large role and should 
therefore be considered to be part of the CCP. It clearly shows that the objectives of the EU 
external trade have a great impact on the interpretation of the CCP. This is contrary to the prior 
understanding that the nature of the objectives should form more of a guiding indication. It is 
part of the EU’s external objectives, and not just a political ambition to shape the international 
order according to EU’s values. The EU objectives are many, and some scholars have 
considered them as a ‘major innovation’ forming the ‘spinal column’ of EU’s external 
  -226- 
action.1182 Others have instead been enormously critical; some considered them to be more of 
a ‘wish list for a better world’,1183 or as a mere ‘epidemic proliferation of objectives of the 
Union’;1184 while others ridicule them as ‘redolent of motherhood and apple pie’,1185 or as 
expressed as the ‘(…) relentless accumulation of constitutional law’1186 which has led to ‘(…) 
too much confusing and unhelpful constitutional law of foreign relations in the EU’.1187 
The objective of any agreement has to be consistent with EU’s legislation, as well as with 
those of its Member States. The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) differs from international 
trade policies. This is due to the specific nature of the EU, as with its own legal system, it 
represents a separate legal order from the rest of international law. However, the unity of 
international representation of the EU is merely an expression of the duty of cooperation, which 
in turn affects the global image of the EU in the international field. 
Even though the imprecise scope of Article 207 TFEU was, to an extent, clarified in 
Opinion 2/15, it had led to further questions in relation to the EU’s objectives in Article 21 
TEU. However, after Opinion 2/15 was issued, the approach of the EU’s policy in Article 21 
TEU can be considered to be redefined by the CJEU. In that opinion, the CJEU relied on Article 
21 TEU to include sustainable development among the EU’s external objectives.1188 The CJEU 
concluded that the objective of sustainable development henceforth forms an integral part of 
the CCP.1189 This may have significant consequences, since it could be understood that the 
CJEU is willing to take the catalogue of competences in Article 21 TEU as a binding rather 
than a guiding instrument. This would apply similarly to Article 3(5) TEU as complementary 
to and capable of influencing the objective of trade liberalization spelled out in Article 206 
TFEU.1190  
As a result, this could lead to that broader objectives of the EUSFTA could be subsumed 
under the umbrella of trade policy, without needing to be categorized as ancillary or incidental 
                                                   
1182 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives of the Common Commercial Policy’ (n 
528), p. 161. 
1183 Armin von Bogdandy, 'The European Constitution and the European Identity: Text and Subtext of the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe' (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 295, p. 315. He speaks in general 
of what he refers to a ‘hodgepodge of objectives’. 
1184 Joris Larik, Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2016). 
1185 Dashwood, Dougan, Barry, Spaventa, Wyatt, Wyett and Dashwood’s European Union Law (n 538), p. 903, referring to 
Article 21(1) TFEU. 
1186 Bruno de Witte, ‘Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union’s Foreign Relations’ in Marise Cremona and 
Bruno de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart Publishing 2008) 10. 
1187 Ibid, p. 12. 
1188 The CJEU also referred to Articles 9 and 11 TFEU (referring to the integration of social protection and environmental 
protection requirements into all EU policies and activities ‘with a view to promoting sustainable development’, 2/15, Opinion 
of Singapore FTA (n 211), paras. 145-146. 
1189 The CJEU also referred to Articles 9 and 11 TFEU (referring to the integration of social protection and environmental 
protection requirements into all EU policies and activities ‘with a view to promoting sustainable development’, ibid, para. 
147. 
1190 Cremona, ‘Shaping EU Trade Policy Post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017’(n 347), p. 243. 
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to the predominant purpose.1191 In this sense, the CCP continuous development that we have 
seen, is in fact just the beginning of the increasingly encompassing CCP. 
Consequently, trade objectives could come to play a large role in the conclusion of an 
international agreement. The scope of the CCP was somewhat clarified by Opinion 2/15; the 
EU’s exclusive competence in relation to trade in services, commercial aspects of the 
intellectual property, and also foreign direct investment, has been further defined. 
1.3 Finding the Right Balance 
A deeper integration is required by the NGFTAs in the sense of accommodating the 
differences among the various layers of governance at the international, European and national 
levels. This type of enhanced integration may lead to promoting the EU autonomy. This is 
because the EU autonomy is there to safeguard the EU’s prerogatives. In this regard, it becomes 
even more important to find an appropriate balance between liberalisation and free trade and 
safeguarding the EU autonomy. 
As this type of agreements are very wide and relatively new, it is important to establish 
the right balance between where it is possible to protect the foreign investors, but at the same 
time protect the Member States right to regulate. Since the investment policy should be ‘(…) 
guided by the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action, including the promotion 
of the rule of law, human right and sustainable development (…)’,1192 it becomes essential that 
there is a clear balance between the right of foreign investors and the right of host states to 
regulate. Hence, there should be investment liberalisation and protection of investors on the one 
hand, and non-trade goals on the other hand that are set to ensure that the EU and its Member 
States are not undermined when pursuing public interest objectives; however, this should be 
accomplished in a manner which reflects the EU’s own approach to the international market. 
For this reason, the NGFTAs need to be designed in a manner, which does not hinder the EU 
and its Member States to regulate public interest objectives. In doing so, there is first of all, a 
necessity to distinguish between the external and internal dimensions. 
There are arguments in relation to the ISDS provision in the NGFTAs that it would lead 
to the suffering of the EU’s institutions and their decision-making procedures due to lack of 
democracy, and legitimacy.1193 The Commission tried to combat this issue, which arose in 
                                                   
1191 Ibid. 
1192 European Commission, Communication Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy (n 53), p. 
6. 
1193 Owen Jones, ‘The TTIP deal hands British sovereignty to multinationals’ The Guardian (London, 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/04/us-trade-deal-full-frontal-assault-on-democracy> accessed 20 
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relation to the TTIP negotiations, and attempted to increase the public participation through an 
online public consultation.1194 
2 The NGFTAs as Mixed Agreements 
Even though international agreements are an integral part of the EU legal order,1195 the 
EU’s involvement is very much limited to surround only the NGFTAs, since the direct effect 
is excluded from the provisions of these agreements.1196 This provides a limitation for the CJEU 
to interpret the agreements, and for this reason, it is not possible to suggest that they are fully 
integrated into the EU legal order.1197 The agreements exclude private rights.1198 The Investors 
are also excluded from initiating treaty-based claims before domestic courts or the CJEU. 
In the EU external action, the established judicial bodies are indispensable elements,1199 
but the powers transferred under the treaty should remain unaltered.1200 The CJEU should have 
the sole responsibility to review the legality of EU law by virtue of Article 19 TEU.1201 
However, the question is whether the arbitration court system can, to some extent, be considered 
to take over the role of assessing the EU legal order. This question is based on earlier 
experiences, where the investment agreements may take over this type of tasks.1202 
When classifying mixed agreements, there is a risk of simplifying it because in practice, 
it is extremely complicated due to the very closely linked exclusive and shared competences 
which interact in a range of EU’s external powers and international agreements.1203 The CCP, 
which now covers services and commercial aspects of intellectual property, allows for a more 
comprehensive approach to trade and investment issues.1204 The main issue of concluding 
                                                   
1194 The public consultation is established in order to give a clear and easy accessible explanation to why provisions on 
investment protection and the ISDS chapters, based on the CETA agreement, was introduced, and giving the public the 
possibility to comment. It would further show the extent to which the provisions would address legitimacy, transparency and 
consistency issues stemming from the ISDS procedures. 
1195 Article 216(2) TFEU. 
1196 Schill, ‘Opinion 2/13 - The End for Dispute Settlement in EU Trade and Investment ’(n 808), p. 385; Semertzi, 
‘Preclusion of Direct Effect in the Recently Concluded EU Free Trade Agreements’ (n 808). 
1197 Schill, ‘Opinion 2/13 - The End for Dispute Settlement in EU Trade and Investment ’(n 808), p. 385.  
1198 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part, chapter 33, Articles 14-15. 
1199 1/91, Opinion on European Economic Area EEA Agreement I (n 447), para. 40; Opinion 1/09, Opinion Establishing 
European Patent Court (n 448), para. 74. 
1200 Opinion 1/09, Opinion Establishing European Patent Court (n 448), para. 76; 2/13, Opinion on Accession to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (n 449), para. 183. 
1201 Herrmann, ‘The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Emerging EU Investment Policy’ (n 739), p. 
574. 
1202 Lavranos, ‘The ECJs Relationship With Other International Courts’ (n 807), p. 399. Lavranos remarks that the pre-
Bosphorus case law of the ECtHR also reflects a de facto review of EU legal acts vis-à-vis the ECHR. 
1203 Eeckhout, External relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (n 478), p. 191. 
1204 From an institutional perspective Lisbon Treaty also strengthened the role of the European Parliament in relation to trade 
related matters. The institutional perspectives will be further discussed in Chapter II. 
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mixed agreements would be the ratification process, which can take considerably long time. 
There can be a risk that a national parliament objects to the mixed agreement, through 
referendums. The Member States even have the right to veto or to nullify the agreement during 
the ratification process. This indicates the Member States’ visible position during the 
negotiation process on the international scene.1205 
There is a risk, due to the extensive implementation of mixed agreements, that the EU 
will no longer be considered to have a single diplomatic presence, and therefore, in relation to 
its trading partners, it may no longer represent a single entity globally.1206 This can naturally be 
a real loss for the EU. There is a clear comparison to draw here in relation to the Doha Round. 
The reason for which this Round reached a standstill was because there were so many issues to 
reach a common consensus. This is not the case with the EU, but the issues present themselves 
rather in the stage of ratification, since it is possible for the Member States to block the 
ratification in mixed agreements. 
2.1 Investment as a New Area to EU’s Trade Policy  
The CJEU considered that exclusive competence should encompass the national 
treatment and market access for goods, trade remedies, technical barriers to trade, sanitary 
phytosanitary measures, customs and trade facilitation, non-tariff barriers to trade, and 
investment in renewable energy generation. Moreover, it also considered services and 
electronic commerce to be within exclusive competence. Investment provisions in relation to 
foreign direct investment, government procurement, intellectual property, competition and 
related matters, trade, sustainable development, and transparency were also considered within 
the exclusive competence.1207 
It is clear from Article 207 TFEU that foreign direct investment would fall within the 
EU’s exclusive competence. The question was whether non-direct investment, such as ISDS, 
would be considered within the EU’s exclusive competence as well. The CJEU concluded that 
the ISDS would fall within shared competence, because it ‘removes disputes from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States’.1208  
For this reason, the argument pursuant to Article 3(2) TFEU in relation to the 
consideration of ISDS and portfolio investment as an implied EU’s exclusive competence, as 
                                                   
1205 Article 218(8) TFEU. 
1206 Wessel, van Vooren, ‘The EEAS's Diplomatic Dreams and the Reality of European and International Law’ (n 122), p. 
1352. 
1207 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part. 
1208 2/15, Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 211), para. 292. 
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the Commission stated, would not be possible. This is because one would not consider that the 
treaty provision on the free movement of capital would be affected by the NGFTAs.1209 
2.2 Vertical Delimitation of Competence  
The Court and the AG Sharpston agreed on that the non-direct investment and ISDS 
should be within shared competence. The CJEU then concluded that shared competence should 
apply for transparency, dispute settlement between parties, mediation mechanism, and also 
institutional, general and final provisions.1210 
As long as the EU and its Member States retain treaty-making capacity, mixed agreements 
will remain as an integral part of the EU’s legal landscape.1211 This does not mean that it would 
be negative for the EU. It may, in fact, be considered a positive advancement since the mixed 
agreements do not require a clear vertical delimitation of competence between the EU and its 
Member States. The EU is then placed in a much better position that easily allows it to have 
more ambitious agreements without endless battles on the competence. As AG Sharpston 
mentioned, the agreement is a creature of pragmatic forces to solve issues for international 
agreements in a multileveled legal system.1212 
The division of competence, even when an agreement is concluded as mixed, becomes 
important in cases, where there is a question regarding who should be responsible, the EU or 
its Member States. This is because the third party would understand that the agreement does 
not fully fall within the competence of the EU, and that the EU only assumes responsibility for 
obligations that fall within its scope of competence.1213 
2.3 The Theory of Facultative Mixity Discarded 
The proposed distinction made by Rosas between two forms of mixity: obligatory mixity, 
and facultative mixity. In these situations, the EU has exclusive competence over only one area 
of an agreement, which would lead to an obligatory mixity, in such case there is no doubt that 
the agreement should be concluded as a mixed agreement. However, this was not the case in 
the Opinion 2/15, and the EUSFTA. In situations where the agreement falls within shared 
competence of the EU and its Member States, there is a political choice as to whom between 
them should exercise the competence. This indicate that there is be a possibility to conclude the 
                                                   
1209 Ibid, paras. 229-238. 
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1211 Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organising the International Relations of the European Community 
and its Member States (n 689). 
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agreement within exclusive competence. the EUSFTA falls partly within shared competence 
and the CJEU stated that since the agreement have a ISDS mechanism it cannot be 
‘(…)established without the Member States’ consent’,1214 and furthermore it ‘(…) cannot be 
approved by the EU alone’.1215 This could be viewed as if the CJEU meant that Opinion 2/15 
should be conclude as a mixed agreement would be an obligation, since it more or less indicates 
that the mechanism of facultative mixity would no longer be a choice at least not in the sense 
of the ISDS mechanism. This statement was clarified in the OTIF case since such statement 
could have had disastrous ramification, if the theory of facultative mixity would have been 
considered to be abandoned altogether. If this would have been the case it would have great 
consequence for the EU in relation to its ability to conclude international agreements in the 
areas of shared competence. The OTIF case if was clarified that the argument of the CJEU was 
in relation to the specific case and could not be considered as a general rule.1216 
It could therefore here be considered possible that the CJEU has taken the stand by the 
theory earlier mentioned in relation to the Council, the finalist theory, which is instead to 
include every measure that would be likely to influence the volume of flow of trade as part of 
the CCP.1217 
In the OTIF case,1218 the CJEU relied on Opinion 2/15 to substantiate its reasoning in 
relation to the exercise of its external competences in a field even though ‘(…) the Union had 
taken no internal action, by adopting rules of secondary law, in that field’, such as in the case 
of non-direct foreign investment.1219 The CJEU further discussed certain effects surrounding 
facultative mixity, and the effects of Opinion 2/15. In Opinion 2/15, it was clarified that the EU 
cannot act alone in shared competence in areas of non-foreign direct investment and that this 
proposition in the previous opinion was solely related to the specific circumstances of the OTIF 
case and could not be considered to have become a general rule.1220 
                                                   
1214 2/15, Opinion of Singapore FTA (n 211 ), para. 292. 
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3 Issues in Relation to EU Autonomy 
Considering, the findings throughout the research it is possible to deduce the issues in 
relation to the ICS which may be considered contrary to EU autonomy. It could be the 
possibility of the ICS to interpret EU law, and enforcement of awards, but also the construction 
of the ICS itself, in particular the determination of the respondent.  
The core task of the investment tribunal is to assess the compatibility of the legal acts in 
relation to the investment protection standards, established in the investment agreements. It is 
clear that this mechanism does not replace the application of EU law in domestic or EU court 
systems. The idea behind an investment tribunal is not to replace domestic or EU courts in 
regard with their application of EU law. If an international agreement would empower a judicial 
body other than the CJEU assessing EU law, it would amount to be contrary to the EU autonomy 
according to Opinion 2/13.1221 
Considering the ICS established in the CETA, prior discussion surrounding the Achmea 
case is not fully applicable. This is due to the fact that the ICS does not correspond to the 
elements considered by the CJEU in the Achmea. The difference between the ICS and the 
Achmea case is that the ICS cannot be considered to be ‘situated within the judicial system of 
the EU’, it can moreover not be considered to give awards that may not be subject to sufficient 
‘review by a court of a Member State’.  
However, while discussing the findings of these three potential areas which may become 
issues in the reasoning of the CJEU, it is important to first of all keep in mind the simple 
understanding of the principle of autonomy. This principle is of high importance for the 
protection of the EU legal order, and similarly to the EUs role that in relation its third party in 
this type of agreements. It is therefore important to recall that the principle of autonomy 
developed into a protection of the Court’s own judicial prerogatives, regardless of whether such 
would be on the cost of the EU’s objective for further development on the international level.1222 
This is because the CJEU remains restrained in its task to interpret EU’s secondary law in the 
context of EU’s agreements. If an investment tribunal engages in a judicial activity, reserved to 
the CJEU, this could affect the essential characteristics of the power of the principle of 
autonomy. It could be seen as if the CJEU concentrates on the protection of the EU’s integrity 
instead of autonomy and the protection of its institutional prerogatives. 
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Safeguarding the allocation of competence has become as included in an umbrella term 
for the application of the principle of autonomy.1223 The power of the CJEU to provide 
interpretations of EU law to questions given by the courts of the Member States is based on the 
institutional dimension of autonomy1224 with the implication of the NGFTAs as a new legal 
instrument for the EU. It is important to also consider these agreements through a broader 
international legal framework. The way the CJEU has interpreted the principle of autonomy has 
not left much space for an ISDS mechanism in the NGFTAs. 
In relation to the EU’s approach to investment protection, the principle of autonomy can 
cause limitations. The issues in relation to autonomy would be a potential spillover effect that 
a decision from a court or a tribunal can cause.1225  
3.1 Interpreting Matters Relating to EU Law 
Since the CJEU’s task is to review the legality of legal acts of EU’s institutions or 
Member States in the light of international agreements,1226 if one were to remove disputes from 
the CJEU and adjudicate them in arbitrational courts, the whole idea of a functional judicial 
system is lost, and the idea of preliminary ruling procedures is also lost together with it.1227 
The CJEU is limited to the interpretation of EU law and is not authorized to review 
ongoing activities in the investment tribunal once the agreement is in force; however, it may 
review already rendered award from the tribunal. The investment tribunal, on the other hand, is 
limited to adjudicate disputes which only concern the interpretation and application of 
investment agreements, and the CJEU is naturally not bound to follow investment awards, 
where the incompatibility only concerns the agreements. However, the precise wording of the 
agreement concerning relevant EU law, could amount to the decisive factor in relation to 
determining whether an arbitrational tribunal would interpret EU law. The function of the 
investment arbitration should in this sense be to review EU’s legal acts as a ‘factual’ example 
vis-à-vis investment standards that are stipulated in the investment agreement.  
The autonomy of the EU legal order could only be preserved by a functional judicial 
system that is capable to ensure consistent interpretation of EU law.1228 The arbitration 
mechanism was considered by the CJEU to interpret EU law, and Article 8 in the Achmea’s 
                                                   
1223 Ibid, p. 146. 
1224 Opinion 1/09, Opinion Establishing European Patent Court (n 448), paras. 84 and 89. 
1225 Hindelang, ‘The Autonomy of the European Legal Order’ (n 916), p. 190 Hindelang, ‘Repellent Forces: The CJEU and 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (n 1023), p. 73. 
1226 Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (n 260), p. 292; Herrmann, ‘The Role of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in the Emerging EU Investment Policy’ (n 739), p. 574.  
1227 C-284/16, Achmea (n 930), paras. 50-52. 
1228 Ibid, para. 35. 
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BIT was incompatible with EU law.1229 If, however, an arbitral tribunal would have to prevent 
interpretative decisions of EU law, there would be no concern. This was accomplished in the 
NGFTAs through excluding the CJEU from being bound by the tribunal’s interpretations.1230 
These are fundamental concerns which apply for NGFTAs, which will be shown in the CJEU’s 
pending Opinion 1/17.  
The conditions that the CJEU developed in relation to their dispute settlement mechanism 
and EU autonomy in Opinion 1/91, further developed in Opinion 1/00 and Opinion 1/09,1231 
have functioned as a base to show how dispute settlement mechanism does not give binding 
interpretation of EU rules, decide on the delimitation of competences between the EU and its 
Member State, and alter the institutional regime, it is considered to be compatible with the 
treaties.1232 
Article 344 TFEU usually concerns cases between Member States, however, the MOX 
Plant and Opinion 2/13 developed the application in the context of the principle of autonomy. 
In this regard, it concerns mixed agreements, which structurally would allow for the intuition 
of dispute settlement procedures between Member States.1233 It has shown that Article 344 
TFEU cannot be limited by a strict reading to apply only to intra-EU relations. Article 344 
TFEU restricts Member States from engaging in disputes before other judicial bodies than the 
CJEU, where the subject matter of the dispute falls within CJEU’s competence; especially 
where the dispute is ‘(…) between two Member States in regard to an alleged failure to comply 
with Community-law obligations’.1234 
The CJEU concluded that, by virtue of Article 344 TFEU in regards to matters which are 
covered by the EU’s exclusive competences, the EU Member States are prevented from 
initiating disputes before courts and tribunal other than CJEU.1235 In this case the Arbitral 
Tribunal in question, UNCLOS, stayed the proceedings and ordered the parties to inquire 
whether the CJEU had jurisdiction, because of their involvement in EURATOM and EU’s 
environmental legislation.1236 Since Ireland referred the dispute to the UNCLOS tribunal, it was 
                                                   
1229 Ibid, paras. 68-72. 
1230 Article 8.31 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European 
Union and its Member States, of the other part; Section 3, Article 16(2) EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as 
of January 2016 These provisions are similar. 
1231 1/91, Opinion on European Economic Area EEA Agreement I (n 447), 1/00, Opinion Establishing a European Common 
Aviation Area (n 785); Opinion 1/09, Opinion Establishing European Patent Court (n 448). 
1232 Dimopoulos, ‘The Compatibility of Future EU Investment Agreements with EU Law’ (n 1169), pp. 447-472. 
1233 Johansen, ‘The Reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and Its Potential Consequences’ (n 1157), p. 169. 
1234 C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (n 625), para. 128. 
1235 Ibid, paras. 126-127. 
1236 Lavranos, ‘MOX Plant Dispute - Court of Justice of the European Communities: Freedom of Member States to Bring 
Disputes before another Court or Tribunal: Ireland Condemned for Bringing the MOX Plant Dispute before an Arbitral 
Tribunal. Grand Chamber Decision of 30 May 2006, Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland’ (n 625), p. 461. 
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in breach of its obligations under the Treaty. For this reason, according to Article 344 TFEU 
Member States have agreed not to submit disputes, which relate to EU law, to external dispute 
mechanisms, in order to preserve and protect the integrity and unity of EU law. This provision 
provides an important function to the Courts judicial monopoly, even in situations where the 
Court does not directly invoke autonomy. The principle of autonomy could in a way explain 
the reasoning and the approach the CJEU has taken when being faced to international law within 
the EU’s legal order.1237 The important question concerns the interpretation of the principle of 
autonomy. If it were to be interpreted too narrowly it would lead to the EU being incapable to 
its external relations, in terms of international trade agreements. However, if it were to be 
interpreted to widely as a principle it could lead to constitutional issues where an external 
institution would be capable of affecting the EU’s international division of competence. 
Similarly, state-to-state disputes between a Member State and third countries can also 
concern material aspects of Treaty interpretation, which would trigger an application of Article 
344 TFEU.1238 Article 2/13 further restricts the CJEU reasoning in MOX Plant and means that 
the intra-EU application of Article 344 TFEU would be concerned. 
Article 344 TFEU would thereby function as an expression of the principle of loyalty,1239 
a protection for the autonomy, but would, at the same time, represent an obligation to facilitate 
the CJEU in its exercise of its competences.1240  
The relevant question is then not whether an investment tribunal could interpret the 
NGFTA, but rather if the investment agreement per se has issues which fall within the scope of 
EU law. 
As put in Opinion 1/09, the external jurisdiction should not call the CJEU’s exclusive 
task of interpreting, applying and reviewing the legality of acts of the EU.1241 
Even though, the ISDS mechanism may, as observed, have spillover effects on EU law, 
the possibility to overcome such issue would be to limit remedies that foreign investors are 
exposed to. The CJEU needs to contain its competence and remain ‘(…) competent to determine 
– de iure and de facto – the legality of the acts of EU institutions under EU law as required in 
Opinion 1/00’.1242 The consequence could, however, be that the protection of foreign investors 
would be undermined. 
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In order for the CETA not to be considered to interpret or apply EU law, it is established 
in Article 8.31(1) of the agreement, that the ICS jurisdiction is limited to the interpretation and 
application of the CETA and would therefore only consider EU law as a matter of fact. The 
CETA would rather set its own standard and unlike Opinion 2/13 and Opinion 1/91, CETA 
would not consider EU’s primary or secondary law. For this reason, the CETA could not per 
se be considered as incompatible with the principle of autonomy. 
In relation to the Achmea case, Article 8 of the BIT specifically required the consideration 
of “(…) the law in force of the contracting parties. It did not refer to the matter as a “matter of 
fact”. Perhaps this is the difference between the Achmea and the CETA in relation to the 
determination of the principle of autonomy. 
3.2 Enforcement of Awards  
The enforcement of ICS awards is also dependent on the provisions of the underlying 
agreement to which third parties are not bound.1243 The enforceability of the ICS awards has 
been given a lot of attention in the EU’s negotiations. As concluded in the final agreements, 
awards cannot further be subject to ‘(…) appeal, review, set aside, annulment or any other 
remedy’.1244 
It is in fact the enforcement system that is the crucial advantage of the ICSID arbitration. 
In ICSID arbitration, the awards are binding and compel the parties to ‘(…) abide by and 
comply with the terms of the award’.1245 In EUVFTA, it is provided according to Article 31(2) 
that each party shall recognize an award and enforce it as a final judgment of a court in its state. 
The ICSID convention provides the same rules in Article 53, where an award cannot be 
overturned by domestic court decision. The EUSFTA and CETA refer directly to the 
enforcement provisions in the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention. The choice 
between the two conventions depends on the arbitration rules that are addressed. 
The actual composition of the ICS can in fact directly threaten the recognition and 
enforcement of its decisions in the sense that it can be considered more of a judicial composition 
than an arbitral composition, which in turn would make it fall outside the scope of the 
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1244 European Commission Textual proposal to the EU negotiaion of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Parternship (TTIP), 
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convention.1246 In other words, the issue is whether the national courts in the New York 
convention contracting States will consider ICS awards as awards made by an arbitral body. 
The ICS seems to be an arbitration establishment, but with judicial features. The question 
is therefore whether the ICS is to be considered as an arbitral body in the sense of the definition 
in the New York convention. The CETA, TTIP and the EU-Vietnam FTA1247 states that the 
offer of consent by a Contracting Party together with its acceptance by an investor through the 
submission of a claim constituting an ‘agreement in writing’ for purposes of the New York 
Convention.1248 
Another risk in relation to the enforcement is the possibility that the awards rendered by 
the ICS will interfere with the uniform interpretation of EU law. This is, however, a question 
that will be further discussed by the CJEU in the pending Opinion 1/17.  
3.3 Determination of the Respondent 
The requirement of determining a respondent for the ICS proceedings can provide a major 
issue to EU law and autonomy. An external institution cannot interfere with the division of 
responsibility of the EU.1249 The EU is the only party who is recognized with power in the first 
stage of investor dispute settlement in relation to determining the respondent. This led to 
avoiding the risk of external interference. 
The intermediate step of determining the respondent becomes necessary. On a technical 
level, the FTAs have taken slightly different approaches to address this issue, but they all lead 
to the same material result. Under the CETA, a notice requesting the determination of the 
respondent may be submitted 90 days after the request for consultation and fruitless 
negotiations of a settlement.1250 Under the EUVFTA, the claimant may deliver a notice of intent 
to arbitrate 90 days after the request for consultations, which automatically triggers the 
determination of the respondent within 60 days of receipt of the notice of intent.1251 
The EUSFTAs mechanism is quite similar to that of the EUVFTA. The notice of intent 
to arbitrate triggers an obligation for the EU to determine the respondent within two months.1252 
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Allowing the arbitrators to determine the respondent in a particular case would violate the EU’s 
principle of autonomy. However, it is central to underline the importance of Regulation 
912/2014 in this regard; and if one were to consider Article 8.21 CETA in relation to this 
Regulation, it could lead to that it is nearly impossible for an external party to determine the 
respondent. 
The risk of interference in the EU’s institutional balance is also important to consider. 
The possible interference between an investment tribunal and the preservation of the system of 
vertical allocation of competence seems to be answered by the power the EU has, acting as a 
respondent in relation to the financial responsibility. 
There has been attempts such as in the CETA where in relation to determining the 
respondent to an investment claim, it is mandatory to send a request to the Commission.1253 
The task of the Commission, within those 50 days, is to  take a decision on the respondent 
which will be binding on the investor-state tribunal.1254 However, the issues is if the 
Commission fails to provide a decision within the 50 days, it is up for the investor to identify 
the responding party. This particular circumstance provides the possibility of the investor to 
engage in the EU’s division of competence and the interference in the EU’s institutional 
balance. 
This division of competence in the financial responsibility basically allows to preserve the 
autonomy of the EU legal order on issues of competence. However, it seems that the division 
of competence, on its own cannot serve as the key function to preserve the principle of 
autonomy, it seems that the EU and Member States should together in the spirit of sincere 
cooperation be collectively responsible for their respecting their obligation under international 
agreements. This specifically in cases where the agreement does not provide for a specific 
declaration of competences has been provided.1255 
This provides a clear clash between the intention of an effective arbitration and the EU’s 
autonomy. Mainly because the provision is intended to safeguard the arbitration process, in 
order to not suffer and lose the effectiveness because of legal or political struggles on the EU’s  
The involvement of such nature of investment tribunals in the interpretation of EU law and 
the legal review of EU legal acts vis-à-vis broadly defined treaty standards is likely to violate 
the essential characteristics conferred upon the Court under Article 19 TEU.’1256 
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Furthermore, the choice on who will be responsible in relation to international disputes 
between the EU and its Member State has to be regulated by the division of competence in the 
EU. This is also made clear in the regulation which states that ‘[i]nternational responsibility for 
treatment subject to dispute settlement follows the division of competences between the Union 
and the Member States’.1257 In other words, the international responsibility is dependent, and 
has to correspond to the EU’s allocation of competence. 
4 Possible Modifications of the EU’s Approach to NGFTAs 
The EU chose a trade policy that includes both trade and investment, instead of a more 
sector-based approach, where agreements could be concluded separately. Separating an 
agreement into two parts, investment and trade, could ease the difficulties, as was done in 
relation to the EU-Singapore agreement post the Opinion 2/15. 
4.1 Risks in Concluding the NFTAs as Mixed Agreements 
There is risk in relation to the NGFTAs, where the Member States do not ratify the 
NGFTAs. If one or more national parliaments choose not to ratify a mixed agreement, this can 
create serious issues. In practice, regarding the NGFTAs that have been provided throughout 
this thesis, most of the areas covered in these agreements fall within EU’s exclusive 
competence. However, there are still some areas that fall within the shared competence of the 
EU and its Member States. This necessarily means that the main issues would, at least in the 
case of the CETA which has been provisionally applied, still be functioning. 
The legal issue concerns the case where an agreement is never ratified, and therefore, 
remains as an incomplete mixed agreement. This can be a result of a Member State’s withdrawal 
from the EU, as well as when a Member State blocks the ratification procedure as was just 
explained.1258 In any case, an incomplete mixed agreement may provide severe issues for the 
EU in its role as a global actor. 
4.2 NGFTAs Concluded in Exclusive Competence 
Concluding NGFTAs by the EU alone would clearly be easier and more efficient. 
Particularly, it would be easier in relation to the withdrawal procedure from the EU, but it would 
also lead to a better image of the EU as a global actor. 
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Most areas fall, in fact, under the exclusive competence of the EU. These areas cover 
traditional trade related aspects, such as market access for goods, trade remedies, various 
barriers to trade, and customs and tariffs. Moreover, the EU’s exclusive competence also covers 
services including transport services, public procurement, intellectual property, sustainable 
development, competition law, and even dispute settlement and transparency. Taking this into 
account, the Commission could have a very solid argument against the political choice of its 
Member States to participate in the conclusion and ratification of such trade agreements. 
By considering the difficulties that were observed in the CETA, and the ratification issues 
surrounding it, one could simply draw the conclusion that avoiding mixity could be a better 
option altogether, specifically when it comes to trade related policy matters. 
In a way, it could be possible to argue that this type of trade agreements would undercut 
the constitutional decision-making procedure of the EU and would in turn delegitimize the 
European parliament. It would moreover undermine the good standing of the EU in 
international relations. The increased power of the European parliament contributes to this 
because of the reaction from the public to agreements such as the ACTA, TTIP, and CETA. To 
this end, it does not mean that the European Parliament should avoid taking position or averting 
agreements which are harmful for the EU to conclude, but such action could also defeat the 
liberalization of free trade, and consequently international relations. 
By considering both Opinion 2/15 and the anticipated Opinion 1/17, and despite the OTIF 
case, where facultative mixity was subject to political decision, one could simply draw the 
conclusion that there is a large possibility that the NGFTAs could be split in the future. This 
conclusion stems from the fact that most of the provisions in these agreements fall into the EU’s 
exclusive competence, and in case one part of the agreement is separated so that it only includes 
such provisions, this will allow for more efficient negotiations without being exposed to the 
risk of blocking the agreement. 
What is left under the shared competence is usually only investment protection and parts 
of the ISDS. This essentially means that it is very possible for the EU to separate the investment 
protection and conclude a far-reaching agreement as an EU-only agreement. The question is 
only how important the investment protection and investment dispute resolution would be under 
such agreements. If these agreements were concluded within exclusive competence the Member 
States would no longer be required to be involved in the ratification process. 
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4.3 Separated Investment and Trade Agreements 
By removing investment dispute settlement from the negotiation, it could be easier to 
conclude an agreement. This issue has been quite contested politically and logically; if such 
was removed, there would not be any issues in relation to the ratification procedure. 
The investment chapters have caused a large delay of several years, at least in relation to 
the CETA, EUVFTA and EUSFTA. Moreover, it led to a large discontent of the EU’s Member 
States and resulted in a problematic situation for the EU’s international image. 
Negotiating a separate agreement would lead to a simplified ratification and lower the 
risks to have provisional application of the agreements that will be prolonged. It would create 
more legal certainty. This is due to the fact that the whole agreement would not be included in 
the provisional application. If the dispute settlement provisions are included under the 
provisional application, this may result in complications with potential disputes brought 
through the agreement’s dispute settlement provisions. 
The idea of separating trade and investment could further provide easier and faster 
negotiation, and a higher chance for successfully concluding an agreement. Additionally, it 
would decrease the chance of reaching a stalled position, such as in the case of the TTIP. 
Consequently, the EU’s reputation as global actor and trustworthy trading partner would be 
enhanced. 
By separating an agreement into two parts, it is the investment part which would be 
concluded separately in the form of a mixed agreement. The investment protection and ISDS 
would still fall under shared competence, together with the objective of the agreement. The 
Member States would need to be part of such agreement which could be done through inserting 
an ‘anchor clause’ into the agreement, indicating the necessity for the parties to also negotiate 
a separate BIT. 
From an economic point of view, this approach is very sensible. In terms of negotiating 
costs, it would simply be too expensive to regulate all domestic instruments that have an impact 
on international trade, because such instruments may potentially affect the trade between 
parties. However, it is inefficient to provide for detailed rules on every form of domestic 
regulation. The reason is that the returns from bargaining over individual instruments are 
diminishing in the course of negotiations. For instance, while the benefits of negotiating market 
access may outweigh the associated costs for motor vehicles, this might not be the case for toys. 
As a consequence, taking the costs of contracting into account, optimal trade agreements 
are necessarily endogenously incomplete contracts,1259 and in contrast to tariffs, it would be too 
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costly relative to the gain, and inefficient to bind all domestic instruments ex ante. In other 
words, even if one would decide to bargain over all imaginable domestic measures at the time 
of negotiations, a solution that is sufficiently flexible to cater for technological or scientific 
changes would still have to be found. This is the reason why the KOREU provides for so many 
institutional arrangements, namely, to complete the contract ex post. In simple terms, currently 
less urgent problems should be solved at the point when they become pressing. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
The NGFTAs, are significant legal instruments for the EU external action which provides 
the fundamental understanding of the need for a balance between the protection of the 
autonomous legal order, and the objective of trade liberalization. This is due to the diverse 
underlying basis of the EUs constitutional framework, i.e., the principle of autonomy of the EU 
legal order and the EUs requirement to respect its international obligations, including those that 
are related to international agreements, such as NGFTAs. The NGFTAs are in the core of the 
EU’s objective of economic growth and prosperity for its Member States. For this reason, the 
balance needs to be maintained in order to ensure that trade liberalization does not restrain the 
EU autonomy. 
Trade liberalisation and regulatory commitments must be conducted through their legal 
basis. The attribution of competence in the wide subject ranged NGFTAs, was long considered 
fragmented but was clarified in Opinion 2/15. The CJEU confirmed that the commitments to 
services of EUSFTA, including transport services, and IPRs fall under the EU exclusive 
competence. Similarly, commitments on the market access and protection of FDI were also 
considered to fall within the exclusive competence of the EU.  
However, the fact that portfolio investments and the dispute settlement mechanism 
between investors and states was considered to fall under the shared competence of the Member 
States and the EU led the Council to announce, according to the Commission’s proposal, that 
future NGFTAs will be split into two parts: One concerning trade, and the other concerning 
investment.  
Moreover, the EU policy objectives establish a more value-based trade policy and may 
come to play a significant role in future NGFTAs. This was the case in Opinion 2/15 in relation 
to the commitments on sustainable development, but other objectives may provide similar 
consequences. It can therefore come to play an important role in future trade agreements and 
may also affect the practice of EU trade policy making. 
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The investment policy, in which the EU’s institutions, in particular the Parliament, 
attempt to link foreign investment with development and broader public policy considerations, 
is shown to have an importance in relation to the ICS established in the CETA. Whether the 
reformed ICS will affect the EU autonomy is of utmost importance, and the issues that may 
lead to ICS being contradictory to the EU autonomy are the following.  
Firstly, the possibility of the ICS to interpret EU law. Even though the ICS provides the 
possibility to deal with EU law as a matter of fact, the possibility still remains that the ICS may 
give meaning to the EU law.  
Secondly, the issue of the construction of the ICS which is more of a judicial composition 
than an arbitral composition makes it fall outside the scope of the convention and could threaten 
the recognition and enforcement of its decisions.  
Thirdly and probably the most likely of all reasons that the ICS would be incompatible to 
the EU autonomy is the possibility of determining a respondent in the ICS proceedings. The 
reason is that the procedure provides the possibility for the respondent party to determine the 
respondent in case the Commission would fail to provide such decision within the 50 days. 
It remains to be seen how the CJEU will consider it in its anticipated Opinion 1/17. If the 
CJEU would, in the unlikely event, consider that the ICS is; its entirety, incompatible with the 
EU autonomy, would lead to the inability of the EU to conclude an investment protection 
agreement. However, the more logical outcome would be that the test in Achmea, which 
technically applies both to intra- and extra-EU tribunals, would be considered not to apply to 
the ICS. This would be due to the fact that the ICS will not be situated within the judicial system 
of the EU and its awards may not be subject to sufficient review by a court of a Member State. 
Such an approach would sound sensible considering the ongoing efforts to establish a 
Multilateral Investment Court System. Consequently, the anticipated Opinion 1/17 will have a 
decisive impact on the NGFTAs, in regard to their compatibility and design. 
Perhaps, the way to find the appropriate balance will be through further emphasizing the 
duty of sincere cooperation, in particular in relation to the ICS. It is possible to conclude that 
the division of responsibility between the EU and its Member States seems to be the key to 
preserve the autonomy of the EU legal order in relation to the issues of competence.  
As a final remark, providing a sustainable balance would lead to an external action that 
runs smoothly and would also benefit the EU’s role as an external actor. If the procedure of 
negotiation of trade and investment becomes too demanding, due to Member States not 
ratifying agreements or due to changes of circumstance with a Member States withdrawing 
from the EU, it could become detrimental for the EUs role as a global international actor. 
Having a cumbersome negotiation may lead to difficulties in further trade negotiations because 
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the EUs international credibility lies within its achievements. Both the provisional application 
of the EU-only part of CETA, and also the initiative of splitting the agreements, with one part 
concerning trade and the other concerning investments, have come to facilitate this process. 
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